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board-deck

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Aktualisiert31. Mai 2026 um 17:04

Produce a board / executive security presentation — risk posture and direction, top risks in business terms, program progress against strategy, the metrics that matter, and investment asks tied to risk. Use to prepare for a board or leadership meeting. Audience is non-technical decision-makers.

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Quelle

jassics

jassics/awesome-claude-security

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Verwandte BerufeSOC

Basierend auf der SOC-Berufsklassifikation

Computersystem- und IT-ManagerFührungsberufe·SOC 11-3021

SKILL.md

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Structure (lead with the answer)

Bottom line — overall risk posture and direction vs. last review (1 slide).

Top risks — 3–5 in business terms (loss scenarios, not CVEs), with severity and trend (cyber-risk-quantification).

Program progress — where the strategy stands vs. plan; key wins and what's behind (security-strategy).

Metrics that matter — a small, stable set (e.g. risk reduction, critical remediation %, MTTR, coverage, incident trend) — consistent across meetings so trend is readable.

The ask — investment/decisions needed, each tied to the risk it reduces and the consequence of inaction.

Appendix — supporting detail, incidents, benchmarks, regulatory items.

Steps

Confirm the audience and the decision/ask this meeting must produce — build backward from it.

Pull the risk picture (cyber-risk-quantification) and program status (security-strategy); translate to business language, drop jargon.

Keep it tight: one message per slide, few stable metrics, clear asks.

Generate the visuals (posture scorecard, risk heat map, trend) with security-diagramming:infographic; assemble narrative via security-reporting:executive-summary.

Structure (lead with the answer)

Bottom line — overall risk posture and direction vs. last review (1 slide).

Top risks — 3–5 in business terms (loss scenarios, not CVEs), with severity and trend (cyber-risk-quantification).

Program progress — where the strategy stands vs. plan; key wins and what's behind (security-strategy).

Metrics that matter — a small, stable set (e.g. risk reduction, critical remediation %, MTTR, coverage, incident trend) — consistent across meetings so trend is readable.

The ask — investment/decisions needed, each tied to the risk it reduces and the consequence of inaction.

Appendix — supporting detail, incidents, benchmarks, regulatory items.

Steps

Confirm the audience and the decision/ask this meeting must produce — build backward from it.

Pull the risk picture (cyber-risk-quantification) and program status (security-strategy); translate to business language, drop jargon.

Keep it tight: one message per slide, few stable metrics, clear asks.

Generate the visuals (posture scorecard, risk heat map, trend) with security-diagramming:infographic; assemble narrative via security-reporting:executive-summary.

board-deck

Goal

Structure (lead with the answer)

Steps

Output

Notes

Goal

Structure (lead with the answer)

Steps

Output

Notes

name	board-deck
description	Produce a board / executive security presentation — risk posture and direction, top risks in business terms, program progress against strategy, the metrics that matter, and investment asks tied to risk. Use to prepare for a board or leadership meeting. Audience is non-technical decision-makers.