detecting-supply-chain-attacks-in-ci-cd

Scans GitHub Actions workflows and CI/CD pipeline configurations for supply chain attack vectors including unpinned actions, script injection via expressions, dependency confusion, and secrets exposure. Uses PyGithub and YAML parsing for automated audit. Use when hardening CI/CD pipelines or investigating compromised build systems.

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Repository: xalgord/xalgorix
Last source activity: June 6, 2026 at 16:41
Detected SKILL.md language: English
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Forks: 146

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Detecting Supply Chain Attacks in CI/CD

When to Use

When investigating security incidents that require detecting supply chain attacks in ci cd

When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain

When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type

When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

Detection Gaps & Validation

SHA-pinning checks miss tag-pinning illusions: flagging @main/@v3 is right, but a @v3 tag (or even a short SHA) is mutable/forgeable — only a full 40-char commit SHA is immutable. Also a pinned action can still pull unpinned transitive actions or docker://image:latest inside itself; recurse into reusable workflows (uses: org/repo/.github/workflows/x.yml@ref) and Dockerfile FROM lines.

Script-injection detection is broader than github.event: untrusted input also flows through github.head_ref, github.event.pull_request.title/body, github.event.issue.*, and env: derived from them. Match the whole untrusted-context set in run: blocks, not just github.event.

pull_request_target + checkout of PR head is the classic poisoned-pipeline RCE that YAML linting alone misses — flag workflows that combine pull_request_target with actions/checkout of the PR ref and any secret access.

Dependency confusion isn't in the YAML: it lives in registry scope/.npmrc/pip.conf config — name-collision risk needs the package manifests, not just .github/workflows.

Validate the scan fires: add a deliberately vulnerable test workflow (unpinned @main, run: echo ${{ github.event.issue.title }}, permissions: write-all) and confirm each rule flags it. FP tuning: first-party/org-owned actions and internal reusable workflows are lower risk — allowlist trusted orgs rather than alerting on every @-ref.

Prerequisites

Familiarity with security operations concepts and tools

Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution