| name | security-check |
| description | Scans the repo (or the pending diff) for committed secrets, gitignore gaps and tokens at rest in configs — report only, works in any repository |
| allowed-tools | Read, Bash, Grep, Glob |
| user-invocable | true |
Security Check
Read-only sweep for the most common self-inflicted leak: a secret in git.
Works in any repo — no project scaffolding required. Report only: never
delete, rewrite history or rotate anything on your own.
1. Scan for secrets
Prefer gitleaks when available (installed or via the repo's toolchain):
gitleaks detect --no-banner --redact
gitleaks protect --staged --no-banner --redact
Without gitleaks, fall back to targeted patterns over tracked files —
private key blocks (BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY), bearer/oauth tokens, provider
prefixes (sk-, ghp_, gho_, xox, AKIA, ntrys_, GOCSPX-),
_TOKEN=/_SECRET=/_KEY= assignments with literal values, and URLs with
embedded credentials. Check git log -p for the file when a hit looks
historical.
2. Check the guards
.gitignore covers the sensitive files the stack uses: .env*,
mise.local.toml, *.pem/*.key, credential JSONs, .tmp/.- Example files (
*.example.*) contain placeholders, not real values.
- MCP/agent configs (
.mcp.json, .codex/config.toml,
.agents/mcp_config.json) have no token at rest — tokens come from
the environment at runtime (wrapper pattern).
- Git hooks (lefthook or equivalent) run a secret scan before commit, if
the project has that standard.
3. Report
Group findings by severity and be precise about exposure:
- 🔴 Secret committed — file, line, and whether it is in history (not
just the working tree). State clearly: rotation is the fix; removing
the line does not un-leak it. Rotation and history rewriting are the
user's decision.
- 🟡 Gap — missing gitignore entry, real-looking value in an example
file, no scan in the hooks.
- Never paste the secret value itself into the report — reference
file:line and a redacted prefix.
