End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
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End-to-end Android APK red-team pipeline — automated APK acquisition (Play Store + apkpure + apkmirror fallback), jadx decompilation, secret/URL/JWT/Firebase grep, pinned-cert extraction, exported-component enumeration, Frida runtime instrumentation templates, intent-injection probes. Built from an authorized external red-team engagement where 7 APKs were pulled manually, 4 download attempts truncated, and a hardcoded JWT + 30 internal API endpoints were recovered from one of the apps. Use when target has a mobile app catalogue (Play Store developer page), when you find an APK URL hosted on a web server, or when post-recon mentions "mobile app" in scope.
# Follow 302 redirects to actual download
curl -sk -L --max-time 60 --connect-timeout 10 \
"https://d.apkpure.net/b/APK/<package_id>?version=latest" \
-o "<package_id>.apk"# Or via the legacy d-XX.app-mirror.example.com mirror chain (we saw this work)
.xapk = a zip containing multiple split APKs (base + config.armeabi-v7a + config.en + etc.)
Unzip outer first, then unzip the inner base.apk or <package>.apk
Some apkpure downloads return truncated XAPK with missing EOCD signature — symptom of CDN rate-limiting; rotate IP and retry, OR use 7z x which is more lenient than unzip
# Standard unzip (works for clean APK)
unzip -o <package>.apk -d extracted_<package>/
# For truncated/repaired XAPK
7z x -y <package>.apk -o"extracted_<package>"# For nested XAPKfor inner in extracted_<package>/*.apk; domkdir -p "extracted_<package>/$(basename "$inner" .apk)"
unzip -o "$inner" -d "extracted_<package>/$(basename "$inner" .apk)"done
Stage 2 — DEX decompilation (jadx)
# Install
brew install jadx # macOS# or
wget https://github.com/skylot/jadx/releases/latest/download/jadx-1.5.x.zip
# Decompile
jadx -d decompiled_<package>/ <package>.apk
# For XAPK that contains multiple APKsfor inner in extracted_<package>/*.apk; do
jadx -d decompiled_<package>_$(basename"$inner" .apk)/ "$inner"done
For a fast "strings only" pass without full decompilation:
Real-world example finding (anonymized — from an authorized engagement)
# Customer-facing APK shipped a hardcoded URL of this shape:
https://api.<client>.example/<path-token>/<resource-token>?token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.<payload>.<sig>
# Decoded JWT payload: {"sid":<int>,"iat":<unix-ts>,"exp":<unix-ts>}
# Expired ~8 years earlier — but path tokens + 30 /v1/* endpoints still useful intel
Stage 4 — Pinned certificate extraction
# Find .cer / .der / .pem files in assets/
find extracted_<package>/assets -iname "*.cer" -o -iname "*.der" -o -iname "*.pem" -o -iname "*.crt" 2>/dev/null
# Or in network_security_config.xml
find extracted_<package> -name "network_security_config.xml" -execcat {} \;
# For each cert, extract subject + SAN (might reveal new internal API hosts)for cert in $(find extracted_<package>/assets -iname "*.cer"); doecho"=== $cert ==="
openssl x509 -in"$cert" -noout -subject -issuer -dates 2>/dev/null
openssl x509 -in"$cert" -noout -text 2>/dev/null | grep -E 'Subject:|DNS:|Issuer:|Validity'done
Real-world example
A customer-facing APK from an authorized engagement contained assets/api_<service>_<domain>_com.cer — revealed the existence of an api.<service>.<domain>.example asset that had NOT surfaced in passive recon.
Stage 5 — Exported component enumeration
AndroidManifest.xml lists components. Exported ones (especially with android:exported="true" or implicit-export via intent-filter) can be triggered by other apps — potential intent-injection attack surface.
# Decode binary AndroidManifest if needed
apktool d <package>.apk -o decoded_<package>/ # apktool decodes binary manifest# Or read directly from jadx outputcat decompiled_<package>/resources/AndroidManifest.xml | grep -E '<(activity|service|receiver|provider)' | head -50
# Filter exported
grep -E 'android:exported="true"' decompiled_<package>/resources/AndroidManifest.xml
For each exported component, check:
Does it accept extras that flow into a WebView (intent → WebView → XSS / file://)
Does it accept URI extras (potential SSRF via deep link)
Does it pass extras to other Activities (intent redirection)
For deeper API discovery once pinning is bypassed.
# Run mitmproxy on host
mitmproxy --listen-port 8080
# Configure Android device proxy to host:8080# Install mitmproxy CA cert on device:# - Pull from http://mitm.it on the device, or# - Push to /system/etc/security/cacerts/ on rooted device# Use the Frida pinning bypass script while traffic flows through mitmproxy# All API calls visible in mitmproxy UI
Decision tree — what to do with what you find
Finding
Next move
Active JWT (not expired)
Test against the API host — does it grant access? Try sid manipulation
Expired JWT
Inspect path tokens / API endpoint structure — useful intel for post-VPN
AWS access key
Use awscli to test: aws sts get-caller-identity — many leaked keys still have permissions
Firebase project_id + web_api_key
Test public Firestore/RTDB/Storage read
Google API key (AIza*)
Test against https://www.googleapis.com/customsearch/v1 etc. — see what API the key activates
Hardcoded HTTP URLs (http://)
Possible MITM via downgrade if cert pinning is missing
Pinned cert for internal host
New asset discovery — that host is real
Exported Activity with WebView
Test intent-injection → URL-loading abuse
Stack-trace artifacts (Stack Overflow URLs)
Identify the developer's questions → infer architecture
Hardcoded credentials
Spray immediately (respect any caps from related skills)
Pitfalls
Don't grep only for "password" — most secrets have specific high-signal patterns (AKIA, AIza, eyJ, etc.). Generic word grep produces too much noise.
Don't skip XAPK split APKs — config.armeabi splits and config. splits sometimes contain different code paths.
Don't trust expired JWTs as "dead intel" — the path structure, endpoint list, and signing algorithm are still useful. The 8-year-expired-JWT example above shows this.
Don't reverse only the latest version — older APK versions (via APKMirror version history) sometimes have secrets removed in newer versions but still active server-side.
Don't ignore Firebase even if app looks "simple" — Firebase rules misconfigurations (public read on Firestore) are extremely common.
Don't run Frida on a production device — use rooted emulator or test device only.
APKPure CDN rate-limiting — truncated downloads with missing EOCD are common. Rotate IP (VPN hop) and retry; 7z x is more lenient than unzip for partially-downloaded archives.
Large APKs can OOM jadx — for APKs >100 MB, increase jadx heap with -Xmx4g or fall back to strings-only pass first.
Keystore/SQLite files in assets/ — overlooked because they don't match regex secret patterns. Manually review assets/ directory tree for .db, .sqlite, .jks, .bks, .p12 files.
ProGuard/R8 obfuscation — most APKs are obfuscated; secret patterns survive renaming, but class names don't. Don't dismiss an APK because method names are a.b.c.d.
Multi-dex APKs — some secrets live in classes2.dex onward; don't stop after classes.dex.
Play Store developer pages may list inactive/beta apps — cross-reference with download counts and last-updated dates; stale apps may have been archived but still expose secrets.
Verification
Run this self-test to confirm the pipeline works end-to-end:
Acquisition test — download any publicly-available APK and verify the file is a valid ZIP:
download-apk() {
local pkg="$1"
curl -sk -L --max-time 60 --connect-timeout 10 "https://d.apkpure.net/b/APK/$pkg?version=latest" -o "/tmp/$pkg.apk"
file "/tmp/$pkg.apk"# should report: Zip archive data / Java archive data
}
download-apk org.example.testapp
Decompilation test — apktool decodes the binary manifest:
apktool d /tmp/org.example.testapp.apk -o /tmp/testapp_decoded/
ls /tmp/testapp_decoded/AndroidManifest.xml 2>/dev/null && echo"PASS: manifest decoded" || echo"FAIL: apktool not installed or APK corrupted"
Secret grep test — confirm patterns match known test values:
If all 5 tests pass, the pipeline is operational. Test 1 (acquisition) may fail due to APKPure CDN blocking — this does not block the rest of the workflow; fall back to APKMirror or direct APK URL.
Tooling install (one-time)
brew install jadx p7zip
pip install --break-system-packages frida-tools objection
# Genymotion or AVD for rooted Android emulator
For APK download convenience, can add a download-apk shell function:
Finding: Hardcoded JWT + 30+ Internal API Endpoints in a customer-facing APK
Subject: Hardcoded artifacts in legacy mobile build reveal internal API surface
Observations: Decompilation of com.<client>.<app> revealed embedded JWT (expired ~8 years earlier) and 30+ /v1/* endpoint paths against api2.<client>.example (internal-only externally)
Description: APK ships with developer build artifacts. Path tokens are security-by-obscurity; API endpoint inventory is reconnaissance-grade.
Impact: Post-VPN-foothold (via cred compromise), attacker has full API surface map without binary reverse. HS256 secret recovery (via SSRF/LFI) would yield arbitrary token forging.
Recommendation: rotate HS256 secret, migrate to RS256, remove hardcoded URLs from builds, audit all org APKs.
cloud-iam-deep — APK secret extraction frequently yields live AWS/GCP/Azure credentials. Chain primitive: jadx string-grep produces AWS Access Key ID + Secret → cloud-iam-deepaws sts get-caller-identity → role/policy enumeration → IAM privilege-escalation path (one of 24 documented AWS escalation patterns) → cloud-plane takeover. Same flow applies to GCP service-account JSON and Azure shared-access-signature tokens extracted from APK resources.
hunt-api-misconfig — APK endpoint inventory hands you the API surface for free; mass-assignment, JWT, and CORS bugs are typical. Chain primitive: APK reveals /v1/users/me and /v1/admin/users → hunt-api-misconfig mass-assignment probes ({is_admin:true}) against /v1/users/me → admin role escalation → access to /v1/admin/users.
hunt-rce — Hardcoded JWT signing secrets (HS256) extracted from APK enable arbitrary token forging. Chain primitive: APK strings yield HS256 secret → forge admin token → access admin API → if API has eval/template/sink → hunt-rce to server. Also: exported components with intent-injection sinks can reach Runtime.exec if app is local-installed.
offensive-osint — APK is one node in the broader org recon graph; pair with breach corpora and cert transparency. Chain primitive: APK reveals internal API hostname api2.example.com → offensive-osint certificate-transparency lookup → discover sibling subdomains → expanded attack surface.
redteam-report-template — APK findings need clear "what the binary leaks" framing because client engineers often dismiss mobile-static findings as "obfuscation problem." Chain primitive: validated finding (token/URL/secret extracted) → triage-validation 7-Question Gate (specifically: "does this credential still authenticate today?") → redteam-report-template packaging with explicit binary version + extraction reproduction steps.
