hunt-clickjacking

## What is Clickjacking Clickjacking (UI Redressing) lets an attacker load a target page inside a transparent iframe on a malicious site. The victim sees the attacker's decoy UI but clicks the hidden target UI beneath it. No JavaScript on the target is required. **Highest-value targets:** - Login / authentication pages — force login with attacker credentials - Money transfer / checkout / "confirm payment" buttons - Account settings (email change, password change, 2FA disable) - OAuth / social-login "Authorize app" confirmation dialogs - Admin actions (delete, promote user, change role) ## Protection Headers Two mechanisms prevent framing: ``` X-Frame-Options: DENY # strongest — blocks all framing X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN # allows same-origin frames only Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none' # CSP equivalent of DENY Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' # CSP equivalent of SAMEORIGIN ``` If NEITHER is present, the page is frameable from any origin. ## How to Test Header-absence is the **trigger for investigation, not the finding**. Two steps: **Step 1 — Header check (screening).** Fetch the target page and inspect the response headers: ``` curl -sI https://target.example/account/transfer | grep -iE 'x-frame-options|content-security-policy' ``` If BOTH `X-Frame-Options` and CSP `frame-ancestors` are absent, the page is a *candidate*. If either is present and restrictive (`DENY`/`SAMEORIGIN`/`frame-ancestors 'none'|'self'`), stop — it's protected. **Step 2 — Prove it actually frames and clicks (required for a real finding).** Build a minimal PoC and load it in a real browser: ```html <!doctype html> <h1>Win a prize — click below</h1> <iframe src="https://target.example/account/transfer" style="opacity:0.1;position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:1000px;height:800px"></iframe> ``` Confirm ALL of the following, or it is not exploitable: - The page **actually renders inside the iframe** (no framebusting JS that blanks/redirects it — e.g. `if(top!==self)` breakout, or a `Sec-Fetch-Dest`/JS frame check). - The **sensitive action still works while framed** — critically, the action must succeed *cross-site*. If it relies on a session cookie set `SameSite=Lax` or `SameSite=Strict` (the modern default), the cookie is **not** sent on the cross-site framed request, and the clickjack fails. Verify the victim's authenticated state carries into the frame. - The target is a **state-changing action** (transfer, settings/email/password change, 2FA disable, OAuth authorize, admin action), not a read-only page. **Strategy:** target the most sensitive action pages first — severity scales directly with what the victim is tricked into doing. ## False Positives - Public, read-only pages (home/marketing) lacking frame protection are low/informational — no sensitive action to redress. - APIs and non-HTML endpoints (JSON, images) are not clickjacking targets. - **Header-absence alone is NOT a finding.** SameSite cookies, framebusting JS, or the lack of any sensitive framed action can each fully defeat it — which is why Step 2 is mandatory. ## Proof Requirements A valid clickjacking report shows: (1) the target page rendered inside an attacker-controlled iframe in a real browser, (2) a sensitive state-changing action reachable by a framed click while the victim is authenticated (cookies survive the cross-site context), and (3) a screenshot/recording of the overlay. Reporting missing headers with no working frame PoC is a documentation-quality issue, not a vulnerability.