| name | everjust-platform |
| description | Operating rules for an agent working inside ANY everjust.app tenant — a heavily-customized multi-tenant Odoo 19 CE fork (NOT stock Odoo), one Postgres DB per tenant. Load this whenever you are connected to a *.everjust.app instance (usually via the everjust_agent_mcp MCP server at https://<tenant>.everjust.app/mcp) and about to read or mutate business data: mail, contacts, users, telephony/SMS, QuickBooks, documents, appointments. It tells you the platform's non-standard shape and the invariants you must not break (one-DB-per-tenant isolation, /odoo debrand, custom everjust.mail.* stack, send gating, per-tenant secrets, sudo/ACL boundaries, Odoo-19 API surface). Read BEFORE your first non-trivial call, not after something breaks. |
everjust.app platform — operating rules
Overview / when to use
You are operating inside a live everjust.app tenant. This is not stock Odoo — it is a heavily-customized multi-tenant Odoo 19 CE fork with a from-scratch mail platform, per-tenant provider swaps, and aggressive debranding. If you treat it like vanilla Odoo you will call models that don't exist, write to the wrong tables, leak secrets, or silently fail to send mail.
Use this skill the moment you connect to *.everjust.app — before your first read that matters and always before any create/update/delete/call. It is the rules layer: the platform's non-standard shape + a numbered checklist of invariants with the why. It does not duplicate deep how-tos that belong in provider-specific skills (see cross-references at the end).
Almost every everjust.app op you run goes through everjust_agent_mcp — an Odoo addon that serves MCP at https://<tenant>.everjust.app/mcp. Auth is an Odoo API key as Bearer, and the server runs AS that user, so every operation is bounded by that user's Odoo role and ACLs. There is no "god mode" from the MCP side.
Architecture — the non-standard shape
The four things that make this platform surprising:
- One Postgres DB == one tenant. The DB you are connected to is the entire world you can see. There is no cross-tenant query, no shared table, no "other company's data." This is the hard isolation boundary. Installed modules, models, and capabilities differ per tenant — never assume a feature exists.
- Fully debranded. Backend is at
/odoo (not /everjust, not /web branding). Product name and version strings are faked. Do not infer "this is Odoo X.Y" from the UI — it's Odoo 19 under the hood.
- Native custom mail platform. Email is a from-scratch stack on
everjust.mail.* models — NOT Odoo Discuss, NOT mail.mail/IMAP. Drafts, threading, domains, sending, suppression all live in everjust.mail.*.
- Per-tenant provider swaps. SMS, voice, accounting, documents, appointments are each backed by whichever integration that tenant installed (TextBee/Ringover/Twilio/QuickBooks/Nextcloud). Same "capability," different model and different secrets per tenant.
The MCP toolset you actually have
All ops are role-bounded (run AS your Odoo user) and every call is audited to everjust.mcp.log.
Call platform_info FIRST on every new connection. The server's own
instructions say so, and it is the only authoritative answer to what server
version am I on and which tools exist here — the table below is a summary and
can lag a deploy. Tool availability differs per tenant and per server version;
never assume a tool exists because it is listed here.
Discovery & orientation
| Tool | Signature | Notes |
|---|
platform_info | () | Call this first. Server version + capabilities. Authoritative tool list. |
list_models | (filter) | Discover installed models. |
describe_model | (model) | Returns fields + your_access = {read, create, write, unlink} booleans for your user. Check this before assuming you can write. |
list_installed_modules | () | Which apps this tenant actually has — tenants differ a lot. |
whats_new | () | Recent platform changes. |
Read
| Tool | Signature | Notes |
|---|
search | (model, domain, fields, limit, order) | Odoo domain syntax. |
get | (model, ids, fields) | Read by id. |
count | (model, domain) | |
find | (model, name) | name_search — fuzzy by display name. |
Write (all ACL-gated)
| Tool | Signature | Notes |
|---|
create | (model, values) | |
update | (model, ids, values) | |
delete | (model, ids, confirm) | confirm: true REQUIRED. |
call | (model, method, ids, args, kwargs, confirm) | Escape hatch. Any non-read method needs confirm: true. |
Capability tools (present only where the feature is installed — check platform_info)
| Tool | Notes |
|---|
mail_send | Send from a tenant mailbox. Server ≥ 1.4.0. The ONLY correct way to send — see [[everjust-mail-ops]]. Never hand-roll mail.mail. |
website_pages · website_new_page · website_edit_page · website_publish · website_menu · website_redirect | Role-bounded website editing — see [[everjust-website]]. |
Two hard gates: delete and call (non-read) require confirm: true. And Odoo ACLs still block anything your user's role can't do — even when you set confirm: true. Confirmation is not elevation.
The rules — numbered checklist (the WHY matters)
1. One DB = one tenant. Never assume cross-tenant data or that a capability exists.
Before relying on a feature, list_models(filter=...) or read ir_module_module (search('ir.module.module', [['state','=','installed']])). Installed modules differ per tenant — the model you want may not be here. Why: the DB is the isolation boundary; a missing module isn't an error, it's a different tenant.
2. The backend is /odoo, product identity is faked. Don't hardcode Odoo assumptions from the UI.
It's Odoo 19 CE underneath regardless of what the branding says. Why: debranding hides the engine; guessing version/paths from branding will be wrong.
3. Never grant base.group_system (Administrator) to a bot/agent user — and never assume you have it.
On this fork, everjust_admin_role rewires implied_ids so Administrator implies EVERY installed app. Granting it to an automation user hands over the whole tenant. Why: one checkbox = total access here; that blast radius is unacceptable for a bot.
4. Mail lives in everjust.mail.*, not mail.mail. Never write mail.mail directly.
Drafts are everjust.mail.entry (not mail.mail). Threading is by thread_root, not Odoo's message_id/parent_id chains. Compose/read/reply through the everjust.mail.* models. Why: a hand-rolled mail.mail row is NOT inert — it rides the same transport compose_send uses, so it can really deliver to a real person, while skipping the verified-identity, rate-limit and suppression gates and filing no everjust.mail.entry. The message is then permanently invisible in the mailbox UI (which reads everjust.mail.entry, not mail.message), so nobody can see, find, or reply to what you sent. Use mail_send (server ≥ 1.4.0), which the server now hard-blocks mail.mail/mail.message writes in favour of.
5. Sending is hard-gated — read the {queued, delivery} result every time.
To send, the everjust.mail.domain must be verification_state='verified' (is_sendable). Sends come back as one of:
blocked — domain unverified (verify the domain first),rate_limited — >300 sends/account/hour,suppressed — recipient in everjust.mail.suppression or mail.blacklist,- otherwise
queued/delivered.
Why: SES reputation is shared fate across the whole account — one careless blast degrades deliverability for every tenant. Always inspect the result; don't fire-and-forget.
6. Inbound mail is an HMAC bridge; the secret is server-held. Do not go looking for it.
The per-tenant inbound secret is not an ir.config_parameter in prod. Don't try to read, reconstruct, or set it. Why: it authenticates the inbound webhook; exposing it lets anyone inject mail.
7. Bot/automation users are tagged; never impersonate system or the human admin.
An agent user has is_everjust_agent=True on res.users and is_agent=True on res.partner (this excludes it from billable seats). Never act as uid 1 (__system__) or uid 2 (the human admin). Why: those uids skip guardrails and pollute the audit trail; billing and attribution depend on the agent tags.
8. Integration secrets are per-tenant ir.config_parameter. Never read, echo, or log them.
Namespaces: everjust_phone.*, everjust.ringover_*, everjust_quickbooks.*, everjust_documents.*, everjust.sms_*. Why: these are live provider credentials; the MCP audits every call, and a leaked key compromises that tenant's Twilio/QuickBooks/Nextcloud/SES.
9. Telephony/SMS provider is swapped per tenant — detect which is installed first.
SMS goes via TextBee or Ringover (company.sms_provider / res.company); voice via Twilio (everjust_phone) and/or Ringover. Check ir.module.module / list_models to see which is present before composing a call/SMS action. Ringover phone numbers are integer E.164 (not strings). Why: the "send SMS" you want lives in a different model per tenant; wrong model = failed op.
10. Never touch QuickBooks (qbo.*) refresh tokens outside qbo.client helpers.
Refresh tokens rotate under a Postgres advisory lock and commit immediately. If you refresh or mutate them by hand (or via a raw call), you desync the token and force a full QuickBooks reconnect. Go through the qbo.client methods. Default environment is sandbox. Why: the rotate-and-commit protocol is the only safe path; anything else breaks the OAuth chain irrecoverably.
11. Branding/onboarding hooks re-run on install AND every -u. Don't hand-edit swept records.
everjust_brand debrand functions and onboarding data hooks fire on install and on every module update. Hand-edited mail.template bodies and mail views may be re-swept (overwritten). Why: your manual edit is not durable; if a value must stick, it belongs in the module data, not a live edit — flag it rather than fight the sweep.
12. Optional subsystems have bespoke shapes.
Where everjust_documents is installed, documents physically live in Nextcloud over WebDAV (the Odoo record is a pointer). Appointments use everjust_appointment models, not Odoo appointment.*. Dark mode is force-disabled. Why: assuming appointment.* or a local attachment blob will miss the real data.
13. ir.rule does NOT constrain sudo(). Record rules only scope person visibility.
Do not treat record rules as a safety net for automated writes; sudo() (and some call paths) bypass them. Self-limit: prefer archive (active=False) over delete, and confirm irreversible actions with the user before executing. Why: the platform won't stop a destructive sudo op — your restraint is the guardrail.
14. This is Odoo 19 — use the current field names and API surface.
res.users groups field is group_ids (NOT groups_id). The native external API is /json/2/<model>/<method> with Bearer auth. XML-RPC / JSON-RPC are deprecated (removal targeted in Odoo 22) — don't build on them. Why: groups_id and the legacy RPC endpoints silently fail or are gone here.
15. Don't depend on everjust.agent.* models — the policy/runtime layer is designed, not built.
There is no everjust.agent.* enforcement today. Your actual boundary is your Odoo user's role + the MCP guardrails (confirm gates + ACLs + audit log). Why: coding against unbuilt models fails; the role/ACL boundary is what's real right now.
Recipes
Orient on an unfamiliar tenant (do this first)
list_models(filter="everjust") # see the custom stack that's installed
count('ir.module.module', [['state','=','installed']])
search('ir.module.module',
[['state','=','installed']], fields=['name','shortdesc'], limit=200)
Then describe_model('<model>') on anything you plan to touch and read its your_access before writing.
Check whether YOU can write before you try
describe_model('res.partner') # inspect .your_access -> {read,create,write,unlink}
If your_access.write is false, the op will be ACL-blocked no matter what confirm you pass — stop and tell the user, don't retry with confirm:true.
Send an email safely
# 1. Confirm the sending domain is verified / sendable
search('everjust.mail.domain', [['verification_state','=','verified']],
fields=['name','is_sendable'])
# 2. Compose/send through everjust.mail.* (NOT mail.mail); drafts = everjust.mail.entry
# 3. ALWAYS read the returned {queued, delivery} status.
# blocked -> verify domain; rate_limited -> back off (300/acct/hr);
# suppressed -> recipient on everjust.mail.suppression or mail.blacklist.
Find the SMS/voice capability for THIS tenant
list_models(filter="sms") # which provider models exist?
get('res.company', [1], fields=['sms_provider']) # TextBee vs Ringover
list_models(filter="phone") # everjust_phone (Twilio) present?
Compose the send against whichever model is installed. Ringover numbers are integer E.164.
Anything QuickBooks
Route through qbo.client helper methods via call(...). Never update a qbo.* token field or hand-roll a refresh — you'll force a reconnect. Assume sandbox unless the tenant config says otherwise.
An irreversible-looking change
Prefer archive over delete:
update('<model>', [id], {'active': False}) # reversible
# vs delete('<model>', [id], confirm=True) # confirm the intent with the user first
Pitfalls (common mistakes)
- Assuming stock Odoo. Calling
mail.mail, appointment.*, or groups_id — all wrong here. Use everjust.mail.*, everjust_appointment.*, group_ids.
- Fire-and-forget email. Not reading the send result and never noticing
blocked/rate_limited/suppressed. The account shares SES reputation — a silent failed blast still hurts every tenant.
confirm: true == permission. It's not. ACLs still apply; if your role can't do it, confirming won't help. Fix the role or stop.- Reading/echoing secrets. Dumping
ir.config_parameter for everjust_phone.*, everjust_quickbooks.*, etc. into output or logs. Every MCP call is audited — treat those namespaces as untouchable.
- Hand-editing branded templates/views. They get re-swept on the next
-u. Your edit won't persist; flag the need for a data-level change instead.
- Granting or assuming Administrator.
base.group_system implies every app on this fork. Never on a bot user.
- Impersonating uid 1 or uid 2. Skips guardrails, corrupts the audit trail, breaks billing/attribution. Act as the tagged agent user.
- Trusting
ir.rule to stop automated writes. It doesn't gate sudo(). Your own caution (archive-not-delete, confirm-first) is the real safety net.
- Refreshing QuickBooks tokens manually. Rotates-and-commits under a lock; touching it out-of-band forces a full reconnect.
- Depending on
everjust.agent.*. Not built yet — your boundary is role + MCP guardrails.
Related skills (don't duplicate — cross-reference)
intelligence-dossier, client-discovery-osint — for research about the businesses in a tenant, once you've read their CRM data here.godaddy-api — DNS/domain records for everjust.app-hosted domains (separate system from everjust.mail.domain verification).mongodb-schema-audit, admin-dashboard-verification — sibling data-integrity workflows if you're auditing a tenant's data.deep-research — the fan-out research pipeline, when a tenant task expands into external investigation.
