guard

name	guard
description	Use when making git operations, handling secrets, committing code, or dealing with credentials. Enforces git safety rules (no force-push to main, no amend of published commits), secret-handling discipline (never commit .env, use .env.example), and destructive-command caution.

Safety Guardrails

Git Safety

Rule	Why
Never force push to main/master	Destroys team history, breaks CI
Never git reset --hard without explicit confirmation	Irreversible data loss
Never amend published commits	Creates divergent history for collaborators
Never skip pre-commit hooks (--no-verify)	Hooks catch real issues
Stage specific files by name	git add . risks committing secrets or binaries
Never commit .env, credentials, API keys	Secrets in git history are permanent
Verify current branch before pushing	Avoid pushing to wrong branch
Never force-push to someone else's branch	Only to your own fork branches

Destructive Commands

These commands need explicit user confirmation before running:

Command	Risk
rm -rf	Permanent file deletion
git reset --hard	Discards uncommitted changes
git push --force	Overwrites remote history
git clean -fdx	Deletes untracked files including gitignored
DROP TABLE / TRUNCATE	Irreversible data loss
kill -9 on shared processes	May corrupt state
Modifying CI/CD pipelines	Visible to whole team

Secrets and Credentials

Never Commit

• .env files, .env.* (except .env.example)
• API keys, access tokens, bearer tokens
• Passwords, connection strings with credentials
• Private keys (.pem, .key, id_rsa)
• OAuth client secrets
• Cloud provider credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure)

Use Placeholders

.env.example with placeholder values is safe to commit:

DATABASE_URL=postgresql://user:password@localhost:5432/dbname
API_KEY=your-api-key-here
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE

If Real Credentials Are in Git History

1. Rotate the credential immediately -- git history is permanent and public
2. Use git filter-repo or BFG to remove from history
3. Force-push cleaned history (coordinate with team)
4. Audit access logs for suspicious use

Scan Before Committing

# Check staged changes for common secret patterns
git diff --cached | grep -iE 'api[_-]?key|secret|password|token|bearer' | grep -v example

# Tools
gitleaks detect --source=. --verbose
trufflehog git file://. --only-verified

Code Security Basics

Rule	Why
Validate user input at system boundaries	Prevents injection attacks
Use parameterized queries, never string concat	SQL injection
Sanitize data before rendering in templates	XSS
Use bcrypt/argon2 for password hashing	MD5/SHA are broken for passwords
Set CORS origins from env, never wildcard in prod	Cross-origin attacks
HTTPS only, no mixed content	MITM attacks
Rate-limit authentication endpoints	Credential stuffing / brute force

Dependency Safety

• Check vulnerabilities before adding new packages (npm audit, pip-audit, cargo audit)
• Prefer well-maintained packages with active security response
• Pin dependency versions in lock files
• Review package permissions (scripts, post-install hooks)
• Watch for typosquatting: reqeusts vs requests, expresss vs express

Working with Shared Systems

Actions that affect others need confirmation:

• Pushing code (affects CI, teammates)
• Creating/closing/commenting on PRs or issues
• Sending messages (Slack, email, GitHub)
• Modifying shared infrastructure
• Deploying to staging/production

Third-Party Uploads

Uploading content to external tools publishes it:

• Pastebins, gists, diagram renderers
• Cloud storage with sharable links
• AI chatbots (data may be retained/trained on)

Before uploading: is this content sensitive? PII, internal architecture, credentials?

Anti-Patterns

Anti-Pattern	Problem	Do Instead
git add .	Accidentally stages secrets, binaries	Stage specific files by name
--no-verify to skip hooks	Bypasses real safety checks	Fix the hook failure, or ask why it's failing
Force push to shared branch	Destroys teammates' work	Rebase locally, only force-push your own branches
Committing secrets "just temporarily"	Git history is permanent	Never, always use .env.example
"It's just a test credential"	Real bad actors scan GitHub	Rotate and remove from history
rm -rf based on LLM suggestion	LLMs hallucinate paths	Verify path manually, dry-run with ls first