Apply professional-grade security standards to any web application task. Use this skill when writing code that handles authentication, authorization, user input, APIs, file uploads, sessions, secrets, payments, or any data from external sources. Also use when the user asks to review, audit, or assess security of code or a web app. Covers OWASP Top 10 (2025), secure coding, threat modeling, and defensive architecture. Activate even when security is not explicitly mentioned — treat every web feature as a security surface.
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Apply professional-grade security standards to any web application task. Use this skill when writing code that handles authentication, authorization, user input, APIs, file uploads, sessions, secrets, payments, or any data from external sources. Also use when the user asks to review, audit, or assess security of code or a web app. Covers OWASP Top 10 (2025), secure coding, threat modeling, and defensive architecture. Activate even when security is not explicitly mentioned — treat every web feature as a security surface.
Every input is hostile until proven otherwise.
Every privilege is a liability until proven necessary.
The average breach goes undetected for 200+ days — not because attacks are sophisticated,
but because code assumed the caller was trustworthy.
Security is not a feature added at the end. It is a design constraint applied from the first line.
OWASP Top 10 — 2025 Edition
Apply these as a mental checklist on every feature you build or review.
A01 — Broken Access Control (#1 most exploited)
The most common and most damaging class of web vulnerability.
Rules:
Every endpoint must verify the caller has permission for the specific resource — not just that they're logged in
Deny by default: if there's no explicit allow, the answer is deny
Never expose internal IDs directly — use opaque tokens or UUIDs, not sequential integers (IDOR prevention)
Check authorization server-side on every request — never trust client-side state or hidden form fields
Validate CORS: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * is only acceptable for truly public, read-only data
File path inputs must be sanitized — validate against a whitelist and use path.resolve() + check prefix
IDOR pattern to enforce:
// Wrong — trusts caller owns the resource
GET /api/orders/1234
// Right — verify ownership server-side
const order = await getOrder(orderId)
if (order.userId !== req.user.id) return 403
A02 — Cryptographic Failures
Rules:
HTTPS everywhere — no exceptions, including internal APIs
Never store passwords in plaintext or with reversible encryption — use bcrypt, Argon2, or scrypt
Never use MD5 or SHA-1 for security purposes — use SHA-256 minimum, SHA-512 preferred
Secrets (API keys, tokens, passwords) never go in source code — use environment variables or secrets managers
Sensitive data at rest must be encrypted — user PII, payment data, health records
Session tokens must be cryptographically random — minimum 128 bits of entropy
Never log sensitive data: passwords, tokens, credit card numbers, SSNs, health info
Secret detection before every commit:
# Patterns that must NEVER appear in source code:
# - API keys (sk-*, AIza*, AKIA*, etc.)
# - Private keys (-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----)
# - Connection strings with passwords
# - .env files committed to git
A03 — Injection (SQL, XSS, Command, NoSQL)
SQL injection — always parameterize:
// Wrong — never do this
db.query(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${userId}`)
// Right — parameterized queries
db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?', [userId])
// or ORM equivalents: User.findById(userId)
XSS — context-aware output encoding:
Never inject user data into HTML without escaping
Use framework's built-in escaping (React JSX auto-escapes, Angular templates, etc.)
innerHTML with user content → always sanitize with DOMPurify or equivalent
eval(), new Function(), setTimeout(string) — ban entirely
Command injection:
// Wrong
exec(`ffmpeg -i ${userFilename} output.mp4`)
// Right — never concatenate user input into shell commands
// Use argument arrays, not string interpolation
execFile('ffmpeg', ['-i', userFilename, 'output.mp4'])
A04 — Insecure Design
Security flaws at the design level that code changes can't fix.
Threat model every feature:
Before building: ask "who would want to abuse this, and how?"
Rate limit endpoints by default, especially auth, password reset, and email verification
Multi-factor authentication for sensitive operations (payment, account changes, admin)
Secure password reset: time-limited tokens, single use, invalidated on use
Principle of least privilege in service architecture — services access only what they need
Access control failures (who tried to access what they can't)
Input validation failures on security-sensitive fields
Admin actions (who did what, when)
Password changes and account lockouts
Never log:
Passwords (even failed attempts)
Session tokens or API keys
Credit card numbers, SSNs, health data
Full request bodies containing sensitive fields
Log format must include: timestamp, IP, user ID (if authenticated), action, result, resource ID
A10 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
If your server fetches URLs based on user input, you are vulnerable to SSRF.
SSRF in cloud environments exposes the instance metadata service (AWS: 169.254.169.254).
// Wrong — user controls what your server fetches
const response = await fetch(req.body.url)
// Right — validate against allowlist before fetching
const ALLOWED_DOMAINS = ['api.trusted.com', 'cdn.trusted.com']
const url = new URL(req.body.url)
if (!ALLOWED_DOMAINS.includes(url.hostname)) return 400
const response = await fetch(url.toString())
Security Review Checklist
Run this mentally on every feature, and explicitly when asked to audit:
Authentication & Authorization
Every endpoint checks authentication
Every endpoint checks authorization for the specific resource
IDOR: resource ownership verified server-side, not by ID alone
Sessions invalidated on logout and privilege change
Rate limiting on auth endpoints
Input & Output
All user input validated and sanitized at the boundary
SQL queries parameterized (no string concatenation)
HTML output context-encoded (no raw innerHTML with user data)
File uploads: type validated, size limited, stored outside webroot, served with correct MIME type
URL inputs validated against allowlist (SSRF prevention)
Secrets & Cryptography
No secrets in source code or logs
Passwords hashed with bcrypt/Argon2 (not MD5/SHA-1)
Errors logged server-side, generic message returned to user
Gotchas — Real Attack Vectors Often Missed
path.join() is not path traversal protection — path.join('/uploads', '../../../etc/passwd') works. Use path.resolve() and verify the result starts with your expected base path.
JWTs are not encrypted by default — the payload is base64-encoded (readable), not encrypted. Never put sensitive data in a JWT payload unless you're using JWE.
SameSite=Lax doesn't protect against all CSRF — top-level navigations (GET requests via links) still send the cookie. Use CSRF tokens for state-changing operations.
Regex can cause ReDoS — catastrophic backtracking in regex patterns applied to user input can DOS your server. Test regexes against ReDoS checkers before using in production.
Rate limiting by IP only is bypassed by distributed attacks — also rate limit by user account and by action type.
JSON.parse() on untrusted input can throw — always wrap in try/catch. An uncaught JSON parse error crashes Node.js requests.
typeof null === 'object' — null checks in JavaScript require explicit === null, not just falsy checks.
Redirect URLs must be validated — ?redirect=https://evil.com after login is an open redirect. Validate redirects against an allowlist of your own domains.
Signed cookies are not encrypted — frameworks like Express's cookie-session sign cookies (prevents tampering) but the content is readable. Don't store sensitive data in signed cookies.
Workflow
Identify security surfaces — map every boundary where data enters the system: HTTP endpoints, file uploads, webhook handlers, CLI args, form inputs.
Apply OWASP checklist — run the Security Review Checklist against every feature touchpoint. Prioritize A01 (access control) and A03 (injection) — they account for the majority of breaches.
Validate at every boundary — parameterize all SQL. Encode all HTML output. Validate file uploads by type, size, and content. Whitelist URL fetches (SSRF prevention).
Harden authentication — HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite cookies. Rate limit auth endpoints. Invalidate sessions on logout and privilege escalation. Never reveal user existence in login errors.
Configure defense in depth — security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options), no debug mode in production, secrets in env vars only, encrypted at rest for PII.
Audit dependencies — run vulnerability scan on every update. Pin versions. Remove unused packages. Check for typosquatting.
Verify logging — security events logged with context. No sensitive data in logs. Errors logged server-side, generic messages returned to users.
Error Handling
Cause
Fix
Exposed stack traces in production errors
Set generic error handler. Log full error server-side. Return "An unexpected error occurred" to user.
Open redirect via ?redirect=evil.com parameter
Validate redirect URLs against an allowlist of your own domains before redirecting.
path.join() bypassed for path traversal
Use path.resolve() and verify the result starts with the expected base path.
