t1098-003-additional-cloud-roles

name	T1098.003_additional-cloud-roles
description	An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant.
category	configuration
version	18.1
author	cyberstrike-official
tags	["mitre-attack","enterprise","t1098.003","persistence","privilege-escalation","iaas","identity-provider","office-suite","saas","sub-technique"]
technique_id	T1098.003
tactic	persistence
all_tactics	["persistence","privilege-escalation"]
platforms	["IaaS","Identity Provider","Office Suite","SaaS"]
mitre_url	https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003
tech_stack	["cloud","identity","office","saas"]
cwe_ids	["CWE-276"]
chains_with	["T1098","T1098.001","T1098.002","T1098.004","T1098.005","T1098.006","T1098.007"]
prerequisites	["T1098"]
severity_boost	{"T1098":"Chain with T1098 for deeper attack path","T1098.001":"Chain with T1098.001 for deeper attack path","T1098.002":"Chain with T1098.002 for deeper attack path"}

T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles

Sub-technique of: T1098

High-Level Description

An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).

This account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts.

For example, in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able to use the CreatePolicyVersion API to define a new version of an IAM policy or the AttachUserPolicy API to attach an IAM policy with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.

In some cases, adversaries may add roles to adversary-controlled accounts outside the victim cloud tenant. This allows these external accounts to perform actions inside the victim tenant without requiring the adversary to Create Account or modify a victim-owned account.

Kill Chain Phase

• Persistence (TA0003)
• Privilege Escalation (TA0004)

Platforms: IaaS, Identity Provider, Office Suite, SaaS

What to Check

• Identify if Additional Cloud Roles technique is applicable to target environment
• Check IaaS systems for indicators of Additional Cloud Roles
• Check Identity Provider systems for indicators of Additional Cloud Roles
• Check Office Suite systems for indicators of Additional Cloud Roles
• Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (3 known mitigations)
• Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

How to Test

Manual Testing

1. Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Additional Cloud Roles by examining the target platforms (IaaS, Identity Provider, Office Suite).