aws-iam-enum
Enumerate AWS IAM policies, detect privilege escalation paths per Rhino Security Labs canonical 21 primitives.
Datos de origen
- Repositorio
- BitterSecurity/Decepticon
- Última actividad en el origen
- 2 de junio de 2026 a las 17:24
- Idioma detectado de SKILL.md
- inglés
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- 5666
- Forks
- 1067
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Instrucciones de origen · Vista previa de solo lectura- name
- aws-iam-enum
- description
- Enumerate AWS IAM policies, detect privilege escalation paths per Rhino Security Labs canonical 21 primitives.
- metadata
- {"subdomain":"cloud","when_to_use":"aws iam enumeration privesc rhino security labs 21 primitives policy escalation","mitre_attack":["T1087.004","T1069.003","T1078.004","T1098.003"]}
# AWS IAM Enumeration + Privesc
## 1. Identity check
```bash
aws sts get-caller-identity
aws iam get-account-summary
```
## 2. Attached policies
```bash
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name ME --output json > /tmp/attached.json
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name ME --output json > /tmp/inline.json
aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name ME --output json > /tmp/groups.json
```
For each attached policy ARN:
```bash
aws iam get-policy --policy-arn ARN --query 'Policy.DefaultVersionId'
aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn ARN --version-id VID > /tmp/policy.json
```
Then:
```
iam_policy_audit(open("/tmp/policy.json").read())
```
## 3. Check each privesc primitive
Rhino Security's canonical 21 paths — any `Allow` on these is a chain step:
1. iam:CreateAccessKey (other user)
2. iam:CreateLoginProfile
3. iam:UpdateLoginProfile
4. iam:AttachUserPolicy / iam:AttachGroupPolicy / iam:AttachRolePolicy
5. iam:PutUserPolicy / iam:PutGroupPolicy / iam:PutRolePolicy
6. iam:CreatePolicyVersion (if SetAsDefault=true)
7. iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion
8. iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction
9. iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances
10. iam:PassRole + ecs:RunTask / UpdateService
11. glue:CreateDevEndpoint / UpdateDevEndpoint
12. cloudformation:CreateStack with iam:PassRole
13. datapipeline:CreatePipeline
14. lambda:UpdateFunctionCode (existing function with priv role)
15. iam:AddUserToGroup
16. iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
17. iam:CreateRole + sts:AssumeRole
18. codebuild:CreateProject with iam:PassRole
19. sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob with iam:PassRole
20. aws-marketplace:Subscribe (rare, but noted)
21. sts:AssumeRole (direct)
## 4. Graph promotion
```
kg_add_node(kind="vulnerability", label="IAM:CreateAccessKey → account takeover", props={"severity":"critical","source":"aws-iam"})
kg_add_node(kind="crown_jewel", label="AWS Account 1234")
kg_add_edge(src=<vuln>, dst=<crown_jewel>, kind="grants", weight=0.3)
```
## 5. Common chains
- Dev user has `iam:PassRole` + `lambda:CreateFunction` + a Lambda role
with admin → create malicious Lambda → assume admin
- `iam:UpdateLoginProfile` + `sts:GetFederationToken` → temporary
console access as another user
Ver en GitHub