sysdig-runtime-remediate

name	sysdig-runtime-remediate
description	Close the runtime loop on a Sysdig-detected threat: turn the investigation context into proposed response actions, analyse the blast radius on the affected workload, and execute (or file) the actions the user approves — one at a time, with explicit confirmation. Triggers: "remediate this runtime threat", "respond to event <id>", "act on this incident", "isolate / kill / pause that container", "/sysdig-runtime-remediate". Not for vulnerability fixes (use sysdig-remediate) or threat investigation itself (use sysdig-runtime-investigate).
allowed-tools	["Read","Write","Glob","Grep","AskUserQuestion","Bash(kubectl get*)","Bash(kubectl describe*)","Bash(kubectl logs*)","Bash(kubectl version*)","Bash(kubectl config current-context*)","Bash(kubectl auth can-i*)","Bash(kubectl patch*)","Bash(kubectl label*)","Bash(kubectl annotate*)","Bash(kubectl scale*)","Bash(kubectl delete networkpolicy*)","Bash(kubectl rollout*)","Bash(aws sts get-caller-identity*)","Bash(aws iam get-role*)","Bash(aws iam list-*)","Bash(aws iam get-role-policy*)","Bash(aws iam get-access-key-last-used*)","Bash(aws cloudtrail lookup-events*)","Bash(aws iam attach-role-policy*)","Bash(aws iam detach-role-policy*)","Bash(aws iam delete-access-key*)","Bash(aws iam update-access-key*)","Bash(curl *events.pagerduty.com*)","mcp__secure-mcp-server__list_runtime_events","mcp__secure-mcp-server__get_event_info","mcp__secure-mcp-server__get_event_process_tree","mcp__secure-mcp-server__run_sysql","mcp__secure-mcp-server__get_customer_settings","mcp__secure-mcp-server__list_response_actions","mcp__secure-mcp-server__submit_response_action","mcp__secure-mcp-server__get_response_action_status","mcp__secure-mcp-server__list_response_action_executions","mcp__secure-mcp-server__undo_response_action","mcp__secure-mcp-server__get_capture_storage","mcp__atlassian__getVisibleJiraProjects","mcp__atlassian__createJiraIssue"]

First-run notice (Public Beta)

Before doing any other work for this skill, perform this one-time check:

1. If ~/.config/sysdig-bloom/disclaimer-shown-v1 exists, skip the rest of this section.

2. Otherwise, display the following message to the user verbatim, preserving the markdown link, in a single message:

   This plugin is a Public Beta release. It is provided "as is" and "as available," without warranties of any kind. By installing this plugin, you agree to the Public Beta Terms available in the repository readme.

3. Create the marker file ~/.config/sysdig-bloom/disclaimer-shown-v1 using the Write tool (any short content, e.g. the current UTC timestamp).

4. Then continue with the user's request.

When you need to ask a question, get confirmation, or present choices, use the AskUserQuestion tool if available.

Input

Three invocation forms:

• /sysdig-runtime-remediate — no argument. Ask the user for an event_id.
• /sysdig-runtime-remediate <event_id> — directed. Load the case for that event.
• Auto-handoff from sysdig-runtime-investigate — the predecessor skill invokes this one with the event_id already loaded. Open with: "sysdig-runtime-investigate handed off <event_id>. Loading the case file and starting Step B (architecture probe)."

Principles

The flow is Steps A through F, not rigid phases. Steps describe shape; the LLM decides ordering within and across them when the signals support it. The hard guardrails are non-negotiable:

• Read-only probing runs immediately. Step B's kubectl/SysQL/AWS reads are read-only; no confirmation gate beyond initial per-session authorization for the surface.
• Every destructive action requires its own explicit yes. Per Bloom S-01 and S-03: no batch confirmation, no implicit consent.
• Show before doing. For every action, restate the exact payload, the expected effect, what it breaks (per references/consequence-analysis-guide.md), reversibility, and the undo path. Then ask.
• Just-in-time authorization for kubectl / AWS. Detect availability at the start. Only ask to authorize the surface when an action actually needs it. Session-scoped (in-memory only, never persisted).
• Narrate every step. Before every tool call — SysQL query, kubectl, AWS CLI, Response Actions API submission, MCP write — say what you're about to do.
• One question per turn. Never bundle.
• Status vocabulary. done / pending / in_progress / failed / skipped / cleared / still_active / inconclusive.
• Cite every claim. Findings in Step B reference their source (SysQL query, kubectl command, AWS API call, MCP tool, case file line).
• Don't fabricate. If the case file didn't say what role the pod assumes, don't guess. Say "unknown — probe with X" or ask.

Steps

Step A ──→ Step B ──→ Step C ──→ Step D ──→ Step E ──→ Step F
Understand  Probe     Propose    Execute    Watch       Report &
context     blast     actions    (per-      (~5 min)    persist
            radius                action)

Step 0 — Preflight

Run all of these before Step A. Surface a single one-line connectivity summary at the end.

1. Trust preamble. Present references/trust-preamble.md verbatim. Do not pause for confirmation; the preamble is informational.
2. MCP authentication preflight (hard-block). Run the preflight in references/auth-preflight.md and follow its instructions exactly. This skill requires the Sysdig MCP for state, event lookups, and Response Actions — degraded mode is not supported. If the preflight returns State 2 (registered but not authenticated) or State 3 (not reachable), emit its verbatim message and stop — no data calls, no state read, no file writes.
3. Response Actions canary. Call mcp__secure-mcp-server__list_response_actions once (no arguments). If it errors, surface the message and stop — the Response Actions API is unreachable, so nothing can be remediated. Success only proves the API is reachable and returns the tenant-wide capability catalog — it does not mean any given action can execute on this cluster or host. Per-scope responder availability (a CLUSTER responder may not be deployed on the target cluster) and remote-storage configuration (needed by output-producing actions) are tenant/cluster-specific and are confirmed later, in Step C and at submit time. Do not promise the user an action is runnable on the strength of this canary alone.
4. kubectl & AWS availability detection (no authorization yet). Run command -v kubectl and command -v aws. Record availability. Do not ask to authorize either surface yet; that happens in Step D when an action actually needs it.
5. Ticketing probe (no-block). Look for mcp__atlassian__* (Jira) and the standard PagerDuty env vars. Used by the file-as-ticket fallback in Step D.

Connectivity line example:

Sysdig ✓ · MCP ✓ · Response Actions API ✓ · kubectl detected (unauthorized) · aws detected (unauthorized) · Jira ✓ · PagerDuty —. Light tier will use Jira if you decline an action.

Step A — Understand the context

Goal: load the threat into memory along with an explicit inventory of what's known and what's missing.

1. Resolve the input.
   • Auto-handoff or <event_id> argument → load the case directly.
   • No argument → ask for an event ID via AskUserQuestion.
2. Find the prior case file. Look for /tmp/sysdig-runtime-investigate-<event_id_short>-*.md. If it exists, read it and treat the contents as authoritative for what the threat is and where it lives.
3. Gating prompt — no prior case. If no case file exists, ask via AskUserQuestion how to proceed:
   • Auto-investigate (recommended) — announce the handoff and invoke sysdig-runtime-investigate <event_id>. When it completes, read the new case file and continue.
   • Lightweight — do minimal inline investigation in Step B (process tree, immediate workload metadata, no cross-cluster sweep). No case file written.
   • Raw — proceed without investigation. Banner-warn: "Consequence analysis will be best-effort — much of Step B will say 'unknown'."
4. Inventory. Print a structured summary to the user — what's known (from case file + event lookup + state) and what's missing:

   Known:
     - event.id, threat type, MITRE tactic
     - cluster, namespace, workload kind/name, container id, process tree
     - AWS account (if surfaced), correlated CVEs
     - prior investigation handoff (Jira/PagerDuty ticket, if any)
   Gaps:
     - <e.g.> ServiceAccount and RBAC not yet enumerated
     - <e.g.> Cloud identity not confirmed
     - <e.g.> Inbound/outbound Service map unknown
   

Step B — Architecture & blast-radius probe (read-only)

Goal: produce the mini-map described in references/consequence-analysis-guide.md. Read-only — no destructive ops here, no authorization gate beyond per-surface read access.

1. SysQL first. Run the queries in references/architecture-probing.md under the "Sysdig MCP — SysQL recipes" section. Workload identity, Service/Ingress map, ServiceAccount + RBAC, cloud identity.
2. kubectl read-only (optional). If kubectl is detected and the user has not authorized any kubectl access yet, first verify the local context actually points at the threat's cluster — don't ask for a grant you can't use. Run kubectl config current-context (read-only, pre-authorized) and compare it against the threat's kubernetes.cluster.name. If they clearly mismatch, say so plainly — "Local kube-context is <ctx>, but the threat is on <cluster>; kubectl probing here would target the wrong cluster" — and do not offer the grant. Instead offer to skip kubectl (continue MCP-only, degraded) or let the user switch context and re-run Step B. Only when the context matches (or you can't tell) ask: "Authorize read-only kubectl access (get, describe, logs) for cluster <context> for this session? This lets me probe pod ownership, NetworkPolicy state, PDB/HPA constraints, and sidecars. yes / read-only / no." On yes or read-only, run the kubectl recipes from architecture-probing.md. On no, declare the gap and continue with degraded fidelity.
3. AWS read-only (optional). If the threat implicates cloud identity (case file mentions IRSA, IMDS access, IAM role usage) and AWS CLI is detected, first verify the active credentials match the threat's account. Run aws sts get-caller-identity (read-only, pre-authorized) and compare the returned Account against the threat's aws.accountId. If they mismatch, say so — "Active AWS profile is account <id>, but the threat is in <accountId>; these reads would hit the wrong account" — and do not offer the grant; offer to skip (note the cloud-identity gap) or let the user switch profile and re-run. Only when the account matches (or you can't tell) ask: "Authorize read-only AWS CLI access with profile <profile> for account <id> for this session? This lets me check the IAM role, attached policies, and recent CloudTrail activity. yes / read-only / no." On yes or read-only, run the AWS recipes from architecture-probing.md.
4. Render the mini-map. Use the shape shown in consequence-analysis-guide.md. Lead with workload identity, then inbound, outbound, sidecars, cloud identity, PDB/HPA, RBAC. Cite the source for every line.

Step C — Propose actions with consequence analysis

Goal: a single, ordered checklist of candidate actions, each with its full consequence analysis. Accept user response as either checkbox selections or natural language.

1. Discover applicable actions. Call mcp__secure-mcp-server__list_response_actions with context_event_id: <event_id> to get Sysdig's tenant-specific catalog with parameter schemas, scoped to the event's responder context. Two outcomes:

   • Non-empty → treat it as the executable set for this event; propose only from it.
   • Empty ({"data":[]}) → this is inconclusive, not "nothing is possible" (the API can't always resolve responder availability from event context alone). Fall back to the full catalog (call list_response_actions with no context_event_id) and apply the availability preflight below.

   Pair the catalog with the threat patterns in references/threat-patterns.md and your reasoning over the investigation + probe findings.

2. Availability preflight (before you propose). There is no read-only "list responders / storage config" endpoint, so confirm what can actually run using the cheap signals available, and be honest about residual uncertainty:

   • Responder scope. Every action has a responderType (HOST / CLUSTER / CLOUD). A CLUSTER responder may not be deployed on the target cluster; submitting then returns HTTP 400 responder_not_found. Use list_response_actions with context_event_id (if non-empty) and mcp__secure-mcp-server__list_response_action_executions (which responderTypes have recently completed in this tenant) as hints. When unconfirmed, label the action's availability unconfirmed rather than available.
   • Storage dependency. GET_LOGS, CAPTURE, and FILE_ACQUIRE write artifacts and require capture storage; without it they return HTTP 412 storage_not_configured. Before proposing them, call mcp__secure-mcp-server__get_capture_storage: if it returns isEnabled: false or no bucket, mark these storage-dependent actions unavailable up front rather than discovering the 412 at submit.
   • Parameter resolvability. HOST + container-scoped actions (KILL_CONTAINER, STOP_CONTAINER, PAUSE_CONTAINER, container-scoped FILE_ACQUIRE) need a runtime container.id. If neither the event payload, the process tree, nor a context-matched kubectl can supply it, mark the action un-parameterizable and don't propose it as runnable.
   • Fail-fast at execution. The first submit of a given responder scope (or the first storage-dependent action) is the authoritative capability probe. On responder_not_found, mark all remaining same-scope candidates unavailable; on storage_not_configured, mark all storage-dependent candidates unavailable — then re-present the revised set instead of marching the user through actions that will fail identically. See Error handling.

3. Build the checklist. For each candidate action, render the format from consequence-analysis-guide.md:

   [ ] <ACTION_TYPE> (<short scope, e.g. "PID 4823 in container abc123">)
       What it does:  <one sentence>
       Expected:      <intended effect, where it shows up>
       Breaks:        <concrete consequences pulled from Step B>
       Reversibility: <yes via undo / no — explain how>
       Surface:       <Sysdig API / kubectl / AWS CLI>
       Responder:     <HOST / CLUSTER / CLOUD — availability: confirmed | unconfirmed>
       Preconditions: <e.g. needs RA storage / needs container.id (resolved? y/n) / needs CLUSTER responder>
   

   If an action's availability is unconfirmed or a precondition is unmet, say so in the line and order it accordingly — don't present a likely-to-fail action as the confident first move.

4. Order with explicit reasoning. Lead the list with the action you'd recommend first; explain why this order in one or two sentences referencing what Step B found. Per the generic principle in threat-patterns.md: evidence first, containment second, destruction last. Prefer actions whose availability is confirmed over unconfirmed ones when they achieve the same containment.

5. Ask once. Via AskUserQuestion with a free-form option: "Pick which actions to run, in this order, or describe what you'd prefer in your own words." Accept structured selections or free-form descriptions; parse natural-language responses against the action list and confirm your interpretation back to the user before proceeding.

Step D — Execute, one at a time, with strong announcement

For each accepted action in the proposed order:

1. Re-state the action. Even if you proposed it three turns ago, restate immediately before execution: exact payload, expected effect, what to watch, undo path, cancel option.
2. Repeat the disclaimer when destructive. If reversibility = no, include: "This action is not reversible by the API. If you change your mind, recovery requires <concrete manual step>."
3. Just-in-time authorization (if needed). If the action requires a surface (kubectl mutating, aws mutating) and you only have read-only authorization for that surface, ask now: "This action needs write access to <surface> (specifically: <command shape>). Authorize for this action? yes / no (file as ticket instead)."
4. Execute.
   • Sysdig API: call mcp__secure-mcp-server__submit_response_action with action_type and parameters. Capture the execution id from the response, then poll mcp__secure-mcp-server__get_response_action_status with that action_execution_id until status is COMPLETED or FAILED. Surface the result inline.
   • kubectl: run the exact command shown in step 1. Capture stdout/exit-code.
   • AWS CLI: run the exact command shown in step 1. Capture stdout/exit-code.
5. Decline → file-as-ticket fallback. If the user declines this action, offer: "File this as a Jira ticket / PagerDuty incident with the exact command and rationale, so a human can execute manually? yes / skip." Build the payload from the action's rendered block (Step C) plus the consequence analysis from Step B.
6. Narrate result. One line before the next action: "<ACTION> <status>. <key detail>. Next: <NEXT_ACTION>."

Step E — Verification watcher

Only if at least one action ran (status executed). Skip if everything was filed or skipped.

1. Capture the workload selector (cluster + namespace + workload, or container id, or pod name — whichever survives the action).
2. Poll mcp__secure-mcp-server__list_runtime_events at ~30 s intervals, up to 10 polls (~5 min), filtering for the same rule that fired on the same workload.
3. Narrate progress: "Watcher 1/10: 0 re-fires. ... 5/10: 0 re-fires." Once per minute is plenty; don't spam.
4. Close as:
   • cleared — full window, no re-fires.
   • still_active — at least one re-fire. Surface the new event id, prompt the user to consider next steps (escalate to a heavier action, file a ticket).
   • inconclusive — the workload disappeared mid-window (action was successful enough to remove the watch target). Treat as success-with-caveat.

Step F — Report

1. Present the report inline. Render the following sections in the chat:
   • Header: event ID, threat summary, remediation outcome.
   • Context inventory from Step A.
   • Architecture mini-map from Step B (mark which lines came from which probe).
   • Action table: action / proposed reason / user decision / execution status / undo URL.
   • Watcher timeline from Step E.
   • Audit trail with UTC timestamps for every action taken.
2. Append to the investigation ticket if one was created during this session (Jira/PagerDuty). Add a section "Remediation log" with the action table.
3. 2-paragraph chat summary. Lead with the outcome (cleared / still_active / inconclusive), then the actions taken. Mention any filed tickets explicitly.

Error handling

Apply the canonical Bloom three-line error template (what / why / fix) for every failure path. Keep messages under four lines. Examples:

Response Actions API returned 403 on submit ISOLATE_NETWORK. Your token is missing the containment-response-actions.exec permission. Either ask an admin to grant it, or pick file as ticket to record the proposed action and re-run after the grant.

submit ISOLATE_NETWORK returned HTTP 400 responder_not_found (scope clusterName:<cluster>). No CLUSTER responder is deployed on that cluster — only the node/host agent is registered. Mark every remaining CLUSTER-scope action unavailable, re-present the revised set (HOST/CLOUD only, plus file-as-ticket), and recommend deploying the Sysdig cluster responder for in-product remediation. Do not submit the other CLUSTER actions — they fail identically.

submit GET_LOGS returned HTTP 412 storage_not_configured. This action stores an artifact, but Response Actions remote storage isn't configured in the tenant. Mark GET_LOGS / CAPTURE / FILE_ACQUIRE all unavailable for this run; ask an admin to configure RA remote storage, or proceed with non-storage actions (ISOLATE/KILL/restart).

kubectl probe failed: error: You must be logged in to the server (Unauthorized). The current kube-context's credentials expired. Refresh with kubectl config use-context <ctx> / SSO login, then re-run Step B.

Watcher couldn't find the container in list_runtime_events. The container ID is gone — the kill succeeded. Closing the watcher as inconclusive (success-with-caveat).

Important rules

• Never bundle confirmations. Every destructive action gets its own explicit yes, even when the user said "yes to all three" earlier.
• Never execute a non-destructive action without confirmation either. Read-only probing in Step B runs immediately, but anything in Step D — including data-gathering actions like FILE_ACQUIRE that consume tenant quota — needs a yes for that specific action.
• Never persist surface authorizations. kubectl/AWS authorization is per-session, in-memory only. Next session asks again.
• Never act outside the threat's scope. If the user asks to remediate something unrelated, refuse and point them at a fresh /sysdig-runtime-remediate invocation.
• Always cite undo when an action is reversible. Give the exact undo call — mcp__secure-mcp-server__undo_response_action with action_execution_id: <id> — in the report and in the chat summary.

Handoff phrasing

• When invoked from sysdig-runtime-investigate: "sysdig-runtime-investigate handed off <event_id>. Loading the case file and starting Step B."
• When auto-invoking investigate first: "No prior investigation found for <event_id>. Handing off to sysdig-runtime-investigate to build the case file — I'll resume here once it returns."
• When falling back to file-as-ticket: "You declined to execute <ACTION>. Filing it as a <destination> ticket with the exact command and rationale so a human can run it manually."