agent-config-security-audit

name	agent-config-security-audit
description	Audit agent configuration files for security vulnerabilities and misconfigurations. Covers settings.json, .mcp.json, .codex/config.toml, AGENTS.md, hooks, plugin manifests, and relay config. Classify findings as P0 or P1.

Agent Config Security Audit

Systematic security review of agent configuration files. Run before committing config changes or onboarding a new repository.

When to Use

• After modifying any agent config file (.claude/settings.json, .claude/mcp.json, AGENTS.md, hooks)
• Before committing configuration changes to version control
• When onboarding a project with existing agent configs
• Periodic hygiene check (monthly or after a major dependency update)

Scope

Audit every config file present:

File	Agent
.claude/settings.json	Claude Code
.claude/mcp.json (or project-root mcp.json)	Claude Code
.codex/config.toml	Codex
docs/AGENTS.md (project root)	Generic/Codex
docs/CLAUDE.md (project root)	Claude Code
hooks/	Any
plugins/*/plugin.json	Agent Powerups
.apx/relay/*.json	apx relay

Audit Checklist

Secrets and Credentials

• No API keys, tokens, or passwords hardcoded in any config file
• All secrets referenced as $ENV_VAR or process.env.* — never literal values
• .env and .env.local files are in .gitignore
• MCP server env fields contain variable references, not values

P0 (block immediately): Hardcoded secret in any committed file.

Permissions and Allow Lists

• allowedTools is scoped — no Bash(*) wildcard granting unrestricted shell access
• deniedTools list is present and non-empty for risky operations
• MCP server tool scopes match the stated purpose of the server
• No --no-verify, --force, or safety-bypass flags in hook commands

P0: Bash(*) or equivalent wildcard in allow list. P1: No deniedTools list when Bash is in scope.

Hooks

• Hook commands use fixed strings — no ${file}, ${input}, or other user-interpolated variables
• No outbound network calls (curl, wget) in hooks without explicit user knowledge
• Errors in safety hooks are not silently suppressed (2>/dev/null, || true)
• PreToolUse hooks for high-risk tools (file delete, shell exec) are present

P0: Command injection via interpolation in any hook. P1: Silent error suppression on a security or quality hook.

MCP Servers

• Each server is from a known, trusted source
• No npx -y without a pinned version or digest
• Each server has a description field
• Servers not in active use are removed or disabled

P1: Unpinned npx -y auto-install in MCP server config.

AGENTS.md / CLAUDE.md

• No auto-run instructions that would execute arbitrary commands on session start
• No instructions that unconditionally override safety behavior
• Prohibitive instructions present (explicit list of what the agent must NOT do)
• No prompt injection patterns (user-controlled values inlined into instructions)

P1: Auto-run instruction with shell exec; unconditional safety override.

Plugin Manifests

• Each plugin's manifest (plugins/NAME/.codex-plugin/plugin.json) declares tool access scoped to its purpose
• No plugin grants broader access than it needs
• Plugin version pinned, not latest

Relay Config (if present)

• Relay session files (.apx/relay/) are in .gitignore
• No secrets in relay artifact files

Classification

Severity	Definition	Response
P0	Can directly compromise security or leak secrets	Fix before any commit; do not push
P1	Increases attack surface or weakens safety controls	Fix before merging; document exception if deferred
Note	Best practice not followed, no direct risk	Fix in follow-up; log as tech debt

Report Format

Agent Config Security Audit — <project>/<date>

P0 findings:
  [P0] <file>:<line> — <description>
       Fix: <what to change>

P1 findings:
  [P1] <file>:<line> — <description>
       Fix: <what to change>

Notes:
  [Note] <file> — <description>

Summary: <N> P0, <N> P1, <N> Notes

If no findings: state "No findings." explicitly.