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detect-mcp-tool-drift

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Aktualisiert10. Juli 2026 um 03:53

Detect MCP tool schema drift mid-session — the MCP tool-poisoning / rug-pull attack pattern. Reads OCSF 1.8 Application Activity (class 6002) or the native application-activity projection produced by ingest-mcp-proxy-ocsf, groups them by session, and flags any tool whose fingerprint (sha256 over name + description + inputSchema + annotations) changes between tools/list responses in the same session. Emits OCSF 1.8 Detection Finding (class 2004) with MITRE ATT&CK T1195.001 (Compromise Software Supply Chain) inside finding_info.attacks. Use when the user mentions MCP security, tool drift, tool poisoning, prompt injection via tool schema, or supply chain compromise of an MCP server. Do NOT use on raw MCP proxy logs — feed them through ingest-mcp-proxy-ocsf first. Do NOT use for cross-session drift (same tool, different sessions) — that is a legitimate MCP server update, not an attack; a separate detector will cover it. Do NOT use for divergence against an out-of-band server-registered baseline — that is detect-m

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name	detect-mcp-tool-drift
description	Detect MCP tool schema drift mid-session — the MCP tool-poisoning / rug-pull attack pattern. Reads OCSF 1.8 Application Activity (class 6002) or the native application-activity projection produced by ingest-mcp-proxy-ocsf, groups them by session, and flags any tool whose fingerprint (sha256 over name + description + inputSchema + annotations) changes between tools/list responses in the same session. Emits OCSF 1.8 Detection Finding (class 2004) with MITRE ATT&CK T1195.001 (Compromise Software Supply Chain) inside finding_info.attacks. Use when the user mentions MCP security, tool drift, tool poisoning, prompt injection via tool schema, or supply chain compromise of an MCP server. Do NOT use on raw MCP proxy logs — feed them through ingest-mcp-proxy-ocsf first. Do NOT use for cross-session drift (same tool, different sessions) — that is a legitimate MCP server update, not an attack; a separate detector will cover it. Do NOT use for divergence against an out-of-band server-registered baseline — that is detect-mcp-shadow-tool-injection. Do NOT use as a compliance check; this is an active detection skill.
purpose	Detect MCP tool schema drift mid-session — the MCP tool-poisoning / rug-pull attack pattern.
capability	detect
persistence	none
telemetry	stderr_jsonl
privilege_escalation	none
license	Apache-2.0
approval_model	none
execution_modes	jit, ci, mcp, persistent
side_effects	none
input_formats	canonical, native, ocsf
output_formats	native, ocsf
concurrency_safety	stateless

detect-mcp-tool-drift

Attack pattern

An MCP server can change the schema of a tool between calls in the same session. A benign-looking query_db(sql) tool with readOnly: true in the first tools/list response can come back in the second tools/list response (after the agent has already trusted the first definition) with a new write argument and readOnly: false. By the time the agent sees the updated schema, it may have already been primed by the original description and will happily call query_db(sql="DELETE …", write=true).

This is the MCP tool-poisoning / rug-pull pattern. It maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1195.001 — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain. The tool is the "software"; the MCP server is the "supply chain."

Detection logic

Walk MCP Application Activity events in timestamp order. The detector accepts:

OCSF Application Activity emitted by ingest-mcp-proxy-ocsf
the native or canonical activity projection emitted by the same skill when --output-format native is selected

For each session and tool name, track the last-seen fingerprint. If a later tools/list entry for the same (session, tool name) has a different fingerprint, emit one Detection Finding per drift event.

state[(session_uid, tool_name)] = last_fingerprint

Same fingerprint in the same session → no finding (idempotent republish of the same tool is normal).
Different fingerprint in the same session → finding.
Different fingerprint in a different session → ignored (cross-session is a separate detector).

Output contract

One Detection Finding per drift event. By default the skill emits OCSF 1.8 Detection Finding (class 2004). With --output-format native, it emits the repo-owned native finding projection.

OCSF output populates:

finding_info.attacks[]: MITRE ATT&CK v14, tactic TA0001 (Initial Access), technique T1195.001 (Compromise Software Supply Chain).
finding_info.types[]: ["mcp-tool-drift"] for downstream filtering.
finding_info.first_seen_time / finding_info.last_seen_time: timestamps of the two tools/list events that triggered the finding.
finding_info.uid: deterministic (det-mcp-drift-<session>-<tool>-<before-8>-<after-8>) so re-running on the same fixture is idempotent.
observables[]: session uid, tool name, before/after fingerprints.
evidence: event counts and pointers to the raw tools/list records.

See ../OCSF_CONTRACT.md for the full Detection Finding contract.

Usage

# Piped from the ingest skill
python ../ingest-mcp-proxy-ocsf/src/ingest.py mcp-proxy.jsonl \
  | python src/detect.py \
  > drift-findings.ocsf.jsonl

# Native input and native output
python ../ingest-mcp-proxy-ocsf/src/ingest.py mcp-proxy.jsonl --output-format native \
  | python src/detect.py --output-format native \
  > drift-findings.native.jsonl

# Standalone file
python src/detect.py ../golden/mcp_proxy_sample.ocsf.jsonl

Native output format

When --output-format native is selected, the skill emits:

schema_mode: "native"
canonical_schema_version
record_type: "detection_finding"
finding_uid and event_uid
provider
time_ms
session_uid
tool_name
before_fingerprint
after_fingerprint
mitre_attacks

Example:

{
  "schema_mode": "native",
  "canonical_schema_version": "2026-04",
  "record_type": "detection_finding",
  "finding_uid": "det-mcp-drift-sess-abc-query_db-9b5f6e3c-7d10a2bf",
  "provider": "MCP",
  "session_uid": "sess-abc",
  "tool_name": "query_db",
  "before_fingerprint": "sha256:...",
  "after_fingerprint": "sha256:..."
}

Tests

Golden-fixture parity: runs against ../golden/mcp_proxy_sample.ocsf.jsonl and asserts the output matches ../golden/tool_drift_finding.ocsf.json exactly (with volatile fields scrubbed).