security-monitoring

name	security-monitoring
description	How to monitor and fix security issues in Massing — CodeQL alerts, dependency audits, secret scanning, and ReDoS/XXE fixes. Invoke after a push (standing directive) or when doing a hardening pass. Emphasises that a green CodeQL *run* != zero alerts.

Security monitoring — Massing

Standing directive: check CodeQL after every push and fix any HIGH that appears.

CodeQL — check ALERTS, not run status

A "CodeQL Advanced" workflow run showing completed success only means the scan executed — it does NOT mean zero alerts. Alerts live in the code-scanning API:

gh api repos/ibuilder/massing/code-scanning/alerts --jq '[.[] | select(.state=="open")] | length'
gh api "repos/ibuilder/massing/code-scanning/alerts?state=open&per_page=30" \
  --jq '.[] | "\(.rule.security_severity_level // .rule.severity) | \(.rule.id) | \(.most_recent_instance.location.path):\(.most_recent_instance.location.start_line)"'

After pushing a fix, wait for the next CodeQL run to re-scan, then re-query — the count drops when alerts auto-close.

Common fixes

• py/polynomial-redos (ReDoS): a free-text scanner using unbounded \d+ / [\d,]+ / \s* under re.search re-scans → polynomial on a crafted long string. Fix: bound the quantifiers ({1,n} not +/*) and cap the input (text[:20_000]) before the regex. Verify detection still works on real inputs + a 100k-char crafted input returns in <100 ms.
• XXE: parse untrusted XML with defusedxml.ElementTree.fromstring (catch ET.ParseError + defusedxml.common.DefusedXmlException → return empty). Never bare xml.etree.
• Weak-hash flags (py/weak-sensitive-data-hashing, bandit B324): SHA-1/MD5 used for non-crypto identity/cache keys → add usedforsecurity=False.

Local audits (run before a hardening release)

cd apps/web && npm audit --omit=dev
cd services/api && ./.venv/Scripts/python.exe -m bandit -r src ../data/src -ll -ii     # HIGH+MED, high-confidence
cd services/api && ./.venv/Scripts/python.exe -m pip_audit --progress-spinner off       # pip install pip-audit first
# secret scan (no gitleaks): grep the source tree for high-signal patterns, exclude node_modules/venv/tests

Pin CVE'd transitive deps in services/data/requirements.txt (e.g. pillow>=12.3.0).

Hand-audit checklist (HARDEN passes — beyond CodeQL's reach)

Run over a release range (git diff vX..vY --stat, then read the changed files). Every class below produced a real finding in the v0.3.510 HARDEN-2 pass:

• Privilege side doors: a stricter endpoint (admin + audited) whose work is ALSO reachable through a generic gate — the job queue (routers/jobs.py _KIND_MIN_ROLE), bulk endpoints, MCP dispatch. New privileged operations must gate every path, not just the front door, and audit each.
• Unbounded stored data → cheap-GET amplification: anything an editor stores that a viewer-level GET later evaluates (rules, configs, lists) needs count/size caps at save (rule_library.MAX_* is the pattern; schedule_baselines._MAX too).
• Payload caps must keep the NEWEST rows: order_by(asc).limit() silently hides everything created after row N — cap with desc().limit() then re-sort ascending for stable display.
• innerHTML interpolation: any file/server/model-derived free-text must pass esc() (panels, from ui/charts) or escapeHtml (viewer). Numbers/.toFixed/server-constant labels are fine. CodeQL catches some (js/xss-through-dom) but not all sinks.
• Hand-rolled parsers: operator splitting must be leftmost + quote-aware (the QUERY-DSL _find_op fix); validate what stored selectors will DO, not just that they parse — a silently-never-matching rule is a false "pass" downstream.
• Serializer/format parity on swaps: replacing a serializer (orjson) or parser needs the FULL suite as the parity gate + explicit deltas checked: non-str keys, float subclasses (numpy.float64), NaN/Infinity, tuples/sets, str subclasses.
• Live-UI teardown: modal/panel tools with timers or visibility state need an onClose hook (ui/result.ts showResult(title, render, onClose)) — closing must stop timers + restore state.
• External-format imports: skip container/rollup rows (MSPDI <Summary>1</Summary>; XER non-TASK tables) — named+dated summary rows import as phantom records otherwise.

Not a vulnerability (don't manufacture fixes)

Per the security-review exclusions: DoS/resource-exhaustion, secrets-on-disk (handled elsewhere), rate-limiting, SSRF that only controls the path, client-side authz, log-spoofing, outdated-dep advisories (handled separately). Fix concrete, exploitable HIGH/MED with a clear path.

See memory: codeql-monitoring, perf-sec-p0-patterns, innerhtml-xss-esc, query-dsl-selector-spine.