xalgord/xalgorix - Page 17

detecting-wmi-persistence

Detect WMI event subscription persistence by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 19, 20, and 21 for malicious EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding creation.

hunting-for-anomalous-powershell-execution

Hunt for malicious PowerShell activity by analyzing Script Block Logging (Event 4104), Module Logging (Event 4103), and process creation events. The analyst parses Windows Event Log EVTX files to detect obfuscated commands, AMSI bypass attempts, encoded…

hunting-for-beaconing-with-frequency-analysis

Identify command-and-control beaconing patterns in network traffic by applying statistical frequency analysis, jitter calculation, and coefficient of variation scoring to detect periodic callbacks from compromised endpoints.

hunting-for-cobalt-strike-beacons

Detect Cobalt Strike beacon network activity using default TLS certificate signatures (serial 8BB00EE), JA3/JA3S/JARM fingerprints, HTTP C2 profile pattern matching, beacon jitter analysis, and named pipe detection via Zeek, Suricata, and Python PCAP analysis.

hunting-for-command-and-control-beaconing

Detect C2 beaconing patterns in network traffic using frequency analysis, jitter detection, and domain reputation to identify compromised endpoints communicating with adversary infrastructure.

hunting-for-data-exfiltration-indicators

Hunt for data exfiltration through network traffic analysis, detecting unusual data flows, DNS tunneling, cloud storage uploads, and encrypted channel abuse.

hunting-for-data-staging-before-exfiltration

Detect data staging activity before exfiltration by monitoring for archive creation with 7-Zip/RAR, unusual temp folder access, large file consolidation, and staging directory patterns via EDR and process telemetry

hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement

Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement by detecting abuse of MMC20.Application, ShellBrowserWindow, and ShellWindows COM objects through Sysmon Event ID 1 (process creation) and Event ID 3 (network connection) correlation, WMI event analysis, RPC endpoint…

hunting-for-dcsync-attacks

Detect DCSync attacks by analyzing Windows Event ID 4662 for unauthorized DS-Replication-Get-Changes requests from non-domain-controller accounts.

hunting-for-defense-evasion-via-timestomping

Detect NTFS timestamp manipulation (MITRE T1070.006) by comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME timestamps in the MFT. Uses analyzeMFT and Python to identify files with anomalous temporal patterns indicating anti-forensic timestomping activity.

hunting-for-dns-based-persistence

Hunt for DNS-based persistence mechanisms including DNS hijacking, dangling CNAME records, wildcard DNS abuse, and unauthorized zone modifications using passive DNS databases, SecurityTrails API, and DNS audit log analysis.

hunting-for-dns-tunneling-with-zeek

Detect DNS tunneling and data exfiltration by analyzing Zeek dns.log for high-entropy subdomain queries, excessive query volume, long query lengths, and unusual DNS record types indicating covert channel communication.

hunting-for-domain-fronting-c2-traffic

Detect domain fronting C2 traffic by analyzing SNI vs HTTP Host header mismatches in proxy logs and TLS certificate discrepancies using pyOpenSSL for certificate inspection

hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi

Detect WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 process creation and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe child process patterns, remote process execution, and WMI event subscription persistence.

hunting-for-living-off-the-cloud-techniques

Hunt for adversary abuse of legitimate cloud services for C2, data staging, and exfiltration including abuse of Azure, AWS, GCP services, and SaaS platforms.

hunting-for-living-off-the-land-binaries

Proactively hunt for adversary abuse of legitimate system binaries (LOLBins) to execute malicious payloads while evading detection.

hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs

Hunt for adversary abuse of Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBins) by analyzing endpoint process creation logs for suspicious execution patterns of legitimate Windows system binaries used for malicious purposes.

hunting-for-ntlm-relay-attacks

Detect NTLM relay attacks by analyzing Windows Event 4624 logon type 3 with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying IP-to-hostname mismatches, Responder traffic signatures, SMB signing status, and suspicious authentication patterns across the domain.

hunting-for-persistence-mechanisms-in-windows

Systematically hunt for adversary persistence mechanisms across Windows endpoints including registry, services, startup folders, and WMI subscriptions.

hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions

Hunt for adversary persistence through Windows Management Instrumentation event subscriptions by monitoring WMI consumer, filter, and binding creation events that execute malicious code triggered by system events.

hunting-for-process-injection-techniques

Detect process injection techniques (T1055) including CreateRemoteThread, process hollowing, and DLL injection via Sysmon Event IDs 8 and 10 and EDR process telemetry

hunting-for-registry-persistence-mechanisms

Hunt for registry-based persistence mechanisms including Run keys, Winlogon modifications, IFEO injection, and COM hijacking in Windows environments.

hunting-for-registry-run-key-persistence

Detect MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 registry Run key persistence by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 13 logs and registry queries to identify malicious auto-start entries.

hunting-for-scheduled-task-persistence

Hunt for adversary persistence via Windows Scheduled Tasks by analyzing task creation events, suspicious task actions, and unusual scheduling patterns.

hunting-for-shadow-copy-deletion

Hunt for Volume Shadow Copy deletion activity that indicates ransomware preparation or anti-forensics by monitoring vssadmin, wmic, and PowerShell shadow copy commands.

hunting-for-spearphishing-indicators

Hunt for spearphishing campaign indicators across email logs, endpoint telemetry, and network data to detect targeted email attacks.

hunting-for-startup-folder-persistence

Detect T1547.001 startup folder persistence by monitoring Windows startup directories for suspicious file creation, analyzing autoruns entries, and using Python watchdog for real-time filesystem monitoring.

hunting-for-supply-chain-compromise

Hunt for supply chain compromise indicators including trojanized software updates, compromised dependencies, unauthorized code modifications, and tampered build artifacts.

hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks

Hunt for adversary persistence and execution via Windows scheduled tasks by analyzing task creation events, suspicious task properties, and unusual execution patterns that indicate T1053.005 abuse.

hunting-for-t1098-account-manipulation

Hunt for MITRE ATT&CK T1098 account manipulation including shadow admin creation, SID history injection, group membership changes, and credential modifications using Windows Security Event Logs.

hunting-for-unusual-network-connections

Hunt for unusual network connections by analyzing outbound traffic patterns, rare destinations, non-standard ports, and anomalous connection frequencies from endpoints.

hunting-for-unusual-service-installations

Detect suspicious Windows service installations (MITRE ATT&CK T1543.003) by parsing System event logs for Event ID 7045, analyzing service binary paths, and identifying indicators of persistence mechanisms.

hunting-for-webshell-activity

Hunt for web shell deployments on internet-facing servers by analyzing file creation in web directories, suspicious process spawning from web servers, and anomalous HTTP patterns.

performing-threat-hunting-with-yara-rules

Use YARA pattern-matching rules to hunt for malware, suspicious files, and indicators of compromise across filesystems and memory dumps. Covers rule authoring, yara-python scanning, and integration with threat intel feeds.

analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence

Campaign attribution analysis involves systematically evaluating evidence to determine which threat actor or group is responsible for a cyber operation. This skill covers collecting and weighting attr

analyzing-certificate-transparency-for-phishing

Monitor Certificate Transparency logs using crt.sh and Certstream to detect phishing domains, lookalike certificates, and unauthorized certificate issuance targeting your organization.

analyzing-cyber-kill-chain

Analyzes intrusion activity against the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain framework to identify which phases an adversary has completed, where defenses succeeded or failed, and what controls would have interrupted the attack at earlier phases. Use when…

analyzing-indicators-of-compromise

Analyzes indicators of compromise (IOCs) including IP addresses, domains, file hashes, URLs, and email artifacts to determine maliciousness confidence, campaign attribution, and blocking priority. Use when triaging IOCs from phishing emails, security alerts,…

analyzing-malware-family-relationships-with-malpedia

Use the Malpedia platform and API to research malware family relationships, track variant evolution, link families to threat actors, and integrate YARA rules for detection across malware lineages.

analyzing-ransomware-leak-site-intelligence

Monitor and analyze ransomware group data leak sites (DLS) to track victim postings, extract threat intelligence on group tactics, and assess sector-specific ransomware risk for proactive defense.