sep41-token-safety

name	sep41-token-safety
description	Trigger Pattern SEP-41 token patterns detected (approve/transfer/transfer_from/allowance/balance) - Inject Into Breadth agents, depth-token-flow, depth-edge-case

SEP41_TOKEN_SAFETY Skill (Soroban)

Trigger Pattern: SEP-41 token patterns detected (approve/transfer/transfer_from/allowance/balance) Inject Into: Breadth agents, depth-token-flow, depth-edge-case Finding prefix: [ST-N] Rules referenced: R4, R5, R10, R11, R13, R15

SEP-41 is Soroban's token interface standard, analogous to ERC-20. It introduces Soroban-specific behaviors that differ from ERC-20: allowances use Temporary storage with expiration_ledger, the approve function can be front-run similarly to ERC-20, and the Stellar Asset Contract (SAC) bridges Stellar classic assets into Soroban with additional accounting complexity.

1. Approve Race Condition

The approve(from, spender, amount, expiration_ledger) function overwrites the current allowance without checking the existing value. This is the ERC-20 approve race condition, present identically in SEP-41:

Token Contract	approve Guarded?	Guard Type	Effective?
{contract}	YES/NO	require!(current == 0) / none	YES/NO

Attack sequence:

1. Owner approves spender for 100 tokens
2. Owner submits new approval for 50 tokens
3. Spender front-runs the new approval and spends the 100-token allowance
4. New 50-token approval is set
5. Spender spends 50 more tokens — net: 150 tokens spent, 50 intended

Soroban-specific note: Soroban does not have a traditional mempool — transaction ordering is determined by validators, not fee-based priority. However, multi-operation transactions and DEX routing can create ordering dependencies. The race condition is lower likelihood than on EVM but the vulnerability exists.

Check for:

• Does approve allow setting non-zero over non-zero without an intermediate zero-set step?
• Does the protocol documentation warn users about the race condition?
• Are there any off-chain tools (like increaseAllowance / decreaseAllowance equivalents) to safely adjust allowances?

2. Allowance Expiry

SEP-41 allowances include an expiration_ledger parameter stored alongside the allowance amount. When the ledger passes expiration_ledger, the allowance is treated as zero. Verify expiry is handled correctly:

Contract	Allowance Expiry Checked Before Use?	Expired Allowance Returns 0 or Panics?	Protocol Communicates Expiry to Users?
{contract}	YES/NO	{behavior}	YES/NO

Allowance storage: SEP-41 standard stores allowances in Temporary storage with TTL linked to expiration_ledger. When expiration_ledger passes, the Temporary entry may be pruned, and the allowance() call returns zero automatically.

Checks:

• Does the calling contract handle the case where a previously valid allowance has expired and transfer_from now fails?
• Is expiration_ledger validated to be in the future when approve is called? Setting expiration_ledger in the past silently creates an already-expired allowance
• For protocol-controlled allowances (e.g., a contract that approves tokens on behalf of users): does the contract re-approve if the allowance has expired?

Edge case: expiration_ledger = 0 behavior — verify whether the token contract treats 0 as "no expiry" or "expired at ledger 0" (already expired). Inconsistency here could cause silent allowance failures.

3. Transfer Auth Propagation

SEP-41 transfer(from, to, amount) requires from.require_auth(). transfer_from(spender, from, to, amount) requires spender.require_auth() and checks the allowance. Trace auth through the contract's transfer chains:

Calling Function	Transfer Type	Auth Address	require_auth Called?	Correct Subject?
{fn}	transfer / transfer_from	{from or spender}	YES/NO	YES/NO

Patterns to check:

• A contract calling token.transfer(user, contract, amount) on behalf of a user — does it call user.require_auth() first, or does it rely on the token contract to enforce it?
• Sub-invocation auth propagation: if a function calls token.transfer inside a invoke_contract chain, is the AuthorizedInvocation tree constructed to include the token transfer?
• transfer_from where the spender is the calling contract itself (valid for vault patterns) — is the allowance actually set, or does the contract assume it already is?

4. SAC Interaction

The Stellar Asset Contract (SAC) wraps Stellar classic XLM and issued assets as SEP-41 tokens. Contracts that interact with SAC face unique considerations:

Concern	Addressed?	Evidence
SAC balance includes trust line state (frozen/unauthorized)	YES/NO	{fn:line or NONE}
Classic Stellar operations affecting SAC balance not reflected in Soroban state	YES/NO	{fn:line or NONE}
Clawback feature of issued assets handled	YES/NO	{fn:line or NONE}
Issuer authorization revocation handled	YES/NO	{fn:line or NONE}
Token address permanence (classic re-issuance / migration)	YES/NO	{fn:line or NONE}

SAC-specific risks:

• Trust line authorization: A classic Stellar account can have its trust line for an asset revoked by the issuer. After revocation, transfer to that account fails silently or panics. Contracts that assume all transfers succeed need to handle this.
• Clawback: Some Stellar assets have clawback enabled. An issuer can call clawback to reduce a Soroban contract's balance without any Soroban transaction. This means a contract's balance() can decrease between two Soroban transactions with no on-Soroban event.
• Balance source of truth: SAC reads balances from the underlying Stellar ledger state. If a classic operation changes the balance, the Soroban contract sees the new balance immediately — this can break invariants if the contract caches balances.
• Token address permanence: On Stellar, classic assets can be re-issued or migrated, changing their effective on-chain identity. Contracts that derive storage keys, registry lookups, or deployment salts from token addresses may become unreachable if a token's address changes. Verify whether token address references can be updated or if the protocol documents this as a known limitation.

5. Balance Verification

When a contract accepts token deposits, it should verify the actual balance received rather than trusting the amount parameter:

Function	Reads Balance After Transfer?	Trusts Amount Parameter?	Fee-on-Transfer Risk?
{fn}	YES/NO	YES/NO	YES/NO

Note: Standard Soroban tokens (non-SAC) do not support fee-on-transfer. However:

• SAC-wrapped assets with clawback can reduce effective received amount
• Custom token implementations may deviate from the standard
• Protocols that accept arbitrary SEP-41 tokens should always read balance before and after transfer

Safe pattern:

let balance_before = token.balance(env.current_contract_address());
token.transfer_from(&spender, &from, &env.current_contract_address(), &amount);
let balance_after = token.balance(env.current_contract_address());
let received = balance_after - balance_before;
// Use `received` not `amount` for accounting

6. Burn Authorization

burn(from, amount) and burn_from(spender, from, amount) must enforce proper authorization:

Function	Auth Check	Auth Subject	Correct?
burn call at {file:line}	from.require_auth()	from	YES/NO
burn_from call at {file:line}	spender.require_auth() + allowance check	spender	YES/NO

Checks:

• burn without require_auth on from → anyone can burn any user's tokens
• burn_from without allowance check → bypasses the approval mechanism
• Protocol contracts that call burn to destroy tokens: verify they call from.require_auth() or that from is the calling contract itself (self-burn is always permitted)
• burn combined with minting: verify the net supply change is intentional and correctly accounted

Finding Template

**ID**: [ST-N]
**Severity**: [Critical if token theft, High if allowance bypass or burn exploit, Medium if expiry/SAC risk, Low if approve race]
**Step Execution**: ✓1,2,3,4,5,6 | ✗(reasons) | ?(uncertain)
**Rules Applied**: [R4:✓/✗, R5:✓/✗, R10:✓/✗, R11:✓/✗, R13:✓/✗, R15:✓/✗]
**Location**: src/{contract}.rs:LineN
**Title**: {Approve race / Expired allowance / Auth bypass / SAC risk / Burn exploit} in `{fn_name}`
**Description**: [Specific SEP-41 interaction flaw with code reference]
**Impact**: [Token theft / silent transfer failure / incorrect accounting / unauthorized burn]

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Step Execution Checklist (MANDATORY)

Section	Required	Completed?	Notes
1. Approve Race Condition	YES	✓/✗/?	All approve call sites
2. Allowance Expiry	YES	✓/✗/?	All transfer_from paths and approve expiration_ledger handling
3. Transfer Auth Propagation	YES	✓/✗/?	All transfer and transfer_from invocations
4. SAC Interaction	IF SAC tokens are involved	✓/✗(N/A)/?	Trust line, clawback, balance caching
5. Balance Verification	IF contract accepts deposits	✓/✗(N/A)/?	Balance-before vs balance-after pattern
6. Burn Authorization	IF burn or burn_from present	✓/✗(N/A)/?	Auth on all burn call sites