Audit and lock down how AI tools hold API keys and credentials. Finds exposed keys across code, config files, .env files, environment variables, shell history, and git history; moves connections to OAuth / "Sign in with X" where one exists; migrates the rest into secure storage (macOS Keychain, a cloud secrets manager, or Cloudflare AI Gateway) with runtime retrieval instead of files; flags what to rotate; and tightens scope, spend caps, expiry, and IP rules. Trigger on "secure my keys", "audit my credentials/secrets", "find exposed API keys", "lock down my secrets", "key hygiene", "did I leak a key", or after wiring up an MCP server or a new integration.
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Quelldateien prüfen
Lesen Sie SKILL.md und alle von SkillsMP angezeigten Begleitdateien, bevor Sie sich für eine Installation entscheiden.
Mit Codex oder Claude installieren Kopieren Sie diesen Prompt, fügen Sie ihn in Codex, Claude oder einen anderen Assistant ein und lassen Sie die Skill-Seite prüfen und installieren.
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Audit and lock down how AI tools hold API keys and credentials. Finds exposed keys across code, config files, .env files, environment variables, shell history, and git history; moves connections to OAuth / "Sign in with X" where one exists; migrates the rest into secure storage (macOS Keychain, a cloud secrets manager, or Cloudflare AI Gateway) with runtime retrieval instead of files; flags what to rotate; and tightens scope, spend caps, expiry, and IP rules. Trigger on "secure my keys", "audit my credentials/secrets", "find exposed API keys", "lock down my secrets", "key hygiene", "did I leak a key", or after wiring up an MCP server or a new integration.
Secure Keys
Audit and harden how the user's AI tools authenticate with external services. Run the phases in order. Read first; change only after showing a plan and getting a yes.
Absolute rules: never violate
Never print, echo, log, or display a secret value. Refer to a key only by name and location, e.g. OPENAI_API_KEY in .env:3. When showing matches, redact the value to a prefix like sk-….
Never ask the user to paste a key into the conversation. If a value must be entered, give them a command to run that reads it off-screen (their shell, a tool prompt), and have the tool store it directly.
Destructive steps require explicit confirmation first: rotating, revoking, deleting a key, or rewriting git history. State the blast radius before doing any of them.
Discovery is read-only. Migrate one credential at a time and verify it live before moving on. Never batch-and-pray.
Phase 1: Discover (read-only)
Find credentials and report location + type only, never the value:
Files: .env*, and config like .mcp.json, **/claude_desktop_config.json, .cursor/, , plus holding key-shaped values.
History: ~/.zsh_history and ~/.bash_history, current env vars, and git log -p / git grep across history for committed or pushed secrets.
Output a table: name · location · type (LLM key / connected-account token / cloud cred / signing key) · exposed? (committed, pushed, or in shell history = yes).
Phase 2: Classify
Split findings into:
(a) Could use a login instead: a "Sign in with Google/GitHub/…" OAuth flow or a managed connector exists. List the migration path for each. Prefer this; a revocable, scoped login beats a long-lived key.
(b) Must stay a key: model API keys, signing keys, tokens with no OAuth path. These go to secure storage in Phase 4.
Phase 3: Triage exposure
Anything in committed files, pushed history, or shell history is compromised. Mark it rotate, top priority. Order by blast radius: account-access tokens (email, drive, repo, cloud) before spend-only model keys, because money is cappable and access is not.
Phase 4: Recommend storage (name the tradeoff)
For each must-keep key, recommend a home and say plainly who ends up holding it:
macOS Keychain (security): local, free, does not sync. Best default for single-machine dev keys.
Cloud secrets manager (1Password op run, Bitwarden, AWS Parameter Store, GCP Secret Manager, Doppler, Infisical): syncs across devices, survives a dead laptop, trusts a vendor; the key still reaches the machine at use.
Cloudflare AI Gateway (BYOK), LLM provider keys only: the real key never touches the machine, the user carries a gateway token instead. Free.
Recommend by the user's actual setup. Ask which they want; never assume.
Phase 5: Migrate (one at a time, verified)
Store the key in the chosen vault, then rewrite each app, script, or MCP server to fetch it at runtime (security find-generic-password, op run --, or the gateway endpoint) so config holds only a pointer. Run the tool once to confirm it still works.
Phase 6: Harden
For each key, apply the smallest practical scope, a spend cap, an expiry, and an IP allowlist where the provider supports them. Then walk the user through revoking and reissuing every rotate key from Phase 3.
Phase 7: Verify
Re-run Phase 1 and confirm zero plaintext keys remain in code, configs, .env, env vars, and shell history. Report what changed, what was rotated, and anything still exposed and why, without ever showing a value.
