Parse Juniper SRX and Junos display-set or hierarchical configurations into the shared firewall schema. Use when input contains set security, zones, policies, address-book, from-zone, to-zone, NAT rule-set, chassis cluster, logical-systems, or routing-instances, including audit, conversion, diff, summary, and explanation tasks.
Installation
Mit Codex oder Claude installieren Kopieren Sie diesen Prompt, fügen Sie ihn in Codex, Claude oder einen anderen Assistant ein und lassen Sie die Skill-Seite prüfen und installieren.
Parse Juniper SRX and Junos display-set or hierarchical configurations into the shared firewall schema. Use when input contains set security, zones, policies, address-book, from-zone, to-zone, NAT rule-set, chassis cluster, logical-systems, or routing-instances, including audit, conversion, diff, summary, and explanation tasks.
Use this skill to parse Juniper SRX / Junos firewall configurations into the shared vendor-neutral firewall intermediate schema. It supports both show configuration | display set lines and hierarchical curly-brace configuration, including zones, address books, applications, security policies, NAT, logical-systems, routing-instances, interfaces, routing protocols, VPN, chassis cluster, and system settings.
Scope and routing
Use only for Juniper SRX or Junos hierarchy and display-set syntax. Hand off ASA/FTD access-list, nameif, or object network input to parsing-cisco-configs, FortiOS blocks to parsing-fortinet-configs, and PAN-OS XML or set deviceconfig to parsing-palo-configs. Verify production-bound results against current device documentation and output. Downstream consumers are the audit, conversion, and diff skills.
Input Format Detection
SRX configs come in two formats. Detect which one:
Set commands — Lines starting with set or deactivate . Example:
set security zones security-zone trust interfaces ge-0/0/0.0
set security policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy allow-web match source-address any
Hierarchical (curly-brace) — Nested blocks with { } and ; terminators. Example:
Detection heuristic: Check the first 2000 characters for known top-level stanza names followed by { (e.g., system {, security {, interfaces {, routing-options {). If found, treat as hierarchical. Otherwise treat as set-command format.
Hierarchical to Set Conversion
If hierarchical format is detected, mentally convert to flat set commands before parsing:
Track the current path as you descend into { } blocks
Each leaf value terminated by ; becomes: set <path> <value>
Handle inactive: prefix → convert to deactivate <path>
Note: inactive: (hierarchical format) and deactivate (set format) are equivalent. In hierarchical parsing, strip inactive: and set enabled: false on the affected object. Handle the re-parse: strip the prefix, rebuild as a normal set line, re-tokenize to extract the target object name.
Handle bracket lists [val1 val2] → expand to one set command per value
Handle quoted strings as single tokens
Handle backslash escapes inside quoted strings
Strip block comments /* ... */
Hierarchical-to-set normalization: After conversion, normalize these impedance mismatches:
range-address X to range-high Y → range-address X to Y
address NAME ip-prefix CIDR → address NAME CIDR
then static-nat prefix name CIDR → then static-nat prefix CIDR
then source-nat pool pool-name NAME → then source-nat pool NAME
then destination-nat pool pool-name NAME → then destination-nat pool NAME
then destination-nat ip addr X → then destination-nat ip X
Extraction Pipeline
Parse the following sections in order. For each, read the reference files as needed.
1. Zones
Path: security.zones.security-zone.<name>
Extract: zone name, interfaces list, description, host-inbound-traffic services/protocols
1b. Interfaces
Path: interfaces.<name> with units at interfaces.<name>.unit.<id>
LAG membership: ether-options 802.3ad <ae-name> → set lag_parent
LAG master: aggregated-ether-options lacp config
Interface type derivation:ae*=lag, lo*=loopback, st0/gr-/ip-/lt-=tunnel, fxp0/fxp1/me0/em0/em1=management.
Management interface zone exclusion: Remove management interfaces (fxp0, me0, em0, etc.) from security zones with a warning.
Unit-0 normalization: When resolving zone membership, normalize .0 suffixed names (e.g., ge-0/0/0.0 → ge-0/0/0) for matching.
Cluster interface exclusion: Skip only true fabric/control interfaces (fab*) and management (fxp*) from security zones with a warning. reth* (redundant Ethernet) and reth*.<unit> are normal dataplane interfaces bound to security zones in a chassis cluster — parse them as usable zone interfaces, not as excluded cluster interfaces.
After all interfaces parsed, back-populate lag_members on ae interfaces.
2. Address Objects
Path: security.address-book.global.address.<name>
Types to handle:
ip-prefix (e.g., 10.0.0.0/24) — type: "subnet"
dns-name — type: "fqdn"
range-address with to — type: "range", value: "start-end"
wildcard-address — type: "wildcard"
Plain IP with /32 — type: "host"
ip-prefix <cidr> / ipv6-prefix <cidr> — explicit keywords in hierarchical format (normalize away during hierarchical-to-set conversion)
Zone-attached address books — two valid forms:
Named books with zone attachment:security.address-book.<book-name>.address.<name> plus security.address-book.<book-name>.attach.zone.<zone>. The book name is arbitrary (operators often name it after the zone) — derive zone scope from the attach zone statement, never from the book name.
Legacy zone-local books:security.zones.security-zone.<zone>.address-book.address.<name> (older configs; a zone cannot use both forms at once).
Migrate both forms to global scope with a warning.
Auto-detect IP version (v4 vs v6) from the value.
3. Address Groups
Path: security.address-book.global.address-set.<name>
Extract members from address and nested address-set references.
4. Service Objects (Applications)
Path: applications.application.<name>
Extract: protocol (from protocol field), destination port (from destination-port),
source port if present, ICMP type/code, inactivity-timeout, description.
Map protocol values: 6 or tcp → TCP, 17 or udp → UDP, 1 or icmp → ICMP.
5. Application Mapping (L7 → Canonical)
JunOS uses predefined junos-* applications that are matched by name in security policies.
These are L7-aware on SRX and must be resolved to canonical names for cross-vendor conversion.
Names verified against show configuration groups junos-defaults applications on
Junos 24.4. Note there is no predefined junos-snmp, junos-snmptrap,
junos-mysql, junos-ike-nat-t, junos-icmpv6-all, or junos-ping6 — SNMP and
MySQL matching require custom applications application definitions (extract
those as custom apps); the NAT-T/ICMPv6 predefined names are junos-ike-nat,
junos-icmp6-all, and junos-pingv6.
Resolution in policies: When match application lists a predefined app:
The services array keeps application-default or explicit port references separately
Custom applications (applications.application.<name>): These are user-defined with explicit
protocol and port. Extract as service objects AND attempt canonical resolution from protocol+port.
If the port matches a known app, set confidence: 0.9.
Unresolvable apps: For any application match or custom apps without a canonical mapping,
set confidence: 0.0, preserve the vendor_name, and warn.
5b. Service Groups (Application Sets)
Path: applications.application-set.<name>
Extract member applications and nested application-sets.
Application-Set vs Application-Group distinction:
Determine member types: for each member, check if it is a predefined junos-* L7 app or a
user-defined port-based application
Application-sets containing all L7/predefined apps → promote to application_groups with
canonical member names
Sets containing user-defined port-based apps → keep as service_groups
Resolve each L7 member from JunOS name to canonical before storing in application_groups.
6. Security Policies
Path: security.policies.from-zone.<src>.to-zone.<dst>.policy.<name>
Also: security.policies.global.policy.<name> (global policies, src/dst zones = ["any"])
For each policy extract:
name and description
src_zones / dst_zones — from the path (or ["any"] for global)
src_addresses / dst_addresses — from match source-address / match destination-address
applications — from match application
action — permit → "allow", deny → "deny", reject → "reset-both" (the schema's reject-family value). Note: SRX reject notifies the source only — TCP RST to the client, ICMP unreachable for other protocols — not both sides; emit an info warning so conversions do not overstate reset-both semantics on the target platform.
log_start — true if then log session-init
log_end — true if then log session-close
security_profiles — extract from then permit application-services:
utm-policy → profile_group
idp-policy → IDP profile
ssl-proxy → SSL proxy profile
disabled — true if deactivate prefix on the policy path
schedule — from scheduler-name
source_users — from match source-identity
Handle then count and then permit firewall-authentication as no-ops (do not misinterpret as action modifiers)
Extract: type, src/dst zones (from rule-set from/to), match addresses,
translated source/destination/port.
Source NAT specifics:
then source-nat interface → translate to egress interface
then source-nat pool <poolname> → translate to named pool (emit as pool:<name>)
Destination NAT specifics:
destination-port <port> → original service match
then destination-nat pool <poolname> → translated destination from pool
Port translation lives on the pool object, not the rule: security.nat.destination.pool.<name> carries address <ip/prefix> and optional port <port> — resolve translated address AND port from the referenced pool definition (... pool <name> port <port> on the rule is not valid Junos)
Handle hierarchical ip addr <ip> form for inline destination translation
Static NAT specifics:
then static-nat prefix <cidr> → bidirectional static translation
8. Schedules
Path: schedulers.scheduler.<name>
Extract: name, type (daily-except/daily), start-date, stop-date, days of week, time ranges.
9. Routing
Static routes (IPv4):routing-options.static.route.<prefix> with next-hop, qualified-next-hop (floating statics), or discard (null routes)
Static routes (IPv6):routing-options.rib.inet6.0.static.route.<prefix> — same structure
OSPFv3:protocols.ospf3 — same structure as OSPF via ospf3 instances
Multicast (presence flag + residual capture): flow-mode SRX does not route multicast by default, so most configs have none — but a multicast-related task has nothing to anchor on unless the parser records whether multicast routing exists at all. Mirror the control-plane-protection handling: emit a presence flag and push full detail to residual_raw. Detect and flag:
Set system.multicast_routing { present: true, protocols: [...] } listing the families seen (e.g. ["igmp","pim"]); absent → present: false. Send the stanza detail to residual_raw. This is a presence flag so downstream skills can reason about "is this box doing multicast routing at all" — not a full multicast parse.
Screen zone binding: for each security.zones.security-zone.<z>.screen <name>, set zones[].screen = <name>. The screen option detail continues to populate the Screen/IDS Config object.
Control-plane / RE protection: when a stateless firewall { family inet filter <name> } is applied as an interface input filter on lo0 (interfaces lo0 unit N family inet filter input <name>), set system.control_plane_protection { re_filter_present: true, applied_to: ["lo0.<N>"] }. The filter terms still go to residual_raw; this is a presence flag, not a full parse.
VPN/IPsec: Full IKE/IPsec chain resolution:
IKE proposals: encryption, integrity, DH group, lifetime, auth method (PSK vs certificate including RSA/DSA/ECDSA)
IKE policies: mode, proposals list, PSK presence (mask the value as "****"), local certificate
IKE gateways: peer address, external interface, IKE version (v1-only/v2-only), local/remote identity
IPsec proposals: encryption, integrity, lifetime
IPsec policies: proposals list, PFS group
IPsec VPNs: bind-interface, IKE gateway reference, IPsec policy reference, establish-tunnels
DHCP Server:access.address-assignment.pool — network, address ranges (low/high), router (gateway), name-server, maximum-lease-time, domain-name. Match pools to interfaces via dhcp-local-server group bindings using IP prefix matching.
DHCP Relay: Two forms:
Legacy: forwarding-options.helpers.bootp.server
Modern: forwarding-options.dhcp-relay.server-group / group / active-server-group / interface
Link relay server groups to per-interface dhcp_relay fields.
12. Multi-Context
Detect logical-systems.<name> and tenants.<name> in the config tree.
Parse each context independently, tag all extracted items with _logical_system or _tenant.
13. Residual Config Capture
Capture all unhandled set lines. Categorize into: IDS Screens, PKI/Certificates, QoS, SNMP, VLANs, Firewall Filters, Bridge Domains, Groups, Other. Store in residual_raw for manual review.
Implicit-rule name values (e.g. "default-deny", "Implicit: Default Deny") are free-form labels; consumers must match implicit rules on _implicit: true, never on the name.
Output Format
Present results in the intermediate schema format documented in references/intermediate-schema.md.
Note: schema sections not yet populated by this pipeline (e.g., security_profile_objects, routing_contexts) are emitted empty ([]/{}); any unhandled source constructs are captured in residual_raw rather than dropped.
Full intermediate-schema emission is optional for single live-device work. The complete JSON schema exists primarily for cross-vendor conversion and multi-config diffing. When interpreting or auditing a single live device pulled via NETCONF/MCP for an ops/audit task, it is fine to reason directly from the hierarchical config and skip full schema emission — extract the sections relevant to the question. Emit the full schema when the parse will feed firewall-config-conversion, firewall-config-diff, or another config for comparison.
Parser Quality Gates
Before returning a parse, run these common quality gates and include the results in the response:
Format and scope detection — report detected vendor, platform family, config format, version clues, virtual context names (VDOM/vsys/logical-system/routing-instance), and whether input appears complete or partial.
Schema conformance — emit the vendor-neutral JSON sections defined in references/intermediate-schema.md; use empty arrays/objects for absent sections rather than omitting expected top-level keys.
Object counts — summarize counts for zones, interfaces, address objects/groups, service/application objects/groups, policies, NAT rules, routes, VPNs, HA, admin users, and residual blocks.
Reference resolution — list unresolved object, service/application, zone/interface, profile, route, VPN, and NAT references with source rule/context where possible.
Ordering preservation — preserve security policy order, NAT order, route order when relevant, and inherited/pre/post/global ordering metadata with _rule_index or a vendor-specific context field.
State preservation — preserve disabled/inactive objects and rules, comments/descriptions, tags, schedules/time-ranges, negation flags, logging settings, and profile attachments.
Residual capture — put unsupported or ambiguous source lines/blocks into residual_raw with enough context for manual review. Do not silently drop unknown syntax.
Warnings and assumptions — populate metadata.warnings with parser limitations, partial-input assumptions, ambiguous conversions, and version-specific caveats.
Conversion readiness — if the user asks for migration/conversion, explicitly separate parsed facts from proposed target-platform design choices and call out non-isomorphic features.
A high-quality parse is not just valid JSON: it must make uncertainty visible. Prefer a complete parse with warnings and residuals over a clean-looking parse that hides unsupported constructs.
Analysis Checks
After extraction, run these checks and report findings:
Unused objects — address/service objects not referenced by any policy
Shadowed policies — rules that can never match because an earlier rule fully covers them
Overly permissive — rules with any/any source+destination or any/any zone+address+application
Missing logging — permit rules without log session-close
Disabled policies — rules with deactivate prefix
Duplicate objects — different names, same value
Empty groups — address-sets or application-sets with no members
references/fixture-expected-output.json — Expected high-level intermediate-schema output for the minimal fixture
Secret Handling
Never emit secrets raw. IKE/VPN pre-shared keys, routing-protocol authentication keys (BGP/OSPF), and user password hashes must be masked as "****" (or reduced to a presence flag) with a metadata.warnings entry noting the redaction — matching the shared-schema convention ("psk": "****").
Common Pitfalls
Do not skip hierarchical-to-set normalization; inactive prefixes, bracket lists, and quoted strings affect extraction.
Zone-local address books are valid in older designs; migrate or normalize to global only with a warning.
Logical-systems and routing-instances are separate contexts; preserve them instead of merging names blindly.
Policy matching depends on NAT order and translated addresses; preserve both faithfully for downstream interpretation.
Management (fxp*), fabric (fab*), and HA control interfaces need special handling and should not be naively treated as ordinary security-zone interfaces. By contrast, reth* redundant-Ethernet interfaces ARE ordinary dataplane interfaces in a chassis cluster and must be parsed as zone interfaces — do not exclude them.
Verification Checklist
Input vendor/platform and config format were detected correctly
All major object counts are reported: zones, interfaces, addresses, services/applications, policies, NAT, routes, VPN, HA, and system settings
Output conforms to references/intermediate-schema.md
Disabled/inactive rules and objects are preserved with explicit state
Unresolved references, unsupported blocks, and parser assumptions are listed in metadata.warnings and/or residual_raw
Rule order and NAT order are preserved with _rule_index or equivalent ordering metadata
Cross-vendor conversion caveats are called out before suggesting target-platform config
No raw secrets in output — PSKs masked as "****", routing-protocol passwords/keys reduced to presence flags with warnings
