cpi-security

name	cpi-security
description	Trigger Pattern CPI flag detected (invoke/invoke_signed/CpiContext usage) - Inject Into Breadth agents, depth agents

CPI_SECURITY Skill

Trigger Pattern: CPI flag detected (invoke/invoke_signed/CpiContext usage) Inject Into: Breadth agents, depth agents Finding prefix: [CPI-N] Rules referenced: S3, S5, R1, R4

For every Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) in the Solana program:

1. CPI Target Inventory

Enumerate ALL CPI calls:

#	Location	CPI Type	Target Program	Target Instruction	Accounts Forwarded	Signers Forwarded
1	{file:line}	invoke/invoke_signed/CpiContext	{program_id}	{instruction}	{list}	{list}

2. Target Program Validation

For each CPI call, verify the target program ID:

CPI	Program ID Source	Hardcoded/Validated?	Spoofable?
{cpi}	{where program_id comes from}	Hardcoded constant / Validated against known / FROM USER INPUT	{if from input: CRITICAL finding}

Attack (S3): If program ID comes from user input without validation, attacker substitutes a malicious program that mimics the expected interface but steals funds. Defense: Always validate program ID against a hardcoded constant or well-known program address.

3. Signer Privilege Tracing

For each CPI that forwards signers:

CPI	Signer Source	Privilege Level	Should Forward?	Over-Privileged?
{cpi}	{PDA / user wallet / authority}	{what the signer can do in target}	YES/NO	{if forwarding more privilege than needed}

Attack: Forwarding user's wallet as signer to a CPI target that uses it for unintended operations. Pattern: PDA signers via invoke_signed are safe (program-controlled). User wallet forwarding needs careful scoping.

4. Account Reload Audit (S5 - CRITICAL)

For each CPI call, check what accounts are read AFTER the CPI returns:

CPI	Accounts Modified by Target	Read After CPI?	reload() Called?	Owner Re-checked?
{cpi}	{list accounts CPI can modify}	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO

Attack (S5): CPI target modifies account data. Caller reads stale cached data without reload(). CRITICAL: Anchor's reload() refreshes data but does NOT re-verify the account owner. A CPI target could assign the account to a different program. After reload(), the data is fresh but the owner may have changed. Full defense: After CPI, both reload() AND re-check account.owner.

5. Lamport Balance Conservation

For each CPI that transfers SOL:

CPI	Expected Lamport Change	Actual Change Verified?	Drain Risk?
{cpi}	{expected delta}	YES/NO	{if NO: CPI could drain more than expected}

Attack: CPI target drains more lamports than expected from accounts owned by the caller's program. Defense: Check lamport balances before and after CPI; verify delta matches expected amount.

6. Account Owner Check Post-CPI

For each CPI that could modify account ownership:

CPI	Can Target Call system_program::assign?	Owner Checked After CPI?	Risk
{cpi}	YES/NO	YES/NO	{if YES and NO: account hijacking}

Attack: CPI target uses system_program::assign to change account owner to attacker-controlled program. Caller continues using the account assuming it's still owned by its program.

7. CPI Depth Analysis

For each code path with nested CPIs:

Entry Point	CPI Chain	Max Depth	CU Cost Estimate	Risk
{instruction}	{A → B → C}	{depth}	{estimate}	{CU exhaustion?}

Solana limit: CPI depth capped at 4 levels. Check if deep chains approach this limit.

Finding Template

**ID**: [CPI-N]
**Severity**: [based on impact: fund theft via program spoofing = Critical, stale data = High]
**Step Execution**: ✓1,2,3,4,5,6,7 | ✗(reasons) | ?(uncertain)
**Rules Applied**: [S3:✓, S5:✓, R1:✓, R4:✓/✗]
**Location**: program/src/{file}.rs:LineN
**Title**: [CPI issue type] in [instruction] enables [attack]
**Description**: [Specific CPI vulnerability with call chain trace]
**Impact**: [Fund theft / state corruption / privilege escalation]

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Step Execution Checklist (MANDATORY)

Section	Required	Completed?	Notes
1. CPI Target Inventory	YES	✓/✗/?	For every CPI
2. Target Program Validation	YES	✓/✗/?	For every CPI
3. Signer Privilege Tracing	YES	✓/✗/?	For every CPI with signers
4. Account Reload Audit	YES	✓/✗/?	CRITICAL - most common CPI bug
5. Lamport Balance Conservation	IF SOL transfers	✓/✗(N/A)/?
6. Account Owner Check Post-CPI	YES	✓/✗/?	assign attack prevention
7. CPI Depth Analysis	IF nested CPIs	✓/✗(N/A)/?	CU exhaustion risk