inventory-security-tools

name	inventory-security-tools
description	OBSERVE: discover the host's OWN defensive tooling and bring it into scope — fail2ban, sshguard, CrowdSec, rkhunter, chkrootkit, auditd, ClamAV, AIDE, debsecan/arch-audit, wazuh/ossec. Reports what is present, whether it is actually effective, and flags a whole class of defense that is missing. Read-only; never installs or enables anything.
lane	coding
allowed-tools	Read, Glob, Grep, Bash

inventory-security-tools (Grammar / Observe)

claude-watchman wraps battle-tested tools instead of reinventing them. This skill makes that concrete from the other direction: it asks what defensive tools does this box already run, brings each into scope, and checks it is actually doing its job — then flags any whole class of defense (brute-force protection, rootkit checking, host audit, file-integrity baseline) that is missing entirely. The box's own toolset shapes what gets monitored. Read-only security / integrity / config findings.

PRIME DIRECTIVE (outranks everything below). Do nothing destructive. If any action would delete or overwrite a file or directory, modify a database in any way, sever access (firewall/SSH/auth), or stop/remove a service or package — STOP, WARN the operator in plain language why it is destructive, and ASK for explicit per-action permission before proceeding. In the unattended loop there is no one to ask, so the action does not happen: record it and surface it instead. The only non-destructive database operation is routine create-or-update through lib/journal.sh. This rule has no exceptions and no mode that overrides it.

What it does NOT do (the ownership boundary)

It is discovery + health + gap detection only, and strictly read-only — it never runs a scan (no rkhunter --check, no clamscan, no aide --check) and never installs, enables, or configures a tool. Where another engine already owns a tool's deeper finding, this skill emits only the info inventory row and defers: CrowdSec hub freshness and ClamAV/AIDE/CVE-scanner currency belong to check-security-currency; CrowdSec inbound alerts belong to inspect-logs; AIDE file checks belong to integrity. No finding is duplicated.

When to use

Every /watchman audit / /watchman loop / /watchman inventory, after inventory-services (which inventories the service surface — web/db/runtime). Relevant on both profiles; the gap checks are profile-aware (rootkit/audit gaps are server-only, via lib/profile.sh).

Workflow

1. Preflight. Run every claude-watchman function through the dispatcher — bash lib/wm <function> [args…] — which sources the libs (lib/journal.sh, lib/distro.sh, lib/profile.sh, lib/sectools.sh, lib/io-courtesy.sh) under bash internally; never source lib/… directly (dontAsk refuses a dot-source). Initialize with bash lib/wm journal_init. Determine the machine's family and profile by running bash lib/wm watchman_family and bash lib/wm watchman_profile and reading the printed values — use them to decide which checks apply. You do NOT pass them to journal_upsert (it auto-resolves them; pass "" ""). I/O courtesy: the observe step reads a couple of last-run logs; IF bash lib/wm io_should_defer_heavy, journal a capacity/info/safe diagnostic_deferred (target=inventory-security-tools): first run bash lib/wm io_pressure_reason, then set detail to its printed output (no $(…)). Skip this pass.
2. Scan. Run bash lib/wm sectools_scan. It is read-only — it detects each registry tool, reads its live status and the tail of any existing last-run log (never triggering a scan), and emits one TSV finding-candidate per row: category \t severity \t risk_tier \t check_id \t target \t title \t detail \t remediation. It emits: an info inventory row per present tool (check_id=sectool_inventory, target=<tool>); a health row when a present tool is degraded — inactive, no jails, zero audit rules (check_id=sectool_health, review tier); and an absent-defense row per uncovered class (check_id=defense_gap_*, manual tier). No rows beyond inventory = the defenses are present and healthy.
3. Journal each record through the dispatcher exactly as emitted (pass "" "" for family/profile — journal_upsert auto-resolves them): bash lib/wm journal_upsert "" "" <category> <severity> <risk_tier> <check_id> <target> <title> <detail> <remediation>. target is the tool (inventory/health) or the class (gaps), so a defense that goes degraded or a tool that is removed regresses loudly on the next run.
4. Tiers — never apply. Inventory rows are info/safe context. A sectool_health row is review: the fix (e.g. systemctl enable --now <unit>) is shown and confirmed per-finding by the operator-run watchman fix — never the loop. A defense_gap_* row is manual: installing software is the operator's call; explain it and hand it back. NEVER install, enable, or configure a tool here.
5. Summarize. Lead with the most important gap (e.g. a public server with no brute-force protection) or any degraded defense; then name the protective tools that ARE present and healthy. If everything is covered, say the box's defensive tooling looks complete.

Grounding

All claude-watchman functions below are reached via bash lib/wm <function> — the dispatcher sources these libs internally; never source lib/… directly.

• lib/sectools.sh — sectools_scan (the registry + observe engine), sectools_present (present tools for the summary). Knob: WATCHMAN_FLAG_AV_ABSENT (flag absent antivirus; off by default).
• lib/distro.sh — pkg_is_installed, service_status, pkg_install_cmd, watchman_family.
• lib/profile.sh — profile_severity for sectool_health / defense_gap_* (single source of severity + profile-gating; rootkit/audit gaps are server-only).
• lib/io-courtesy.sh — io_should_defer_heavy / io_pressure_reason (defer under load).
• lib/journal.sh — journal_upsert (per-tool / per-class findings; regress over time).
• skills/grammar/check-security-currency, skills/grammar/inspect-logs, skills/grammar/audit-system — own the deferred deep findings (hub/signature/CVE currency, inbound alerts, Lynis).
• skills/rhetoric/fix-redflag — applies a sectool_health repair (review-tier, confirmed).
• manifest.json — declared permissions (sectool_status, sectool_log_paths, service_status, pkg_query).