rootscan

name	rootscan
description	Systematic bug-hunting mode with logic reasoning. Use when user wants to find bugs before they happen — combines pattern-based detection (fast) with logic reasoning (deep) to find structural defects, design flaws, and edge cases. Forces 2-phase scan, severity rating, and actionable report before any fix.
triggers	["버그 찾아","버그 찾아줘","버그 있는지","버그 검사","버그 스캔","문제 찾아","취약점 찾아","취약점 검사","코드 검사","코드 리뷰","잠재적 버그","숨어있는 버그","안전한지 확인","보안 검사","성능 문제","메모리 누수","find bugs","scan bugs","code scan","vulnerability scan","security scan","performance issues","rootscan","루트스캔"]

rootscan — Logic-Driven Bug Hunting Mode

Don't wait for bugs to bite. Find them before they escape to production. When this skill activates, run 2-phase scan: Phase 1 (pattern detection) finds known anti-patterns, Phase 2 (logic reasoning) finds structural defects that only appear when understanding code flow.

Activation

Explicit: /rootscan

Auto-triggers (when these phrases appear in user message):

• "버그 찾아줘", "버그 있는지 확인"
• "취약점 찾아", "보안 검사"
• "코드 검사", "잠재적 버그"
• "성능 문제", "메모리 누수"
• "find bugs", "scan bugs", "vulnerability scan"

What's Different (vs general code review)

General Review	rootscan Mode
Read code + spot issues	2-phase: pattern scan (fast) + logic reasoning (deep)
Subjective "looks OK"	Severity-rated findings (🔴 HIGH / 🟡 MEDIUM / 🟢 LOW)
Mixed findings	Categorized report (Logic / Security / Performance / Type)
Text feedback	Actionable items (file:line + trace + fix suggestion)
One-pass read	Multi-pass: pattern → logic → cross-file → report
Finds known bugs	Finds known bugs + structural defects + design flaws

4-Category Bug Hunt

Category 1: Logic Bugs 🧩

What to find: Edge cases, race conditions, null/undefined handling gaps, off-by-one errors, async coordination issues.

Patterns to detect:

• Null/Undefined: obj.prop without obj?.prop or null check, array access without bounds check
• Edge Cases: loop with i < arr.length but arr[i+1] access, division without zero check, string operations without empty check
• Race Conditions: multiple asyncio.create_task or Promise.all with shared state mutation, no lock/event for concurrent access
• Async Coordination: await inside loop without considering parallelism, missing error handling in async tasks, dangling promises
• Off-by-One: range(len(arr)) then arr[i+1], slice(0, n) logic errors
• Boolean Logic: complex if conditions with mixed and/or, De Morgan's law violations, redundant checks

Detection method:

1. Grep for risky patterns: \.\w+\( without null check, arr\[.*\+.*\], asyncio.create_task, Promise.all
2. Read functions with >3 branches or >2 levels of nesting
3. Check all async functions for error handling + coordination

Severity rating:

• 🔴 HIGH: Null dereference in hot path, race on shared state, async coordination gap
• 🟡 MEDIUM: Missing edge case handling, off-by-one in non-critical path
• 🟢 LOW: Redundant checks, minor boolean logic simplification

---

Category 2: Security Vulnerabilities 🔒

What to find: SQL injection, XSS, command injection, path traversal, authentication bypass, authorization gaps, secrets in code.

Patterns to detect:

• Injection:
  • SQL: string concatenation in queries (f"SELECT * FROM {table}" or "SELECT * FROM " + table)
  • Command: os.system(user_input), subprocess.call with shell=True + user input
  • Path Traversal: open(user_path) without validation, ../ not blocked
  • XSS: HTML output with user input without escaping (innerHTML = userInput)
• Authentication/Authorization:
  • Missing auth check: endpoints without @require_auth decorator or similar
  • JWT: hardcoded secrets, no expiration check, no signature verification
  • Session: session ID in URL, no CSRF token
• Secrets:
  • Hardcoded: password = "...", API_KEY = "...", token = "..."
  • Logged: logger.info(f"password: {pw}"), sensitive data in error messages
• Cryptography:
  • Weak hash: MD5, SHA1 for passwords (instead of bcrypt/argon2)
  • ECB mode, hardcoded IV/salt

Detection method:

1. Grep for injection patterns: f".*SELECT.*{, os.system, subprocess.*shell=True, innerHTML
2. Grep for secrets: password\s*=\s*["'], api_key\s*=, token\s*=, secret\s*=
3. Check all route handlers for auth decorators
4. Check crypto usage: hashlib.md5, Cipher.*MODE_ECB

Severity rating:

• 🔴 HIGH: SQL injection, command injection, hardcoded secrets in production code, auth bypass
• 🟡 MEDIUM: Path traversal without validation, weak hash, missing CSRF
• 🟢 LOW: Secrets in test fixtures, verbose error messages

---

Category 3: Performance Issues ⚡

What to find: N+1 queries, memory leaks, infinite loops, O(n²) algorithms, redundant API calls, unindexed DB queries.

Patterns to detect:

• N+1 Query:
  • Loop with DB query inside: for item in items: db.query(...)
  • ORM lazy load in loop: for user in users: user.profile.name
• Memory Leaks:
  • Unclosed resources: open(file) without with, requests.get without .close()
  • Event listeners without cleanup: addEventListener without removeEventListener
  • Growing cache without eviction: unbounded dict/map used as cache
• Algorithmic:
  • Nested loops on same data: for i in arr: for j in arr:
  • Linear search in loop: for item in big_list: if item == x
  • Repeated sorting: sorted(arr) called multiple times on same data
• Redundant Work:
  • Same API call in loop: for id in ids: api.get(id)
  • Repeated computation: same calculation in loop without memoization

Detection method:

1. Grep for N+1: for.*in.*:.*\.(query|get|fetch)
2. Grep for unclosed: open\( not in with, requests\.(get|post) without context manager
3. Read nested loops (>2 levels)
4. Check functions with >50 lines for repeated patterns

Severity rating:

• 🔴 HIGH: N+1 query in production hot path, memory leak in long-running service
• 🟡 MEDIUM: O(n²) algorithm on medium-size data, unclosed file handle
• 🟢 LOW: Minor redundant computation, non-critical repeated API call

---

Category 4: Type Safety Holes 🏷️

What to find: any type abuse, type assertion without validation, runtime type mismatch, missing null checks in typed code.

Patterns to detect (TypeScript/Python typed context):

• Type Escape Hatches:
  • TypeScript: as any, @ts-ignore, // @ts-expect-error without explanation
  • Python: cast() without runtime check, # type: ignore without reason
• Runtime Mismatch:
  • JSON parsing without validation: JSON.parse(data) then direct property access
  • API response without schema check: response.data.field without validating structure
  • User input cast: int(user_input), Number(input) without try-catch
• Null Unsafety (in strict-null-check context):
  • Non-null assertion without check: obj!.prop, obj.prop! in TypeScript
  • Optional chaining overuse masking real issue: a?.b?.c?.d?.e (design smell)
• Type Declaration Drift:
  • Interface/type definition doesn't match actual usage
  • Function signature says X but returns X | null in some paths

Detection method:

1. Grep for escape hatches: as any, @ts-ignore, cast\(, # type: ignore
2. Grep for non-null assertions: !\\., \\..*!
3. Check JSON.parse call sites for validation
4. Run type checker and check for any in inferred types

Severity rating:

• 🔴 HIGH: as any in production code bypassing critical type check, JSON parse without validation in API handler
• 🟡 MEDIUM: @ts-ignore without explanation, missing null check in typed code
• 🟢 LOW: Type declaration comment out of sync, harmless any in test code

---

6-Step Scan Workflow

Step 1: Scope Definition

• What to scan: user specifies file/directory/entire project
• Focus area: user can request specific category (e.g., "security only") or all 4
• Depth:
  • shallow = entry points only (API handlers, main functions) + pattern scan
  • deep = all files + pattern scan + logic reasoning

Ask user if not clear:

Scanning scope:
- Files: [which files/directories?]
- Categories: [all 4, or specific ones?]
- Depth: [shallow = pattern scan only, deep = pattern + logic reasoning]

Default: If user says "버그 찾아줘" without specifying, use deep scan on current directory.

---

Step 2a: Pattern Detection (Phase 1 - Fast)

Purpose: Find known anti-patterns via automated checks.

For each category, run the detection method:

• Grep for known patterns
• Read flagged files
• Cross-reference with checklist

Output format per finding:

[Category] Severity: Issue Title
  File: path/to/file.py:42
  Pattern: [pattern name]
  Code:
    41 | def process(data):
    42 |     result = data.field  # ← no null check
    43 |     return result
  Why risky: [explanation]
  Fix suggestion: [actionable fix]

Time estimate: ~30 seconds per 1000 LOC

---

Step 2b: Logic Reasoning (Phase 2 - Deep)

Purpose: Find bugs that pattern matching can't catch — structural defects, design flaws, edge cases that only appear when understanding code flow.

When to run: Only when depth = deep. Skip if shallow.

7-Point Logic Reasoning Checklist

For each critical function (API handlers, core business logic, async coordinators):

1. State Flow Tracing

Question: "If I trace all possible state transitions, where does it break?"

Method:

• Identify all mutable state (class vars, DB fields, cache keys, async events)
• Trace state changes through function calls
• Look for paths where state becomes inconsistent

Example findings:

🔴 HIGH: State inconsistency in order processing
  File: services/order.py:67
  Logic: order.status = 'paid' but order.payment_id is None
  Why risky: Later code assumes payment_id exists when status='paid'
  Trace:
    - Line 45: status set to 'paid'
    - Line 52: payment_id set only if payment_method == 'card'
    - Line 67: returns order (payment_id may be None)
  Fix: Set payment_id before setting status, or add validation

2. Auth/Permission Boundary Check

Question: "Who can access what, and is it enforced everywhere?"

Method:

• Map all resources (DB rows, files, API data)
• Check if access control is consistent across read/write/delete
• Look for "owner checks" that only check user_id but not resource_id

Example findings:

🔴 HIGH: Authorization bypass in analysis results
  File: api/analysis.py:34
  Logic: Only checks user_id match, but analysis can be shared
  Why risky: User A shares analysis with User B → both have same user_id in sharing table
            → User C can read if they guess analysis_id
  Boundary: Should check (user_id OR analysis_id in user's shared list)
  Fix: Add analysis ownership/sharing check in middleware

3. Edge Case Enumeration

Question: "What inputs/states would make this function do something unexpected?"

Method:

• For each function, enumerate input dimensions: empty, zero, null, negative, very large, concurrent
• Check if each edge is handled

Example findings:

🟡 MEDIUM: Unhandled empty list in batch processor
  File: workers/batch.py:23
  Logic: Assumes items list is non-empty
  Edge cases:
    - items = [] → range(len(items)) = range(0) → loop never runs
    - Line 45: result[0] access → IndexError
  Why risky: Batch queue can send empty list during backpressure
  Fix: Add early return if not items

4. Async Coordination Gaps

Question: "What happens if two async tasks run this code at the same time?"

Method:

• Find all asyncio.create_task / Promise.all / background jobs
• Check shared resources (DB, cache, file, state)
• Look for read-modify-write without locks

Example findings:

🔴 HIGH: Race condition in token refresh
  File: auth/token.py:56
  Logic:
    T=0: Task A reads token (expires_at = T+5)
    T=1: Task B reads token (expires_at = T+5)
    T=2: Task A refreshes → new token written
    T=3: Task B refreshes → overwrites A's token with older one
  Why risky: Token becomes invalid, all requests fail
  Fix: Use lock or atomic compare-and-swap

5. Error Propagation Analysis

Question: "If step 3 fails, does step 5 know about it?"

Method:

• Trace error paths (try-except, return None, error callbacks)
• Check if errors propagate or get silently swallowed
• Look for "optimistic" code that assumes success

Example findings:

🟡 MEDIUM: Silent failure in notification sender
  File: notifications/email.py:78
  Logic:
    - send_email() catches all exceptions, logs, returns None
    - Caller doesn't check return value
    - User thinks notification sent, but it failed
  Why risky: Users miss critical alerts (payment failed, account locked)
  Fix: Return success/failure status, or raise exception

6. Data Schema Drift Detection

Question: "Does code assume a schema that may not be true?"

Method:

• Check API response handling: does code assume fields exist?
• Check DB queries: does code assume row shape matches model?
• Look for dict access data['field'] without checking key existence

Example findings:

🔴 HIGH: Missing field handling in external API response
  File: integrations/payment.py:45
  Logic: response.data.transaction_id accessed directly
  Schema risk:
    - External API docs say transaction_id is optional
    - Code assumes it always exists
    - Error: KeyError when payment pending (no transaction_id yet)
  Why risky: Breaks checkout flow
  Fix: Use response.data.get('transaction_id') with fallback

7. Implicit Assumptions Hunt

Question: "What does this code assume that might not be true?"

Method:

• Read function comments/docstrings for assumptions
• Check "obvious" behavior that's not validated
• Look for magic constants without explanation

Example findings:

🟡 MEDIUM: Unvalidated assumption about list order
  File: ranking/scorer.py:34
  Logic: Assumes items are sorted by score descending
  Assumption: Caller sorts before passing
  Risk: If caller doesn't sort, top 10 may not be actual top 10
  Evidence: No sorting in this function, no assertion
  Fix: Add assert items == sorted(items, key=...) or sort here

---

When to flag as finding vs. when to skip

Flag if:

• Assumption can be violated in real usage
• Failure mode is data loss / security breach / user-facing error
• Code in critical path (auth, payment, core business logic)

Skip if:

• Assumption is guaranteed by framework/library contract
• Only breaks in test scenarios
• Already covered by existing validation layer

---

Step 3: Severity Triage

Group findings by severity:

• 🔴 HIGH: Must fix before merge (blocks PR)
• 🟡 MEDIUM: Should fix soon (follow-up ticket)
• 🟢 LOW: Optional improvement (backlog)

---

Step 4: Cross-File Analysis

Some bugs only appear when reading multiple files together:

• Inconsistent Error Handling: one file throws, another returns null for same error
• Shared State Race: file A writes _cache[key], file B reads it without lock
• API Contract Drift: caller expects {status, data}, but handler returns {ok, result}

Method:

• Identify shared state (global vars, class attributes, DB tables)
• Trace access patterns across files
• Flag inconsistencies

This step is enhanced by Step 2b logic reasoning — cross-file issues are often caught during state flow tracing and async coordination checks.

---

Step 5: Report Generation

Summary:

🔴 HIGH: N findings (must fix)
🟡 MEDIUM: M findings (should fix)
🟢 LOW: L findings (optional)

Top 3 risks:
1. [most critical finding]
2. [second most critical]
3. [third most critical]

Detailed Findings (grouped by category → severity):

## 🧩 Logic Bugs
### 🔴 HIGH
- [finding 1]
- [finding 2]
### 🟡 MEDIUM
- [finding 3]

## 🔒 Security Vulnerabilities
### 🔴 HIGH
- [finding 4]
...

Actionable Next Steps:

Immediate (before merge):
1. Fix [file:line] - [issue]
2. Fix [file:line] - [issue]

Follow-up (next sprint):
1. Add [test/validation] for [pattern]
2. Refactor [area] to eliminate [risk]

Optional (backlog):
1. Consider [improvement]

---

Output Format

[rootscan — <scope>]

Scan Summary:
- Scope: [files/directories]
- Categories: [Logic / Security / Performance / Type]
- Depth: [shallow = pattern only / deep = pattern + logic reasoning]
- Phase 1 (Pattern): N findings
- Phase 2 (Logic): M findings (only if deep scan)
- Total Findings: 🔴 X HIGH / 🟡 Y MEDIUM / 🟢 Z LOW

Top 3 Risks:
1. [most critical]
2. [second most critical]
3. [third most critical]

---

## 🧩 Logic Bugs

### 🔴 HIGH
[findings...]

### 🟡 MEDIUM
[findings...]

### 🟢 LOW
[findings...]

---

## 🔒 Security Vulnerabilities
[same structure...]

---

## ⚡ Performance Issues
[same structure...]

---

## 🏷️ Type Safety Holes
[same structure...]

---

## Next Actions

🚨 Immediate (before merge):
1. [action]
2. [action]

📋 Follow-up (next sprint):
1. [action]

💡 Optional (backlog):
1. [action]

---

Confidence: HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW
Reason: [why this confidence level]

---

Termination Conditions

Scan complete → report delivered when ALL of:

• Scope clearly defined (files + categories + depth)
• Phase 1: Pattern detection run for all requested categories
• Phase 2: Logic reasoning performed (only if depth = deep)
  • State flow traced for critical functions
  • Auth/permission boundaries checked
  • Edge cases enumerated
  • Async coordination verified
  • Error propagation analyzed
  • Data schema drift checked
  • Implicit assumptions hunted
• Each finding has: file:line + severity + fix suggestion (+ trace if from Phase 2)
• Findings grouped by category → severity → phase
• Cross-file analysis performed (for deep scan)
• Top 3 risks identified
• Next actions classified (Immediate / Follow-up / Optional)
• Confidence declared (HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW + reason)

Any unchecked item → scan incomplete.

Confidence rating guide:

• HIGH: Deep scan completed, all 7 logic checks passed, cross-file analysis done
• MEDIUM: Pattern scan completed, partial logic reasoning (some checks skipped due to code complexity)
• LOW: Shallow scan only, or deep scan blocked by missing context (unclear requirements, external dependencies)

---

Anti-Patterns (forbidden in this mode)

1. "Looks OK to me" — skipping systematic checklist, relying on intuition
2. Pattern-only when user wants deep — skipping Phase 2 logic reasoning when depth = deep
3. Unfocused scan — reading code without specific pattern/logic check in mind
4. No severity — listing findings without priority (user can't triage)
5. Vague fix — "improve error handling" instead of "add try-catch at line 42"
6. False negatives — missing patterns because grep wasn't run, or missing logic flaws because trace wasn't done
7. Category mixing — security + performance in one finding (separate them)
8. Claiming HIGH confidence without Phase 2 — can't be HIGH if you skipped logic reasoning

---

Notes

• Derived from real-world code review sessions where critical bugs were missed because review was unfocused or pattern-only.
• Phase 2 logic reasoning is the differentiator — finds bugs that static analyzers can't catch.
• Pairs with rootfix: scan → find issue → rootfix → fix root cause.
• Works in any language. Adjust patterns per language (e.g., Python vs TypeScript vs Go).
• Can be run as pre-commit hook (shallow), PR gate (deep), or periodic audit (deep).
• Time estimate: shallow ~1 min per 1000 LOC, deep ~5 min per 1000 LOC (depends on complexity).

---

Example Usage

User: "버그 찾아줘 이 API 핸들러에"

Agent (rootscan activated):

[rootscan — api/handlers/]

Scan Summary:
- Scope: api/handlers/*.py
- Categories: All (Logic, Security, Performance, Type)
- Depth: Deep (pattern + logic reasoning)
- Phase 1 (Pattern): 3 findings
- Phase 2 (Logic): 2 findings
- Total Findings: 🔴 3 HIGH / 🟡 2 MEDIUM / 🟢 1 LOW

Top 3 Risks:
1. Authorization bypass in analysis results (logic reasoning - no pattern match)
2. SQL injection in user_search() - no parameterized query
3. Race condition in async cache update - no lock

---

## 🧩 Logic Bugs

### 🔴 HIGH (Phase 1 - Pattern)
**Race condition in cache update**
  File: api/cache.py:34
  Pattern: Shared state mutation without lock
  Code:
    33 | async def update_cache(key, value):
    34 |     _cache[key] = value  # ← no lock, multiple tasks can race
    35 |     await notify_subscribers(key)
  Why risky: Multiple concurrent calls can interleave, leading to lost updates
  Fix suggestion: Use asyncio.Lock() or single-writer pattern

### 🟡 MEDIUM (Phase 1 - Pattern)
**Missing null check in profile access**
  File: api/user.py:67
  Pattern: Null dereference
  Code:
    66 | user = get_user(id)
    67 | return user.profile.bio  # ← user could be None
  Why risky: If user not found, AttributeError crashes handler
  Fix suggestion: Add `if user is None: return 404` before access

---

## 🔒 Security Vulnerabilities

### 🔴 HIGH (Phase 1 - Pattern)
**SQL injection in search**
  File: api/search.py:23
  Pattern: String concatenation in SQL
  Code:
    22 | query = request.args.get('q')
    23 | sql = f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name LIKE '%{query}%'"  # ← injection!
    24 | results = db.execute(sql)
  Why risky: Attacker can inject `'; DROP TABLE users; --`
  Fix suggestion: Use parameterized query: `db.execute("... WHERE name LIKE ?", (f"%{query}%",))`

### 🔴 HIGH (Phase 2 - Logic Reasoning)
**Authorization bypass in analysis results**
  File: api/analysis.py:34
  Logic Check: Auth/Permission Boundary
  Code:
    33 | def get_analysis(analysis_id):
    34 |     analysis = db.query(Analysis).filter_by(id=analysis_id).first()
    35 |     if analysis.user_id == current_user.id:
    36 |         return analysis
  Why risky: Only checks user_id match, but analysis can be shared
  Trace:
    - User A creates analysis (owner)
    - User A shares with User B via sharing_table
    - User C guesses analysis_id → Line 34 succeeds
    - Line 35 fails (not owner) → but C already saw analysis in line 34 query
  Boundary violation: Should check (user_id == current OR analysis_id in shared_with_user)
  Fix suggestion: Add sharing check in query filter or middleware

---

## ⚡ Performance Issues

### 🟡 MEDIUM (Phase 1 - Pattern)
**N+1 query in user list**
  File: api/users.py:45
  Pattern: DB query inside loop
  Code:
    44 | for user in users:
    45 |     user.profile = db.query(Profile).filter_by(user_id=user.id).first()  # ← N queries
  Why risky: 1000 users = 1000 DB queries, scales poorly
  Fix suggestion: Use `joinedload(User.profile)` to fetch in one query

---

## 🏷️ Type Safety Holes

### 🟢 LOW (Phase 1 - Pattern)
**Type ignore without reason**
  File: api/utils.py:12
  Pattern: Type escape hatch
  Code:
    11 | def parse(data):
    12 |     return json.loads(data)  # type: ignore
  Why risky: Bypasses type checker, actual issue could be signature mismatch
  Fix suggestion: Add proper return type annotation or explain why ignore is needed

---

## Next Actions

🚨 Immediate (before merge):
1. Fix authorization bypass in api/analysis.py:34 [rootfix]
2. Fix SQL injection in api/search.py:23 [rootfix]
3. Fix race condition in api/cache.py:34 [rootfix]

📋 Follow-up (next sprint):
1. Add integration test for concurrent cache updates [rootbuild]
2. Add sharing matrix test for analysis permissions [rootbuild]
3. Refactor user list to use joinedload [rootclean]

💡 Optional (backlog):
1. Add type validation for JSON.parse calls [rootclean]

---

Confidence: HIGH
Reason: Deep scan completed - all 4 categories + 7 logic checks performed. Phase 2 found authorization bypass that pattern matching missed.