crypto-compliance

name	crypto-compliance
description	The banned-primitive gate. Routed to when changed code hashes, signs, encrypts, derives keys, generates security-relevant randomness, configures TLS, or imports a crypto library. Rejects broken primitives, disabled TLS verification, and home-rolled crypto; the approved-primitive list lives in security-controls.md. The auth-crypto-reviewer agent is dispatched as the reviewer.

crypto-compliance

The banned-primitive gate. Routed to when changed code uses cryptography, hashing, signing, key derivation, security-relevant random generation, or TLS configuration.

Pre-flight

Read these, or STOP and surface the gap — never guess the policy:

• <project-root>/.codearbiter/security-controls.md — the project's approved and forbidden primitives, key requirements, and TLS minimum. If this file is unreadable, BLOCK; do not infer the policy.

Phase 1 — Banned-primitive scan · gate: BLOCK

Scan every crypto operation in the changed code against security-controls.md. Apply the project's forbidden list; where it is silent, the following BLOCK unconditionally:

• Broken primitives — md5, sha1/sha-1 (including in HMAC or "just for IDs"), des, 3des, rc4, and RSA keys below 2048 bits.
• Disabled TLS verification — rejectUnauthorized: false, verify: false, or any disabling of certificate peer verification, on any connection.
• Home-rolled crypto — a hand-built cipher, AEAD, KDF, signature scheme, or any reimplementation of a primitive in userland instead of a vetted, approved one.
• Unapproved primitive or library — any algorithm, mode, key size, or crypto library not on the approved list in security-controls.md.

Dispatch the auth-crypto-reviewer agent (${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/agents/auth-crypto-reviewer.md) to confirm these findings against security-controls.md.

Gate: no banned or unapproved primitive, no disabled TLS verification, and no home-rolled crypto in the changed code.

On pass — record the gate: follow ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/includes/security-gate-record.md (the shared record mechanism). For this gate the relevant commit hook is H-09b (crypto/TLS). On any BLOCK, do NOT record the pass.

Out-of-scope finding: do not act on it and do not author an ADR (ADRs are user-attributed, via /adr only). Mark it inline with [NEEDS-TRIAGE]; never silently drop it.

Hard rules

• MUST read security-controls.md before scanning — BLOCK if it cannot be read.
• MUST NOT use MD5, SHA1, DES, 3DES, RC4, or RSA below 2048 bits — even for non-security checksums or IDs.
• MUST NOT set verify: false or rejectUnauthorized: false, or otherwise disable certificate verification, on any TLS connection.
• MUST NOT use a home-rolled or userland-reimplemented cryptographic primitive.
• MUST NOT use any primitive, key size, or crypto library not on the approved list in security-controls.md.
• MUST record the security-gate-passed marker (via hooks/security-pass.py) ONLY when the gate genuinely passes — the marker is what unblocks the commit (hook H-09b), so a premature or unconditional recording defeats the gate.