| name | secure-design-reviewer |
| description | Review secure-by-design decisions, least privilege, Zero Trust, tenant separation, secure defaults, and abuse scenarios. |
| version | 1.1.0 |
| since | 2026-06-17 |
| last_modified | 2026-06-17 |
| authors | ["platform-engineering"] |
| stability | stable |
| min_platform_version | {"codex":"unknown","amazon-q":"unknown","antigravity":"unknown","auggie":"unknown","bob":"unknown","claude-code":"unknown","cline":"unknown","codebuddy":"unknown","continue":"unknown","costrict":"unknown","crush":"unknown","github-copilot":"unknown","gitlab-duo":"unknown","factory":"unknown","forgecode":"unknown","opencode":"unknown","openhands":"unknown","cursor":"unknown","roo-code":"unknown","kiro":"unknown","junie":"unknown","gemini-cli":"unknown","iflow":"unknown","kilocode":"unknown","kimi":"unknown","lingma":"unknown","pi":"unknown","qoder":"unknown","qwen":"unknown","windsurf":"unknown","ollama":"unknown"} |
| deprecated_since | null |
| replaces | null |
| supersedes | [] |
| changelog | [{"version":"1.1.0","date":"2026-06-17","change":"Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill"}] |
Secure Design Reviewer
Purpose
Review secure-by-design decisions, least privilege, Zero Trust, tenant separation, secure defaults, and abuse scenarios. Treat regulatory, security, and operational references as review and evidence guidance, not legal advice.
When to use
- secure design decisions, controls, or operating practices need independent review.
- A change affects secure design artifacts such as design proposal, trust boundary, permission model, tenant model, default configuration, abuse case.
- The user needs evidence-oriented findings for risks such as overtrusted network, privilege creep, tenant data leak, insecure default, missing abuse case, weak isolation.
- Audit, security, operations, or platform stakeholders need a concise readiness position.
- Existing documentation, tickets, tests, or logs must be turned into actionable remediation items.
Operating model
- Identify the relevant secure design artifacts, owners, systems, environments, and review boundary.
- Compare the available artifacts against expected signals such as architecture diagram, threat model, access decision, configuration baseline, data-flow review, control rationale.
- Separate confirmed gaps from assumptions, missing evidence, and advisory improvement opportunities.
- Rate findings by operational, security, compliance, customer, and auditability impact.
- Recommend minimal remediation steps, validation evidence, owners, and review cadence.
Spec-Driven Change Context
- Treat repository specs, ADRs, runbooks, change proposals, design notes, and task files as durable context that outlives a chat session.
- For non-trivial changes, prefer a checked-in change artifact or equivalent proposal/design/tasks record before implementation begins.
- Capture requirement deltas explicitly: added, modified, removed, deprecated, or unchanged behavior.
- Keep implementation tasks traceable to acceptance criteria, affected specs, validation commands, and owners.
- During verification, compare the implementation against the proposal, design decisions, task checklist, and spec deltas.
- After completion, sync or archive completed change artifacts so the repository's source of truth reflects the final behavior.
- If the repository has no spec workflow yet, report the missing artifact and provide a minimal proposal/spec/tasks outline instead of relying on chat-only intent.
Skill-Specific Review Scope
- Primary artifacts: design proposal, trust boundary, permission model, tenant model, default configuration, abuse case.
- Risk themes: overtrusted network, privilege creep, tenant data leak, insecure default, missing abuse case, weak isolation.
