dependabot-sweep

name	dependabot-sweep
description	Use when the user wants to fix, address, clear, or resolve open Dependabot security/vulnerability alerts for a repository, end to end. Fetches open alerts via the gh CLI, fixes them per ecosystem (pnpm/npm overrides + lockfile regen, cargo update, pip/go/bundler), verifies with audit and frozen-lockfile installs, then branches → commits → pushes → opens a PR, and squash-merges once CI is green — escalating only when a fix carries breaking-change risk or can't be resolved. Trigger on "/dependabot-sweep", "address the dependabot alerts", "fix the security vulnerabilities", "clear the dependabot alerts", "handle the dependency vulnerabilities", "sweep dependabot".
when_to_use	Use when the user wants open Dependabot alerts fixed end-to-end. Triggers on: '/dependabot-sweep', 'fix the dependabot alerts', 'address security vulnerabilities', 'clear dependency alerts', 'sweep dependabot'.
effort	high

Dependabot Sweep

Resolve open Dependabot alerts end to end: fetch → triage → fix per ecosystem → verify → branch → commit → push → PR → merge. Built to run with minimal intervention.

Announce at start: "I'm using the dependabot-sweep skill to clear open Dependabot alerts."

This is a workflow skill. It invokes the gh CLI, the repo's package managers (pnpm / npm / cargo / pip / go / bundler), git, and may hand the final merge to the merge-pr skill.

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Autonomy contract

Running this skill is the user's consent for the whole workflow — fetch through merge — with no confirmation prompts. Do not ask "should I push / open a PR / merge?". Proceed.

Stop and surface a concise summary only when an Escalate condition is hit:

• A required fix is a SemVer-major bump of a direct dependency (real breaking-change risk).
• Lockfile regeneration would pull major bumps of packages unrelated to the alert (churn well beyond the targeted package and its subtree). A large minor/patch refresh of a stale lockfile is fine — note it, don't stop.
• No patched version exists, or the only remaining vulnerable copy is an upstream-pinned / build-only transitive with no reachable fix → document it and recommend dismissing that specific alert; fix everything else and continue.
• The ecosystem audit still reports the vulnerability after the fix.
• CI fails and the documented quick-fixes don't resolve it after one attempt.
• A merge conflict with the base branch that isn't a trivial lockfile re-resolution.
• A manifest uses an ecosystem with no playbook here.

When you escalate, do the fixable work first, then present only the decision the user actually needs to make.

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Step 1 — Fetch open alerts

Resolve the repo, then list every open alert grouped by manifest:

REPO=$(gh repo view --json nameWithOwner -q .nameWithOwner)
gh api "repos/$REPO/dependabot/alerts" --paginate \
  -q '.[] | select(.state=="open")
      | [.number, .security_advisory.severity, .dependency.package.ecosystem,
         .dependency.package.name, .dependency.manifest_path, .dependency.scope,
         .security_vulnerability.vulnerable_version_range,
         .security_vulnerability.first_patched_version.identifier] | @tsv' \
  | sort -t$'\t' -k5 | column -t -s$'\t'

If there are zero open alerts, report that and stop. Otherwise build a per-manifest work list. The first_patched_version is your target; the vulnerable_version_range tells you whether a copy still in the tree is affected.

Step 2 — Branch

Work off a fresh branch from the default branch — never on main:

git checkout -b fix/dependabot-security-alerts   # reuse if it already exists

Step 3 — Fix per ecosystem

For each manifest, prefer the smallest change that lands a patched version:

• Direct dependency (named in the manifest): raise its version range to >= patched.
• Transitive dependency (scope/dep not in the manifest): use the ecosystem's override/pin mechanism.
• Then regenerate the lockfile (lockfile-only — no need to write node_modules/build).

See the Ecosystem playbooks below.

Step 4 — Verify

• Run the ecosystem audit at moderate+ and confirm "No known vulnerabilities found".
• Run a frozen-lockfile install to prove the lockfile is internally consistent (this is what CI runs).
• If a build/test is cheap, run it; otherwise rely on CI.

Step 5 — Commit

Conventional commit, specific git add (no -A):

fix(deps): resolve Dependabot security alerts

Body: per-manifest list of what changed with the alert numbers, plus any alert deliberately left unfixed and why. End with:

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[e-mail]>

Step 6 — Push + open PR

git push -u origin fix/dependabot-security-alerts
gh pr create --title "fix(deps): resolve Dependabot security alerts" --body "<template below>"

Step 7 — Merge (autonomous)

PR=$(gh pr view --json number -q .number)
gh pr checks "$PR" --watch

• CI green → squash-merge and clean up: gh pr merge "$PR" --squash --delete-branch (or invoke the merge-pr skill). Dependabot closes the alerts automatically once the fix lands on the default branch.
• CI red → attempt the documented quick fixes once; if still failing, escalate.

Final report: alert numbers cleared, anything intentionally deferred, and the merge result.

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Ecosystem playbooks

pnpm / npm

• Direct dep → bump its range in package.json to >= patched.
• Transitive dep → add/raise an entry in pnpm.overrides (pnpm) or overrides (npm), e.g. "qs": ">=6.15.2".
• Regenerate without installing: pnpm install --lockfile-only (npm: npm install --package-lock-only).
• Workspaces: overrides MUST live in the workspace-root package.json. A nested package's pnpm.overrides is ignored in the workspace context (pnpm prints a warning) — put workspace overrides at the root.
• Standalone lockfiles: a sub-project with its own committed lockfile (e.g. a docs/website site built separately on its own CI job) is installed with --ignore-workspace. Regenerate it from inside that directory:

  cd <subdir> && pnpm install --lockfile-only --ignore-workspace
  

  and put that project's overrides in its own package.json. A repo can have BOTH a root workspace lockfile and one or more standalone lockfiles pinning the same package at different versions — Dependabot lists each manifest_path separately, so fix every manifest the alerts name.
• A standalone lockfile whose specifiers no longer match its package.json (e.g. lock pins next@16.2.3 while package.json says ^16.2.7) is stale and was failing --frozen-lockfile — regenerating it produces a large but correct diff. Note the churn; don't treat it as suspicious.
• Verify: pnpm audit --audit-level=moderate (append --ignore-workspace when auditing a standalone project) and pnpm install --frozen-lockfile.

cargo (Rust)

• cargo update -p <pkg>@<current> --precise <patched> from the crate dir (the one with Cargo.toml + Cargo.lock).
• Multiple copies in the tree: the same crate can appear at several versions; the advisory range may cover more than one. Use cargo tree -i <pkg>@<ver> to see who pulls each.
• Runtime vs build-only: a copy reachable only through [build-dependencies] is compile-time (codegen, perfect-hash generators, etc.), never shipped in the binary, and usually not runtime-exploitable. If such a copy is pinned by an upstream crate (e.g. a framework's own toolchain) with no reachable patch, document it and recommend dismissing that alert rather than forking upstream. Fix the runtime-relevant copy and move on.

pip / Python

• requirements.txt: bump the pin to >= patched. Poetry: poetry update <pkg>. uv: uv lock --upgrade-package <pkg>. Regenerate the lock, then pip-audit / uv pip audit to verify.

go

• go get <pkg>@<patched> && go mod tidy. Verify with govulncheck ./... if available.

bundler (Ruby)

• bundle update --conservative <gem> to bump only the vulnerable gem. Verify with bundle audit.

Any other ecosystem: apply the same pattern — direct bump or transitive override → regenerate lockfile → audit.

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PR body template

Resolves the open Dependabot alerts.

## Changes

| Manifest | Fix | Alerts |
|---|---|---|
| `<path>` | `<pkg> X → Y` (direct / override) | #NN, #NN |

## Notes
- <intentional lockfile churn, if any, and why>
- <any alert deliberately left, with the reason and a dismissal recommendation>

## Verification
- `<audit cmd>`: No known vulnerabilities found (moderate+)
- `<frozen-lockfile install>`: passes
- <build/test result or "relying on CI">

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

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Notes

• This sweeps all open alerts in one PR by default — don't ask which ones.
• Keep git add scoped to the manifests and lockfiles you changed.
• Don't use --no-verify; let hooks run.
• If the repo already has an open Dependabot-fix PR/branch, update it instead of opening a duplicate.