sc-session

name	sc-session
description	Session management flaw detection — fixation, hijacking, cookie misconfiguration, and lifecycle issues
license	MIT
metadata	{"author":"ersinkoc","category":"security","version":"1.0.0"}

SC: Session Management Flaws

Purpose

Detects session management vulnerabilities including session fixation, predictable session tokens, insecure cookie attributes, missing session regeneration on privilege change, excessive session timeouts, and improper session invalidation. Covers cookie-based sessions, server-side sessions, and token-based session patterns.

Activation

Called by sc-orchestrator during Phase 2 when session management is detected.

Phase 1: Discovery

Keyword Patterns to Search

"session", "cookie", "Set-Cookie", "httpOnly", "secure", "SameSite",
"session_start", "session_regenerate_id", "req.session",
"SESSION_COOKIE", "CSRF_COOKIE", "express-session", "cookie-session",
"maxAge", "expires", "session.save(", "session.destroy(",
"SessionCreationPolicy"

Vulnerability Patterns

1. Missing Cookie Security Attributes:

// VULNERABLE: Session cookie without security flags
app.use(session({
  secret: 'keyboard cat',
  cookie: { }  // No httpOnly, secure, or sameSite
}));

// SAFE: All security attributes set
app.use(session({
  secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET,
  cookie: {
    httpOnly: true,
    secure: true,
    sameSite: 'strict',
    maxAge: 3600000  // 1 hour
  },
  resave: false,
  saveUninitialized: false
}));

2. Missing Session Regeneration After Login:

# VULNERABLE: Same session ID before and after authentication
def login(request):
    user = authenticate(request.POST['username'], request.POST['password'])
    if user:
        request.session['user_id'] = user.id  # Session fixation!
        return redirect('/dashboard')

# SAFE: Regenerate session after login
def login(request):
    user = authenticate(request.POST['username'], request.POST['password'])
    if user:
        request.session.flush()  # Destroy old session
        request.session.cycle_key()  # New session ID
        request.session['user_id'] = user.id
        return redirect('/dashboard')

3. Session Not Invalidated on Logout:

// VULNERABLE: Session data cleared but session ID persists
@PostMapping("/logout")
public void logout(HttpSession session) {
    session.removeAttribute("user");
}

// SAFE: Invalidate entire session
@PostMapping("/logout")
public void logout(HttpSession session) {
    session.invalidate();
}

4. Session Token in URL:

// VULNERABLE: Session ID in URL parameter
session_start();
echo '<a href="page.php?PHPSESSID=' . session_id() . '">Link</a>';

// SAFE: Use cookie-only sessions
ini_set('session.use_only_cookies', 1);
ini_set('session.use_trans_sid', 0);

Phase 2: Verification

Cookie Attribute Checklist

• HttpOnly: Prevents JavaScript access (XSS protection)
• Secure: Only sent over HTTPS
• SameSite: Prevents CSRF (Strict or Lax)
• Path: Scoped to application path
• Max-Age/Expires: Reasonable session duration

Framework-Specific Checks

• Django: SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY, SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE, SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE, SESSION_COOKIE_AGE
• Express: cookie.httpOnly, cookie.secure, cookie.sameSite, cookie.maxAge
• Laravel: session.http_only, session.secure, session.same_site, session.lifetime
• Spring: server.servlet.session.cookie.http-only, server.servlet.session.cookie.secure
• ASP.NET: CookieHttpOnly, CookieSecure, CookieSameSite

Severity Classification

• Critical: Predictable session tokens, session fixation in authentication flow
• High: Missing httpOnly flag (enables XSS-based session theft), no session regeneration on login
• Medium: Missing Secure flag, excessive session timeout (>24h), no invalidation on logout
• Low: Missing SameSite attribute, concurrent session not limited

Output Format

Finding: SESS-{NNN}

• Title: {Session vulnerability type}
• Severity: Critical | High | Medium | Low
• Confidence: 0-100
• File: file/path:line
• Vulnerability Type: CWE-384 (Session Fixation) | CWE-614 (Sensitive Cookie Without Secure) | CWE-613 (Insufficient Session Expiration)
• Description: {What was found}
• Impact: Session hijacking, account takeover, CSRF.
• Remediation: {Specific fix with configuration example}
• References: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/384.html

Common False Positives

1. Development configuration — secure: false in dev config with env-specific override for production
2. API-only applications — APIs using JWT/Bearer tokens may not need cookie security attributes
3. Static sites — sessions used for non-sensitive data (preferences, language)
4. Proxy-terminated HTTPS — secure flag may be set at the reverse proxy level