| name | identity-access-management |
| description | Set up and manage SSO, SCIM provisioning, and MFA for startup teams using Google Workspace, Okta, or Azure AD. Use when centralizing authentication, onboarding SSO, or meeting compliance requirements. |
| license | MIT |
| metadata | {"author":"devops-skills","version":"1.0"} |
Identity & Access Management for Startups
Centralized identity management is not optional once your team exceeds a handful of people. This skill covers practical, production-ready configurations for SSO, SCIM provisioning, MFA enforcement, and access governance using the three most common identity providers for startups: Google Workspace, Okta, and Azure AD (Entra ID).
1. When to Use This Skill
Reach for this skill when:
- First SSO setup -- You are moving from individual app logins to centralized authentication.
- Compliance audit preparation -- SOC 2, ISO 27001, or HIPAA requires documented access controls, MFA enforcement, and audit logs.
- Team growth inflection -- You are crossing 15-20 employees and manual onboarding/offboarding is becoming error-prone.
- Vendor security questionnaires -- Customers are asking about your identity posture and you need to demonstrate controls.
- Incident response -- You need to revoke access quickly across all systems for a departing or compromised user.
Signs you are overdue:
- Shared passwords in a spreadsheet or chat channel.
- No central audit log of who accessed what and when.
- Offboarding takes more than one business day.
- Developers have standing admin access to production.
2. Google Workspace as Identity Provider
Google Workspace is the most common starting IdP for startups. Combined with the GAM CLI tool, it provides powerful automation.
Install GAM (Google Apps Manager)
bash <(curl -s -S -L https://gam-shortn.appspot.com/gam-install)
gam oauth create
gam info domain
Create Organizational Units
Organizational units (OUs) control policy inheritance and app access.
gam create org "Engineering"
gam create org "Engineering/Backend"
gam create org "Engineering/Frontend"
gam create org "Operations"
gam create org "Operations/IT"
gam create org "Finance"
gam create org "Contractors"
gam update user alice@company.com org "Engineering/Backend"
gam print orgs
Configure a SAML App in Google Workspace
gam create samlapp "Internal Dashboard" \
acs_url "https://dashboard.company.com/saml/acs" \
entity_id "https://dashboard.company.com" \
name_id_format "EMAIL" \
name_id "user.primaryEmail"
gam update samlapp "Internal Dashboard" org "Engineering" enabled on
gam print samlappinfo "Internal Dashboard"
SCIM Provisioning with Google Workspace
gam print tokens
gam sync samlapp "Slack" users
gam csv users.csv gam create user ~email \
firstname ~firstname lastname ~lastname \
password ~password org ~org \
changepassword on
Enforce MFA at the Workspace Level
gam update org "/" 2sv enforced
gam update org "Engineering" 2sv enforced
gam update org "/" 2sv enforced enforceddate 2026-04-15
gam print users fields isEnforcedIn2Sv,isEnrolledIn2Sv
gam print users query "isEnrolledIn2Sv=false" fields primaryEmail,name
3. Okta Setup
Okta offers a free tier for startups (Okta for Startups program -- up to 100 users) making it an excellent choice for teams that need a dedicated IdP.
Initial Okta Configuration via API
export OKTA_ORG_URL="https://company.okta.com"
export OKTA_API_TOKEN="your-api-token"
curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/org" | jq '.companyName'
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/users?activate=true" \
-d '{
"profile": {
"firstName": "Alice",
"lastName": "Engineer",
"email": "alice@company.com",
"login": "alice@company.com"
},
"credentials": {
"password": { "value": "TempP@ss123!" }
}
}' | jq '.id'
Create Groups for RBAC
for group in "Engineering" "Operations" "Finance" "Contractors" "AdminAccess"; do
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/groups" \
-d "{\"profile\": {\"name\": \"${group}\", \"description\": \"${group} team group\"}}" \
| jq '{id: .id, name: .profile.name}'
done
USER_ID="00u1abc123"
GROUP_ID="00g1def456"
curl -s -X PUT \
-H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/groups/${GROUP_ID}/users/${USER_ID}"
Add a SAML Application in Okta
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/apps" \
-d '{
"name": "custom_saml_app",
"label": "Internal Dashboard",
"signOnMode": "SAML_2_0",
"settings": {
"signOn": {
"defaultRelayState": "",
"ssoAcsUrl": "https://dashboard.company.com/saml/acs",
"audience": "https://dashboard.company.com",
"recipient": "https://dashboard.company.com/saml/acs",
"destination": "https://dashboard.company.com/saml/acs",
"subjectNameIdFormat": "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress",
"attributeStatements": [
{
"type": "EXPRESSION",
"name": "email",
"namespace": "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic",
"values": ["user.email"]
},
{
"type": "EXPRESSION",
"name": "groups",
"namespace": "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic",
"values": ["getFilteredGroups({\"00g1def456\"}, \"group.name\", 50)"]
}
]
}
}
}' | jq '{id: .id, label: .label, status: .status}'
APP_ID="0oa1xyz789"
curl -s -X PUT \
-H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/apps/${APP_ID}/groups/${GROUP_ID}"
Okta MFA Policy
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/policies" \
-d '{
"type": "MFA_ENROLL",
"name": "Require Strong MFA",
"status": "ACTIVE",
"settings": {
"factors": {
"webauthn": { "enroll": { "self": "REQUIRED" } },
"google_otp": { "enroll": { "self": "OPTIONAL" } },
"okta_email": { "enroll": { "self": "NOT_ALLOWED" } },
"okta_sms": { "enroll": { "self": "NOT_ALLOWED" } }
}
}
}' | jq '{id: .id, name: .name, status: .status}'
4. Azure AD / Entra ID
Azure AD (now Microsoft Entra ID) is common at startups using Microsoft 365 or Azure cloud.
Azure CLI Setup
az login
az account set --subscription "your-subscription-id"
az ad signed-in-user show --query '{name:displayName, email:userPrincipalName}'
Create Users and Groups
az ad user create \
--display-name "Alice Engineer" \
--user-principal-name "alice@company.onmicrosoft.com" \
--password "TempP@ss123!" \
--force-change-password-next-sign-in true
for group in "SG-Engineering" "SG-Operations" "SG-Finance" "SG-Admins"; do
az ad group create --display-name "$group" --mail-nickname "$group"
done
USER_OID=$(az ad user show --id "alice@company.onmicrosoft.com" --query id -o tsv)
GROUP_OID=$(az ad group show --group "SG-Engineering" --query id -o tsv)
az ad group member add --group "$GROUP_OID" --member-id "$USER_OID"
az ad group member list --group "SG-Engineering" --query '[].{name:displayName, email:userPrincipalName}' -o table
Conditional Access Policies via Graph API
ACCESS_TOKEN=$(az account get-access-token --resource https://graph.microsoft.com --query accessToken -o tsv)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACCESS_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies" \
-d '{
"displayName": "Require MFA for all users",
"state": "enabledForReportingButNotEnforced",
"conditions": {
"users": {
"includeUsers": ["All"],
"excludeGroups": ["'${BREAKGLASS_GROUP_OID}'"]
},
"applications": {
"includeApplications": ["All"]
}
},
"grantControls": {
"operator": "OR",
"builtInControls": ["mfa"]
}
}'
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACCESS_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies" \
-d '{
"displayName": "Block legacy authentication",
"state": "enabled",
"conditions": {
"users": { "includeUsers": ["All"] },
"applications": { "includeApplications": ["All"] },
"clientAppTypes": ["exchangeActiveSync", "other"]
},
"grantControls": {
"operator": "OR",
"builtInControls": ["block"]
}
}'
5. SSO Integration Patterns
SAML vs OIDC Decision Guide
| Factor | SAML 2.0 | OIDC / OAuth 2.0 |
|---|
| Best for | Enterprise SaaS apps | SPAs, mobile apps, APIs |
| Token format | XML assertions | JWT tokens |
| Setup complexity | Higher (certificates, metadata XML) | Lower (client ID + secret) |
| Logout | Inconsistent (SLO is poorly supported) | Token expiry + revocation |
| Use when | App only supports SAML | You have a choice, or need API auth |
Rule of thumb: If the SaaS vendor supports OIDC, prefer it. If they only support SAML, use SAML. Never use LDAP-over-internet.
Integrating Common SaaS Apps
Slack Enterprise SSO
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_SCIM_TOKEN}" \
"https://api.slack.com/scim/v2/Users?count=5" | jq '.Resources[].userName'
GitHub Organization SSO
gh api orgs/company/credential-authorizations --paginate \
| jq '.[] | {login: .login, credential_type: .credential_type, authorized_at: .authorized_credential_note}'
gh api -X PATCH orgs/company \
-f saml_enforced=true
AWS SSO (IAM Identity Center)
aws sso-admin list-instances --query 'Instances[0].InstanceArn' --output text
INSTANCE_ARN="arn:aws:sso:::instance/ssoins-1234567890"
IDENTITY_STORE_ID="d-1234567890"
aws sso-admin create-permission-set \
--instance-arn "$INSTANCE_ARN" \
--name "DeveloperAccess" \
--description "Read-only + deploy access for engineers" \
--session-duration "PT8H"
PERMISSION_SET_ARN="arn:aws:sso:::permissionSet/ssoins-1234567890/ps-abc123"
aws sso-admin attach-managed-policy-to-permission-set \
--instance-arn "$INSTANCE_ARN" \
--permission-set-arn "$PERMISSION_SET_ARN" \
--managed-policy-arn "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/ReadOnlyAccess"
aws sso-admin create-account-assignment \
--instance-arn "$INSTANCE_ARN" \
--target-id "123456789012" \
--target-type AWS_ACCOUNT \
--permission-set-arn "$PERMISSION_SET_ARN" \
--principal-type GROUP \
--principal-id "a1b2c3d4-5678-90ab-cdef-GROUP001"
6. SCIM Provisioning
SCIM (System for Cross-domain Identity Management) automates user lifecycle across SaaS apps.
SCIM API Examples
SCIM_BASE="https://app.example.com/scim/v2"
SCIM_TOKEN="your-scim-bearer-token"
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SCIM_TOKEN}" \
"${SCIM_BASE}/Users?count=10&startIndex=1" | jq '.Resources[] | {id, userName, active}'
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${SCIM_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/scim+json" \
"${SCIM_BASE}/Users" \
-d '{
"schemas": ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:User"],
"userName": "alice@company.com",
"name": { "givenName": "Alice", "familyName": "Engineer" },
"emails": [{ "primary": true, "value": "alice@company.com", "type": "work" }],
"active": true,
"groups": []
}' | jq '{id, userName, active}'
USER_SCIM_ID="abc-123-def"
curl -s -X PATCH \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${SCIM_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/scim+json" \
"${SCIM_BASE}/Users/${USER_SCIM_ID}" \
-d '{
"schemas": ["urn:ietf:params:scim:api:messages:2.0:PatchOp"],
"Operations": [{ "op": "replace", "value": { "active": false } }]
}' | jq '{id, userName, active}'
curl -s -X DELETE \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${SCIM_TOKEN}" \
"${SCIM_BASE}/Users/${USER_SCIM_ID}"
SCIM Group Management
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${SCIM_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/scim+json" \
"${SCIM_BASE}/Groups" \
-d '{
"schemas": ["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:core:2.0:Group"],
"displayName": "Engineering",
"members": [
{ "value": "user-id-001", "display": "alice@company.com" },
{ "value": "user-id-002", "display": "bob@company.com" }
]
}' | jq '{id, displayName}'
GROUP_SCIM_ID="grp-456"
curl -s -X PATCH \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${SCIM_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/scim+json" \
"${SCIM_BASE}/Groups/${GROUP_SCIM_ID}" \
-d '{
"schemas": ["urn:ietf:params:scim:api:messages:2.0:PatchOp"],
"Operations": [{
"op": "add",
"path": "members",
"value": [{ "value": "user-id-003" }]
}]
}'
7. MFA Enforcement
WebAuthn / Passkeys (Strongest)
WebAuthn (FIDO2) hardware keys and passkeys are phishing-resistant and should be the primary MFA factor.
curl -s -X PUT \
-H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/org/factors/webauthn" \
-d '{ "status": "ACTIVE" }'
gam update org "/" 2sv enforced allowedmethods security_key
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACCESS_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/policies" \
-d '{
"displayName": "Require phishing-resistant MFA for admins",
"state": "enabled",
"conditions": {
"users": { "includeRoles": ["62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10"] },
"applications": { "includeApplications": ["All"] }
},
"grantControls": {
"operator": "OR",
"authenticationStrength": {
"id": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000004"
}
}
}'
TOTP Backup Configuration
USER_ID="00u1abc123"
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/users/${USER_ID}/factors" \
-d '{
"factorType": "token:software:totp",
"provider": "GOOGLE"
}' | jq '{id: .id, status: .status}'
MFA Bypass Procedure (Emergency)
USER_ID="00u1abc123"
curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/users/${USER_ID}/factors" | jq '.[].factorType'
FACTOR_ID="fct1abc123"
curl -s -X DELETE \
-H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/users/${USER_ID}/factors/${FACTOR_ID}"
gam user alice@company.com update backupcodes
az rest --method DELETE \
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/${USER_OID}/authentication/phoneMethods/3179e48a-750b-4051-897c-87b9720928f7"
8. Role-Based Access Control
Group-Based Access Patterns
Map every application permission to a group, never to an individual user.
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/groups/rules" \
-d '{
"type": "group_rule",
"name": "Auto-assign engineers to GitHub",
"conditions": {
"expression": {
"value": "user.department == \"Engineering\"",
"type": "urn:okta:expression:1.0"
}
},
"actions": {
"assignUserToGroups": { "groupIds": ["GITHUB_ENGINEERS_GROUP_ID"] }
}
}'
Just-in-Time (JIT) Access
aws sts assume-role \
--role-arn "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/EmergencyAdmin" \
--role-session-name "alice-incident-2026-03-24" \
--duration-seconds 3600 \
| jq '{AccessKeyId: .Credentials.AccessKeyId, Expiration: .Credentials.Expiration}'
curl -s -X PUT \
-H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/groups/${ADMIN_GROUP_ID}/users/${USER_ID}"
echo "0 */4 * * * curl -s -X DELETE -H 'Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}' \
'${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/groups/${ADMIN_GROUP_ID}/users/${USER_ID}'" | crontab -
Break-Glass Accounts
az ad user create \
--display-name "Break Glass 1" \
--user-principal-name "breakglass1@company.onmicrosoft.com" \
--password "$(openssl rand -base64 48)" \
--force-change-password-next-sign-in false
az ad group member add --group "SG-BreakGlass" --member-id "$BREAKGLASS_OID"
az monitor activity-log alert create \
--name "BreakGlass-SignIn-Alert" \
--resource-group "security-rg" \
--condition category=Administrative and caller=breakglass1@company.onmicrosoft.com \
--action-group "/subscriptions/SUB_ID/resourceGroups/security-rg/providers/microsoft.insights/actionGroups/SecurityTeam"
9. Audit & Compliance
Login Audit Logs
gam report login user all start "2026-03-01" end "2026-03-24" \
fields "actorEmail,ipAddress,loginType,isSecondFactor,isSuspicious"
curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/logs?filter=eventType+eq+\"user.session.start\"&since=2026-03-01T00:00:00Z&limit=100" \
| jq '.[] | {actor: .actor.displayName, time: .published, outcome: .outcome.result, ip: .client.ipAddress}'
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACCESS_TOKEN}" \
"https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/auditLogs/signIns?\$filter=createdDateTime ge 2026-03-01T00:00:00Z&\$top=50" \
| jq '.value[] | {user: .userDisplayName, app: .appDisplayName, status: .status.errorCode, ip: .ipAddress, mfa: .mfaDetail}'
Access Reviews
gam print group-members fields email,role > /tmp/access-review-groups.csv
curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/users?limit=200" \
| jq -r '.[] | [.profile.email, .status, .lastLogin] | @csv' > /tmp/okta-users.csv
while IFS= read -r user_id; do
curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/users/${user_id}/appLinks" \
| jq -r '.[] | [.label, .linkUrl] | @csv'
done < /tmp/okta-user-ids.txt > /tmp/okta-access-review.csv
az role assignment list --all --query '[].{principal:principalName, role:roleDefinitionName, scope:scope}' -o table
Compliance Reporting
echo "=== MFA Enrollment Report ==="
echo "Enrolled:"
gam print users fields isEnrolledIn2Sv | grep -c True
echo "Not enrolled:"
gam print users fields isEnrolledIn2Sv | grep -c False
curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/users?filter=status+eq+\"ACTIVE\"&limit=200" \
| jq '[.[] | select(.credentials.provider.type != "SOCIAL") | .id] | length'
NINETY_DAYS_AGO=$(date -d "-90 days" +%Y-%m-%dT00:00:00Z 2>/dev/null || date -v-90d +%Y-%m-%dT00:00:00Z)
curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/users?filter=lastLogin+lt+\"${NINETY_DAYS_AGO}\"&limit=200" \
| jq '.[] | {email: .profile.email, lastLogin: .lastLogin}'
10. Offboarding
Account Deactivation Checklist
Run this sequence when an employee departs. Order matters -- revoke sessions first, then deactivate.
DEPARTING_USER="alice@company.com"
USER_ID=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/users/${DEPARTING_USER}" | jq -r '.id')
curl -s -X DELETE \
-H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/users/${USER_ID}/sessions"
gam user "${DEPARTING_USER}" signout
gam user "${DEPARTING_USER}" deprovision
az ad user update --id "${DEPARTING_USER}" --account-enabled false
az rest --method POST \
--url "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/${DEPARTING_USER}/revokeSignInSessions"
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/users/${USER_ID}/lifecycle/deactivate"
gam update user "${DEPARTING_USER}" suspended on
gam user "${DEPARTING_USER}" transfer drive manager@company.com
gam user "${DEPARTING_USER}" transfer calendar manager@company.com
curl -s -H \
\
| jq -r | gid;
curl -s -X DELETE \
-H \
gh api -X DELETE
SLACK_USER_ID=$(curl -s -H \
\
| jq -r )
curl -s -X PATCH \
-H \
-H \
\
-d
aws sso-admin delete-account-assignment \
--instance-arn \
--target-id \
--target-type AWS_ACCOUNT \
--permission-set-arn \
--principal-type USER \
--principal-id
>> /var/log/offboarding-audit.log
Post-Offboarding Verification
DEPARTING_USER="alice@company.com"
echo "=== Offboarding Verification ==="
gam info user "${DEPARTING_USER}" fields suspended | grep -i "suspended: true" && echo "[OK] Google suspended" || echo "[FAIL] Google still active"
curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/users/${DEPARTING_USER}" \
| jq -r '.status' | grep -q "DEPROVISIONED" && echo "[OK] Okta deprovisioned" || echo "[FAIL] Okta still active"
gh api "orgs/company/members/${DEPARTING_USER}" 2>&1 | grep -q "404" && echo "[OK] GitHub removed" || echo "[FAIL] GitHub still member"
echo "=== Checking for post-offboard activity ==="
curl -s -H "Authorization: SSWS ${OKTA_API_TOKEN}" \
"${OKTA_ORG_URL}/api/v1/logs?filter=actor.alternateId+eq+\"${DEPARTING_USER}\"&since=$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)&limit=10" \
| jq '.[] | {time: .published, event: .eventType, outcome: .outcome.result}'
Quick Reference
| Task | Google Workspace | Okta | Azure AD |
|---|
| Create user | gam create user | POST /api/v1/users | az ad user create |
| Suspend user | gam update user suspended on | POST /lifecycle/deactivate | az ad user update --account-enabled false |
| Enforce MFA | gam update org 2sv enforced | MFA enrollment policy | Conditional access policy |
| Revoke sessions | gam user signout | DELETE /users/{id}/sessions | revokeSignInSessions |
| Audit logins | gam report login | GET /api/v1/logs | GET /auditLogs/signIns |
| SCIM provision | Built-in for supported apps | App integration SCIM tab | Enterprise app provisioning |