package-pi-permission-system

name	package-pi-permission-system
description	Package-specific context for @gotgenes/pi-permission-system. Load when working on code, tests, or docs in packages/pi-permission-system/.

pi-permission-system

Pi extension that enforces deterministic permission gates over tool, bash, MCP, skill, and special operations so the agent cannot silently exceed the policy a user has configured.

This package is a full fork of MasuRii/pi-permission-system. It began as a config-layout divergence (#10) and has since diverged substantially in config format, internal architecture, and permission model. The /permission-system slash command name is the only upstream identity preserved.

Read docs/plans/ before making architectural changes. Pre-monorepo plans from the upstream fork live in docs/plans/archive/ — issue numbers there refer to the upstream repo, not this monorepo.

docs/architecture/architecture.md tracks the improvement phases as a flat numbered step list plus a Mermaid graph — one issue per step, never a chain inside a single node label. When a plan touches that roadmap, enumerate the whole phase: search dependents too (gh issue list --search "#N"), not just the issues the current one references. When the implementation completes a numbered roadmap step, mark it complete in docs/architecture/architecture.md in the implementation doc-update commit (/tdd-plan step 7 / /build-plan), not a deferred /ship-issue commit — ✅ on both the step heading and its Mermaid diagram node, plus any stale health-metric/target rows in the same commit. Deferring the marker to ship splits it from the work and risks it falling through entirely (Refs #479, #480).

Implementation Priorities

• Default to least privilege — when in doubt, prompt (ask), do not silently allow.
• Enforce permissions deterministically; the same policy + same input must always produce the same decision.
• Keep config files the source of truth; do not bake policy into code.
• Hide denied tools from the agent before it starts (tool filtering + system-prompt sanitization).
• Keep block/ask/allow decisions reviewable: write to the permission review log by default.
• Preserve the /permission-system slash command name — renaming it is a breaking change.
• In the flat permission format, permission["*"] is the universal fallback; pattern ordering is last-match-wins.
• The four path layers (path, external_directory, per-tool, bash) compose with most-restrictive-wins across surfaces: a more-permissive rule on one surface cannot loosen a more-restrictive rule on another (ask > allow). So a path allow cannot suppress an external_directory: ask prompt — allow outside-CWD directories on external_directory, not path.
• Wildcard matching must be explicit and tested — silent over-matching is a permission bypass.
• Prefer config patterns over new runtime mechanisms. Mechanism is forever; docs are reversible.
• Treat any declared config field not read at runtime as a maintenance trap.

Single source of truth for tool policy

Pi-subagents removed its disallowed_tools frontmatter field and extensions: string[] allowlist (pi-subagents Phase 14, #237, #238, #239 — shipped). This package is the sole authority for tool access control. Users migrating from disallowed_tools should use permission: frontmatter in agent definitions:

# Before (pi-subagents, removed in Phase 14)
disallowed_tools: bash

# After (pi-permission-system)
permission:
  bash: deny

Event-based subagent integration

@gotgenes/pi-subagents emits a child-execution lifecycle on pi.events (subagents:child:*); this package subscribes via subscribeSubagentLifecycle (src/authority/subagent-lifecycle-events.ts) and registers/unregisters child sessions in the SubagentSessionRegistry on session-created / disposed (pi-subagents #261, ADR-0002). The dependency direction is inverted — pi-subagents has zero knowledge of pi-permission-system. The session-created handler MUST stay synchronous: the core emits it on the same call stack right before bindExtensions(), and the event bus dispatches listeners synchronously, so a synchronous handler lands the registry entry before binding proceeds.

The SubagentSessionRegistry is process-global. Access it via getSubagentSessionRegistry() (src/authority/subagent-registry.ts), backed by globalThis + Symbol.for("@gotgenes/pi-permission-system:subagent-registry"). This is necessary because each session's ResourceLoader creates its own pi.events bus: the parent emits subagents:child:session-created on its bus and only the parent's instance receives it. The child's separate jiti instance runs on a different bus and never receives the event — but getSubagentSessionRegistry() returns the same global store, so the parent's registration is visible to the child when it checks isSubagentExecutionContext(). Do not instantiate new SubagentSessionRegistry() in production code; use the accessor. This lesson comes from issue #296: the regression where permission-bridge.ts was retired in favour of pi.events registration but the per-session bus split meant the child never saw the registration.

Configuration

One unified config file per scope, following the pi-autoformat convention (extensions/<id>/config.json).

• Global config: ~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json (respects PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR)
• Project config: <cwd>/.pi/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json
• Per-agent overrides: YAML frontmatter in agent definition files

Merge precedence: project overrides global; per-agent frontmatter overrides both. The permission object uses deep-shallow merge; scalar fields use simple replacement.

• Zod source of truth: src/config-schema.ts (the composable schemas, the z.infer config types, and buildPermissionsJsonSchema).
• Schema: schemas/permissions.schema.json — generated from config-schema.ts via pnpm run gen:schema; never edit it by hand. A parity test in test/config-schema.test.ts fails on drift (Refs #547).
• Example: config/config.example.json
• Keep config-schema.ts, example config, docs/configuration.md, and README.md aligned when the config shape changes — the schema and the config types are both derived from config-schema.ts, so it is the one edit point.
• docs/architecture/architecture.md inline-copies the core rule.ts types (Rule, RuleOrigin, Ruleset). Adding or removing a field on one of these must update that listing too — a module-move check misses it, and only the pre-completion reviewer catches it otherwise.
• Config files are validated strictly against unifiedConfigSchema (config-schema.ts) and rejected fail-closed on any invalid field (empty scope → universal ask), with a clear per-issue message (Refs #547). Per-agent frontmatter stays tolerant — policy-loader.ts extracts only its permission block via normalizeFlatPermissionValue, since frontmatter carries non-config keys.
• When removing a config field, drop it from unifiedConfigSchema; configs that still set it are then rejected. For a soft-deprecation window, keep the field optional in the schema and ignore its value.
• When adding an optional field to PermissionSystemExtensionConfig, do not include it in DEFAULT_EXTENSION_CONFIG with an explicit undefined value — tests use deepEqual and it breaks equality.
• When adding a field, define it in unifiedConfigSchema (config-schema.ts, with .meta({ description, markdownDescription })) and regenerate the schema (pnpm run gen:schema); UnifiedPermissionConfig is inferred from it. Then carry it through PermissionSystemExtensionConfig (extension-config.ts) and merge it in mergeUnifiedConfigs(). A field on the runtime type but not the merge intermediate is silently dropped before runtime (the #332 / #347 bug class). After #356, omitting a field from UnifiedPermissionConfig that normalizePermissionSystemConfig reads is a compile error — normalizePermissionSystemConfig reads fields directly from the typed UnifiedPermissionConfig parameter, so tsc catches the gap immediately.
• When a config example sets a policy for write, include the same policy for edit — both tools modify files and users expect them gated together.

Cross-Extension Integration

Single-agent core

Pi is single-agent by design; multiple named agents are an external-extension concept (pi-subagents, pi-agent-router), not Pi core. Per-agent permission: frontmatter is an extension bridge on this single-agent core — see docs/architecture/architecture.md design principle 9. Do not propose pushing agent-awareness (an agents directory, frontmatter parsing) into the SDK or core.

Jiti isolation

Pi's extension loader keeps each extension's module isolated — a variable set in this extension's module is invisible to other extensions.

Module-scoped state no longer resets per session. Since earendil-works/pi#5905 (shipped in pi-coding-agent — "cache extension imports for session switches"), the loader caches the imported factory function per (extensionPath, cwd). The factory is still re-invoked on every /new / /resume / /fork / /import switch (with a fresh pi/ExtensionContext), so everything constructed inside the factory body — PermissionSession, SessionRules, subscriptions, pi.on(...) registrations — is rebuilt fresh each session, and session_shutdown still fires. But the module itself is imported only once per cwd; the cache clears only on /reload or a cwd change (clearExtensionCache). So module-scoped mutable state (top-level let, module-level caches, memoized values like getParser = memoizeAsyncWithRetry(...) in access-intent/bash/parser.ts) now persists across same-cwd session switches instead of being reborn each session. This is safe today (the package's module-scoped state is read-only lookup tables plus the stateless tree-sitter parser — persisting the parser is a win), but do not park session-scoped or permission-relevant state at module level assuming a per-session reset — it will leak between sessions in the same cwd. Keep per-session state inside the factory closure (where it is rebuilt) or in the session_start/session_shutdown-driven lifecycle. A regression guard lives in test/composition-root.test.ts ("session approvals do not leak across same-cwd session switches").

Shared communication channels:

• pi.events (the event bus) — for fire-and-forget broadcasts (permissions:ready / permissions:ui_prompt / permissions:decision).
• globalThis + Symbol.for() — process-global by spec, survives jiti isolation. Use for direct service access.

The deprecated event-bus RPC channel (permissions:rpc:check / permissions:rpc:prompt) was removed in #531; the Symbol.for() service accessor is the sole cross-extension policy/prompt surface. The in-process implementation of PermissionsService is LocalPermissionsService (src/permissions-service.ts). It routes policy queries through the PermissionResolver, not PermissionManager directly: a path-shaped surface (path / external_directory / read / write / edit / grep / find / ls) query builds an AccessPath via buildAccessIntentForSurface and emits an access-path intent, so external queries match the lexical ∪ canonical set the gates do (#503); the normalizer is fetched per call from the session (getPathNormalizer()), so the published service answers against the parent cwd. The session_start-gated publication, #302 subagent-child guard, ready-event emit, and session teardown ordering are all owned by PermissionServiceLifecycle (src/service-lifecycle.ts), which is injected into SessionLifecycleHandler. Changes to publication timing or teardown order should go through PermissionServiceLifecycle, not index.ts.

Do not propose module-scoped singletons or Node.js module-cache sharing as a cross-extension communication mechanism — module isolation keeps them invisible to other extensions.

The path and external_directory gates are path-aware for all tools, not just the six built-ins (#352). getToolInputPath (src/tool-input-path.ts) extracts a path for built-ins (input.path), MCP (input.arguments.path), and extension tools (default input.path, or a custom key via a registered extractor); getPathBearingToolPath stays built-in-only and now drives the per-tool gate's AccessPath (the pipeline builds normalizer.forPath(getPathBearingToolPath(...)) and emits an access-path intent on the tool-name surface, #502), plus the raw decision/log value. The ToolAccessExtractorRegistry (src/tool-access-extractor-registry.ts) mirrors ToolInputFormatterRegistry: one instance created in index.ts, its lookup threaded into ToolCallGatePipeline, its registrar exposed cross-extension via PermissionsService.registerToolAccessExtractor. Extension/MCP path gating is default-on (no registration needed); per-tool path maps for extension tools (a custom extractor key that supplies the path via a registered ToolAccessExtractor) are a deferred follow-up.

Testing

Shared test fixtures live in test/helpers/:

• session-fixtures.ts — real-instance builders for PermissionSession / PermissionResolver tests: makeRealSession (builds a real PermissionSession from per-collaborator fakes; returns { session, paths, logger, forwarding, permissionManager, sessionRules, configStore, gateway }), makeFakePermissionManager (fake ScopedPermissionManager with vi.fn() stubs — unannotated return type for full mock access; exposes a single check(intent, sessionRules?) stub, the one resolution entry point since #478), makeRealResolver (real PermissionResolver over a fake manager + SessionRules; pass shared instances to connect it to a session's manager/rules), plus makePaths / makeLogger / makeConfigStore / makeGateway / makeForwarding. Tests exercising resolveAgentName must mock active-agent in their own file (the vi.hoisted / vi.mock pattern), since that mock is module-scoped.
• handler-fixtures.ts — makeCtx, makeEvents, makeToolRegistry, makeToolCallEvent, makeCheckResult (neutral default, override-driven), makeHandler (builds a real PermissionSession + PermissionResolver wired into the handler and pipelines exactly as index.ts; the session override bag maps checkPermission onto permissionManager.checkPermission and getActiveSkillEntries / getInfrastructureReadDirs / getToolPreviewLimits / resolveAgentName onto vi.spyOn overrides of the real session; accepts optional tools: string[] and prompter: AskEscalator (the single-method ask-escalation seam that replaced GatePrompter in #556 — stub it as { escalate }); returns { handler, events, session, logger, toolRegistry, prompter, recorder, permissionManager, forwarding } — session.activate is the real method, so assert forwarding.start instead), makeSurfaceCheck / makeBashCommandCheck (surface-/bash-dispatching checkPermission mocks — pass the result as session.checkPermission, applied to permissionManager.checkPermission), getDecisionEvents. MockGateHandlerSession now covers only the pipeline-input surface (ToolCallGateInputs & SkillInputGateInputs); the wide 17-field intersection mock and the standalone makeSession factory are gone (#341).
• gate-fixtures.ts — makeDescriptor, makeGateRunner (constructs a GateRunner with four role mocks and returns { runner, deps } so tests can invoke runner.run(...) and assert on deps.reporter.*, deps.resolve, etc.; accepts optional resolveResult: PermissionCheckResult shortcut — wraps resolve in a vi.fn returning that value, taking precedence over the default allow result), makeDenialDescriptor (write-surface variant of makeDescriptor with a caller-supplied DenialContext — use when testing denial-message formatting), makeReporter (DecisionReporter mock with writeReviewLog/emitDecision vi.fn stubs), makeResolver (ScopedPermissionResolver mock — plain object with a single vi.fn resolve stub; pass a PermissionCheckResult to set its default return value; omitting the arg leaves it returning undefined so callers must call mockReturnValue or pass a result explicitly, #478), makePathDispatchResolver (resolver whose single resolve dispatches on the AccessIntent kind — tool keys on intent.input.path, access-path on any matching entry in intent.path.matchValues() — pass a byPath map and a defaultResult; since #486 the emitted union is tool | access-path only, #393, #478, #486), makeTcc (bash defaults: toolName: "bash", input: { command: "cat .env" } — passing { input: { command: "cat .env" } } explicitly is redundant and can be omitted), makeGateCheckResult (path-surface defaults: toolName: "path", source: "special", origin: "global"), makeGateInputs (mock of ToolCallGateInputs for ToolCallGatePipeline unit tests — stubs the three query methods getActiveSkillEntries, getInfrastructureReadDirs, getToolPreviewLimits; the resolver is now a separate makeResolver(makeCheckResult()) passed as the first arg to ToolCallGatePipeline — makeGateInputs no longer stubs resolve), makeSkillInputInputs (mock of SkillInputGateInputs for SkillInputGatePipeline unit tests — single-method stub for checkPermission; returns makeCheckResult() by default), makeNotifier (GateNotifier mock — unannotated return type so callers retain full vi.fn() access on warn). makeRunnerDeps has been deleted; GateRunnerDeps no longer exists.
• manager-harness.ts — createManager (filesystem-backed PermissionManager), createManagerWithProject (two-level harness with global + project config dirs and per-level agent files; returns { manager, cleanup } — use when testing project-level or project-agent precedence), createManagerWithConfig (permission-map shorthand delegating to createManager), createManagerWithScopes (global + optional project permission maps delegating to createManagerWithProject), createMissingConfigManager (manager over nonexistent paths; universal ask default), createInMemoryPolicyLoader + createInMemoryManager (in-memory PolicyLoader, no filesystem — pass the loader directly when overriding platform), createAgentDirHarness (agentDir-layout harness via getGlobalConfigPath / getProjectConfigPath), and sessionRule(surface, pattern, action?) (session-layer Rule builder, default action allow). These were extracted from permission-manager-unified.test.ts in #525 (Phase 8 Step 1); import them instead of redefining local manager factories.
• make-fake-pi.ts — makeFakePi (composition-root harness): runs the real piPermissionSystemExtension(pi) factory against a fake ExtensionAPI with a real createEventBus(), an inspectable handlers map, captured commands, and a fire(event, input, ctx) driver. Use it for composition-root wiring tests (handler-registration completeness, shared-instance contracts, teardown, event ordering) — see test/composition-root.test.ts. Composition-root tests must vi.stubEnv("PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR", <tmpdir>) and clear both Symbol.for() global slots (:service, :subagent-registry) in afterEach, since the factory mutates process-global state.

Import from these instead of redefining factories inline. When a call site needs different defaults from makeCheckResult, pass explicit overrides (e.g. makeCheckResult({ state: "deny", matchedPattern: "*" })).

Since #478 the manager and resolver each expose a single resolution method (ScopedPermissionManager.check(intent) / ScopedPermissionResolver.resolve(intent)), so the #393 false-green class is structurally impossible — there is no second method a fixture can stub-but-forget. makeHandler routes the makeSurfaceCheck / makeBashCommandCheck override onto permissionManager.check via an intent→(surface, input) adapter: a path-values intent maps to surfaceCheck(intent.surface, { path: intent.values[0] }, …) so path / external_directory overrides apply to bash tokens and tool paths alike (#418). An inline handler that mocks permissionManager.check directly must dispatch on intent.kind (path-values carries values, tool carries input) and intent.surface, or external-directory checks false-green to allow. The gate emitting the intent picks the surface: since #486 every path gate emits access-path — the tool/bash path gates on "path" and the external-directory gates on "external_directory" — and since #502 the per-tool gate also emits access-path on the tool-name surface (read/write/edit/grep/find/ls); the resolver unwraps it via AccessPath.matchValues() to match a path's typed and symlink-resolved aliases, so the path surface and the per-tool surfaces now match the canonical form too (#418, #486, #502). The gate-emitted path-values variant was removed; path-values survives only as the resolver-internal ResolvedAccessIntent form the string-based manager consumes (so permissionManager.check and the makeHandler adapter at line above still see tool | path-values). This resolver-internal boundary is a deliberate, formalized seam, not transitional scaffolding (see packages/pi-permission-system/docs/decisions/0002-path-values-string-boundary.md, #506): the manager stays string-based and must not import AccessPath — a no-restricted-imports lint rule on permission-manager.ts guards it.

• Test permission resolution (allow/deny/ask decisions across tools, bash, MCP, skills, special).
• Test wildcard matching (bash patterns, skill globs) including over-match and under-match cases.
• Test policy merge precedence: global → project → per-agent frontmatter.
• Test system-prompt sanitization (denied tool lines narrowed out of the Available tools: listing, allowed tools preserved).
• Test the external-directory guard for path-bearing file tools, including extension and MCP tools (default-on path gating, #352).
• Test config loading, validation issues, and tolerance of deprecated keys.
• To test the file-based permission-forwarding round-trip (a subagent's ask reaching the parent), do not await the child's pi.fire("tool_call", …) directly — ParentAuthorizer.authorize (src/authority/approval-escalator.ts) polls for a response with a 10-minute timeout when forwarding to the parent. Instead: fire without awaiting, poll the parent's requests/ dir (createPermissionForwardingLocation(forwardingDir, parentSessionId)) for the child's request file, write an approval JSON to responses/<id>.json, then await the fire. See the subagent registry sharing test in test/composition-root.test.ts.

Debugging

When investigating a reported bug:

1. Check the runtime environment: which extensions are loaded, from which paths, and whether any are loaded more than once.
2. Check .pi/settings.json and ~/.pi/agent/settings.json for overlapping package entries.
3. Instrument only after confirming the bug reproduces in isolation.
4. When the bug involves path, filesystem, or platform semantics, check how @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent solves it first (local checkout or published source). Prefer Node path builtins (path.relative, path.win32/path.posix) over hand-rolled comparison; pi's containment idiom is relative() + a ../absolute-prefix check (case-insensitive on Windows). Platform handling has a single home: PathNormalizer (src/path-normalizer.ts), built at the session edge from the injected host platform + session cwd and exposed via PermissionSession.getPathNormalizer() (#510); the getPlatform() accessor was retired once both #511 and #502 folded their reads (#513). Hand the normalizer raw tokens (forPath/forLiteral/isAbsolute/resolveBase/joinBase/isWithinDirectory/isOutsideWorkingDirectory/comparableValue/isInfrastructureRead); do not read process.platform inside src/ — an ESLint no-restricted-syntax guard scoped to pi-permission-system/src (exempting index.ts, the only reader) blocks it, and every path-containment / path-normalization / pi-infrastructure-read / canonicalize-path / rule.ts / subagent-context.ts leaf takes an injected platform parameter (the path-utils.ts grab-bag was dissolved into those focused modules in #505). To test Windows behavior on a POSIX CI, inject a win32 PathNormalizer (or pass platform: "win32") — never vi.mock("node:path").
5. When a report claims a path/permission bypass (or that a rule is evadable), reproduce the literal repro against the running extension before concluding it is already handled — a live deny is stronger evidence than unit tests and can surface adjacent bugs (#493's bypass claim was already fixed, but the live repro exposed a misleading prompt, filed as #507).

The gate fails closed (#452). Every tool_call goes through createFailClosedToolCall (src/handlers/tool-call-boundary.ts), the only pi.on("tool_call") target and the sole place an internal GateOutcome is translated to the SDK result shape. A thrown gate is blocked (not allowed) and recorded as a permission_request.blocked review entry with resolution: "gate_error" — the SDK's emitToolCall does not catch a throwing handler, so this boundary must absorb it. An unparseable bash command (a non-empty command that parses to zero command units) resolves to ask with the <unparseable-bash-command> sentinel matchedPattern, instead of falling through to a permissive top-level *. An opaque-payload wrapper (bash/sh/dash/zsh/ksh -c, or eval) is flagged opaque by the command enumerator and floored from allow to ask with the sibling <opaque-bash-wrapper> sentinel — so bash -c "…" prompts even under a permissive bash *: allow (an explicit deny still wins). The enumerator also strips a leading variable_assignment prefix from each command unit so an env-var prefix (AWS_PROFILE=prod aws …) cannot defeat a command-pattern rule (#481). With debugLog on, the boundary writes one permission.decision trace per call and a permission.session_summary line on shutdown (via DecisionAudit); a toolCalls != allowed + blocked + errors mismatch logs a warning — a re-opened silent path.

Windows and Git Bash

Platform facts verified against Pi core source during #533 planning:

• Pi core executes every bash tool command through Git Bash on Windows (pi/packages/coding-agent/src/utils/shell.ts): resolution order is custom shellPath → %ProgramFiles%\Git\bin\bash.exe → any bash.exe on PATH (MSYS2/Cygwin); there is no cmd/PowerShell branch. So bash tokens gated on a win32 host carry POSIX/MSYS path semantics, while tool-input paths (read/write/edit) carry Node fs win32 semantics — the two surfaces have different platforms on the same host.
• Node fs on Windows genuinely resolves /dev/null to C:\dev\null, so a tool-input /dev/null prompting is correct behavior; a bash > /dev/null prompting is a bug — Git Bash's MSYS runtime maps it to the NUL device and never touches the filesystem.
• Pi core rewrites Windows-style > NUL redirects to > /dev/null before spawning the shell (normalizeNulRedirects(), earendil-works/pi#4731), because MSYS does not recognize NUL and would create a literal undeletable file. So /dev/null is the canonical device token the gates see on win32 — core actively produces it.
• MSYS interprets POSIX-shaped absolute paths through its mount table: /dev/* are runtime devices; /c/… is a deterministic drive mount for C:\…; /tmp is a mount whose Windows target varies by bash flavor (Git Bash → %TEMP%; MSYS2 → <msysroot>\tmp; Cygwin → its own root) and other absolutes (/usr, /etc, /mingw64) resolve inside the install root. This package therefore must never map /tmp (or any non-drive-mount POSIX absolute) to a concrete Windows path — no cygpath shell-outs, no os.tmpdir() reads; determinism (same policy + same input → same decision) forbids both.
• Git Bash also accepts Windows-shaped paths (C:/foo, C:\foo) unchanged, so the drive-letter token handling (#508) and win32 case folding (#382) apply to those shapes on both surfaces — the MSYS semantics above are additive branches for POSIX-shaped tokens, not a replacement.
• On win32 a backslash is a path separator, so a backslash-relative bash argument (cat dir\file) is gated by the path surface the same as dir/file (#520); the broad rule-candidate classifier recognizes it under the windowsSeparators option (from PathNormalizer.usesWindowsSeparators()), and it resolves through the ordinary win32 forBashToken (plain) branch. On POSIX \ is a legal filename character, so the token stays bare there.
• The bash-token interpretation layer implementing these semantics (exact /dev/* devices preserved, /c/ mounts translated, other POSIX absolutes literal-only external) shipped in #533: PathNormalizer.forBashToken/interpretBashCdTarget/isBoundaryOutsideWorkingDirectory branch on the shape returned by the pure access-intent/bash/msys-bash-tokens.ts classifier, and BashPathResolver routes every bash token (both the external_directory and path surfaces) through forBashToken. See docs/decisions/0003-git-bash-posix-path-semantics.md.
• A win32 non-mount POSIX absolute (/tmp/foo) is a literal-only AccessPath whose value() (display) stays as typed but whose matchValues() carries a backslash alias (\tmp\foo) — the win32 path matcher folds a rule's separators (/ → \, see pathMatchOptions in rule.ts), so a forward-slash value is otherwise unmatchable and a /tmp/* allow rule would never suppress the prompt. When adding another literal-only path shape on win32, give it a backslash match alias or it cannot be allow-listed.

Notes for Agents

Before implementing, understand:

1. The problem being solved.
2. Which permission surface is involved (tools / bash / mcp / skills / special / external_directory).
3. The merge precedence between global, project, and per-agent policies.
4. Whether the change renames the /permission-system slash command — if yes, it is breaking.
5. The need to keep schema, example config, loader, and docs aligned.

Do not assume "allow" is a safe default. Do not add a permission surface without also adding a policy field, schema entry, and example.

When writing documentation that claims this extension lacks a feature, verify by searching src/, docs/retro/, and closed issues.

When planning a refactoring that targets testability, read the test files alongside the production code.

When planning a refactoring that touches handler wiring or shared interfaces, load the design-review skill to audit for structural smells before writing the plan.

The bash external_directory gate only sees tokens that classifyTokenAsPathCandidate accepts — absolute (/…), home-relative (~/…), parent-traversal (..), and Windows drive-letter absolute paths (C:/… or C:\…). A plain ./relative token (e.g. cat ./link/hosts) is dropped before that gate and is instead gated by the broader path surface (classifyTokenAsRuleCandidate). The broader classifier also recognizes the backslash drive form (D:\…) — the forward-slash form is caught by includes("/"). On win32 the broad classifier additionally recognizes a backslash-relative token (dir\file, no leading ., no /, no .., not a drive-letter absolute) as a path-surface candidate — gated the same as its forward-slash equivalent dir/file (#520) — while on POSIX \ is a legal filename character so the token stays bare; the decision is the windowsSeparators option, derived from PathNormalizer.usesWindowsSeparators() so the classifier never reads process.platform. On POSIX, a drive-shaped token (C:/foo) resolves as the real in-CWD path ./C:/foo and remains gated by the path surface; the PathNormalizer's isAbsolute decides platform-correct routing. Once a token passes classification, its resolution is platform-aware on win32: PathNormalizer.forBashToken applies Git Bash/MSYS semantics (safe /dev/* devices preserved, /c/… drive mounts translated to C:\…, other POSIX absolutes kept literal-only) before building the AccessPath, so a plan must not assume a leading-/ win32 bash token resolves with node:path.win32 rules (#533; see the Windows and Git Bash section). A bare filename (cat id_rsa), which has none of the broad classifier's accepted shapes, is nonetheless promoted into the path surface when it matches an active, specific (non-*) path deny/ask rule (#509) — rule-driven promotion via classifyPromotedRuleCandidate, decided by PermissionManager.getPromotablePathTokenMatcher (owns the ruleset filter and the Windows case/separator fold) and threaded into BashPathResolver as an injected predicate. A bare token that matches no specific path rule, or any config without path rules at all, is still dropped exactly as before — promotion never fires against the universal "*" fallback. When a plan or test asserts a specific bash repro string, trace the token through the classifier first — an issue's headline repro can describe a symptom whose literal input never reaches the gate being changed.