security-and-hardening

name	security-and-hardening
description	Hardens code against vulnerabilities. Use when handling user input, authentication, data storage, or external integrations. OWASP-aware, language-agnostic principles with TypeScript examples — applies to any feature that accepts untrusted data, manages user sessions, or interacts with third-party services.
lastReviewed	2026-05-26T00:00:00.000Z

Security and Hardening

Overview

Security-first development practices for web applications. Treat every external input as hostile, every secret as sacred, and every authorization check as mandatory. Security isn't a phase — it's a constraint on every line of code that touches user data, authentication, or external systems.

Examples below use TypeScript/Node.js syntax for concreteness, but the principles (parameterized queries, hashed passwords, schema validation at boundaries, secrets out of source, OWASP Top 10) apply to any language.

When to Use

• Building anything that accepts user input
• Implementing authentication or authorization
• Storing or transmitting sensitive data
• Integrating with external APIs or services
• Adding file uploads, webhooks, or callbacks
• Handling payment or PII data

The Three-Tier Boundary System

Always Do (No Exceptions)

• Validate all external input at the system boundary (API routes, form handlers)
• Parameterize all database queries — never concatenate user input into SQL
• Encode output to prevent XSS (use framework auto-escaping, don't bypass it)
• Use HTTPS for all external communication
• Hash passwords with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (never store plaintext)
• Set security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)
• Use httpOnly, secure, sameSite cookies for sessions
• Run dependency audits (npm audit, pip-audit, cargo audit, etc.) before every release

Ask First (Requires Human Approval)

• Adding new authentication flows or changing auth logic
• Storing new categories of sensitive data (PII, payment info)
• Adding new external service integrations
• Changing CORS configuration
• Adding file upload handlers
• Modifying rate limiting or throttling
• Granting elevated permissions or roles

Never Do

• Never commit secrets to version control (API keys, passwords, tokens)
• Never log sensitive data (passwords, tokens, full credit card numbers)
• Never trust client-side validation as a security boundary
• Never disable security headers for convenience
• Never use eval() or innerHTML with user-provided data
• Never store sessions in client-accessible storage (localStorage for auth tokens)
• Never expose stack traces or internal error details to users

OWASP Top 10 Prevention

1. Injection (SQL, NoSQL, OS Command)

// BAD: SQL injection via string concatenation
const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '${userId}'`;

// GOOD: Parameterized query
const user = await db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [userId]);

// GOOD: ORM with parameterized input
const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } });

2. Broken Authentication

// Password hashing
import { hash, compare } from 'bcrypt';

const SALT_ROUNDS = 12;
const hashedPassword = await hash(plaintext, SALT_ROUNDS);
const isValid = await compare(plaintext, hashedPassword);

// Session management
app.use(session({
  secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET,  // From environment, not code
  resave: false,
  saveUninitialized: false,
  cookie: {
    httpOnly: true,     // Not accessible via JavaScript
    secure: true,       // HTTPS only
    sameSite: 'lax',    // CSRF protection
    maxAge: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000,  // 24 hours
  },
}));

3. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

// BAD: Rendering user input as HTML
element.innerHTML = userInput;

// GOOD: Use framework auto-escaping (React does this by default)
return <div>{userInput}</div>;

// If you MUST render HTML, sanitize first
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);

4. Broken Access Control

// Always check authorization, not just authentication
app.patch('/api/tasks/:id', authenticate, async (req, res) => {
  const task = await taskService.findById(req.params.id);

  // Check that the authenticated user owns this resource
  if (task.ownerId !== req.user.id) {
    return res.status(403).json({
      error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Not authorized to modify this task' }
    });
  }

  // Proceed with update
  const updated = await taskService.update(req.params.id, req.body);
  return res.json(updated);
});

5. Security Misconfiguration

// Security headers (use helmet for Express)
import helmet from 'helmet';
app.use(helmet());

// Content Security Policy
app.use(helmet.contentSecurityPolicy({
  directives: {
    defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
    scriptSrc: ["'self'"],
    styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"],  // Tighten if possible
    imgSrc: ["'self'", 'data:', 'https:'],
    connectSrc: ["'self'"],
  },
}));

// CORS — restrict to known origins
app.use(cors({
  origin: process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS?.split(',') || 'http://localhost:3000',
  credentials: true,
}));

6. Sensitive Data Exposure

// Never return sensitive fields in API responses
function sanitizeUser(user: UserRecord): PublicUser {
  const { passwordHash, resetToken, ...publicFields } = user;
  return publicFields;
}

// Use environment variables for secrets
const API_KEY = process.env.STRIPE_API_KEY;
if (!API_KEY) throw new Error('STRIPE_API_KEY not configured');

Input Validation Patterns

Schema Validation at Boundaries

import { z } from 'zod';

const CreateTaskSchema = z.object({
  title: z.string().min(1).max(200).trim(),
  description: z.string().max(2000).optional(),
  priority: z.enum(['low', 'medium', 'high']).default('medium'),
  dueDate: z.string().datetime().optional(),
});

// Validate at the route handler
app.post('/api/tasks', async (req, res) => {
  const result = CreateTaskSchema.safeParse(req.body);
  if (!result.success) {
    return res.status(422).json({
      error: {
        code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR',
        message: 'Invalid input',
        details: result.error.flatten(),
      },
    });
  }
  
   task =  taskService.(result.);
   res.().(task);
});

File Upload Safety

// Restrict file types and sizes
const ALLOWED_TYPES = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp'];
const MAX_SIZE = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5MB

function validateUpload(file: UploadedFile) {
  if (!ALLOWED_TYPES.includes(file.mimetype)) {
    throw new ValidationError('File type not allowed');
  }
  if (file.size > MAX_SIZE) {
    throw new ValidationError('File too large (max 5MB)');
  }
  // Don't trust the file extension — check magic bytes if critical
}

Triaging Dependency Audit Results

Not all audit findings require immediate action. Use this decision tree:

Dependency audit reports a vulnerability
- Severity: critical or high
  - Is the vulnerable code reachable in your app?
    - YES --> Fix immediately (update, patch, or replace the dependency)
    - NO (dev-only dep, unused code path) --> Fix soon, but not a blocker
  - Is a fix available?
    - YES --> Update to the patched version
    - NO --> Check for workarounds, consider replacing the dependency, or add to allowlist with a review date
- Severity: moderate
  - Reachable in production? --> Fix in the next release cycle
  - Dev-only? --> Fix when convenient, track in backlog
- Severity: low
  - Track and fix during regular dependency updates

Key questions:

• Is the vulnerable function actually called in your code path?
• Is the dependency a runtime dependency or dev-only?
• Is the vulnerability exploitable given your deployment context (e.g., a server-side vulnerability in a client-only app)?

When you defer a fix, document the reason and set a review date.

Rate Limiting

import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit';

// General API rate limit
app.use('/api/', rateLimit({
  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
  max: 100,                   // 100 requests per window
  standardHeaders: true,
  legacyHeaders: false,
}));

// Stricter limit for auth endpoints
app.use('/api/auth/', rateLimit({
  windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
  max: 10,  // 10 attempts per 15 minutes
}));

Secrets Management

.env files:
  .env.example  → Committed (template with placeholder values)
  .env          → NOT committed (contains real secrets)
  .env.local    → NOT committed (local overrides)

.gitignore must include:
  .env
  .env.local
  .env.*.local
  *.pem
  *.key

Always check before committing:

# Check for accidentally staged secrets
git diff --cached | grep -i "password\|secret\|api_key\|token"

Security Review Checklist

Authentication

• Passwords hashed with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (salt rounds ≥ 12)
• Session tokens are httpOnly, secure, sameSite
• Login has rate limiting
• Password reset tokens expire

Authorization

• Every endpoint checks user permissions
• Users can only access their own resources
• Admin actions require admin role verification

Input

• All user input validated at the boundary
• SQL queries are parameterized
• HTML output is encoded/escaped

Data

• No secrets in code or version control
• Sensitive fields excluded from API responses
• PII encrypted at rest (if applicable)

Infrastructure

• Security headers configured (CSP, HSTS, etc.)
• CORS restricted to known origins
• Dependencies audited for vulnerabilities
• Error messages don't expose internals

Common Rationalizations

Rationalization	Reality
"This is an internal tool, security doesn't matter"	Internal tools get compromised. Attackers target the weakest link.
"We'll add security later"	Security retrofitting is 10x harder than building it in. Add it now.
"No one would try to exploit this"	Automated scanners will find it. Security by obscurity is not security.
"The framework handles security"	Frameworks provide tools, not guarantees. You still need to use them correctly.
"It's just a prototype"	Prototypes become production. Security habits from day one.

Red Flags

• User input passed directly to database queries, shell commands, or HTML rendering
• Secrets in source code or commit history
• API endpoints without authentication or authorization checks
• Missing CORS configuration or wildcard (*) origins
• No rate limiting on authentication endpoints
• Stack traces or internal errors exposed to users
• Dependencies with known critical vulnerabilities

Verification

After implementing security-relevant code:

• Dependency audit (npm audit / equivalent) shows no critical or high vulnerabilities
• No secrets in source code or git history
• All user input validated at system boundaries
• Authentication and authorization checked on every protected endpoint
• Security headers present in response (check with browser DevTools)
• Error responses don't expose internal details
• Rate limiting active on auth endpoints

Related skills

• code-review — security review is one dimension of comprehensive code review
• deep-review — Skeptic perspective surfaces security issues that single-pass review misses

Would Revise If

Revise by 2026-08-26 (90 days) or sooner if any of the following fires:

• TypeScript-heavy examples confuse heirs working in Python/Rust/Go (the language-agnostic claim breaks down in practice — port snippets or split per-language references)
• The Three-Tier Boundary System (Always Do / Ask First / Never Do) gets bypassed in observed heir security work without surfacing as a problem (the tiers are wrong shape)
• OWASP Top 10 reorganizes such that the numbered subsections (Injection, Broken Authentication, etc.) become misleading
• Dependency audit framing (npm audit decision tree) becomes stale as package ecosystems evolve
• 90 days pass with zero observed invocations of the skill (it's decorative, not load-bearing)