| name | token |
| description | Auto-loaded by token-auditor agent during Phase 2. Provides detection patterns for: fee-on-transfer, rebasing tokens, ERC777 hooks, ERC721/1155 callbacks, missing return values, blacklist/pausable, low decimals. Core artifact: Token Compatibility Matrix.
|
| user-invocable | false |
Token Vulnerability Patterns
This skill provides comprehensive knowledge for identifying token-related vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
Overview
Not all tokens follow the "happy path" of standard implementations. Protocols must handle edge cases from fee tokens, rebasing tokens, callback tokens, and malicious tokens.
Token Weirdness Categories
1. Fee-On-Transfer Tokens
Vulnerable Pattern:
// DANGEROUS: Assumes transfer amount equals received amount
function deposit(uint256 amount) external {
token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
balances[msg.sender] += amount; // May be more than received!
}
Secure Pattern:
function deposit(uint256 amount) external {
uint256 balanceBefore = token.balanceOf(address(this));
token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
uint256 received = token.balanceOf(address(this)) - balanceBefore;
balances[msg.sender] += received;
}
Common Fee Tokens:
- PAXG (0.02% fee)
- STA (1% fee)
- USDT (potential fee, currently 0)
Detection:
Grep("transferFrom.*\\+=|transfer.*\\+=", glob="**/*.sol")
2. Rebasing Tokens
Vulnerable Pattern:
// DANGEROUS: Caches balance that will change
function stake(uint256 amount) external {
token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
stakedAmount[msg.sender] = amount; // Becomes stale!
}
Secure Pattern:
// Use shares instead of amounts
function stake(uint256 amount) external {
uint256 totalBefore = token.balanceOf(address(this));
token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
uint256 received = token.balanceOf(address(this)) - totalBefore;
uint256 shares = totalShares == 0
? received
: received * totalShares / totalBefore;
userShares[msg.sender] += shares;
totalShares += shares;
}
Common Rebasing Tokens:
- stETH (positive rebase daily)
- AMPL (elastic supply)
- OHM (rebasing)
- aTokens (AAVE interest)
Detection:
- Look for balance caching
- Check if protocol claims to support stETH, AMPL
3. ERC777 Callback Reentrancy
Vulnerable Pattern:
// DANGEROUS: State updated after transfer
function withdraw(uint256 amount) external {
require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
token.transfer(msg.sender, amount); // Triggers tokensReceived!
balances[msg.sender] -= amount; // Too late!
}
ERC777 Hooks:
tokensToSend() - Called BEFORE transfer on sender
tokensReceived() - Called AFTER transfer on recipient
Detection:
Grep("IERC777|tokensReceived|tokensToSend", glob="**/*.sol")
4. ERC721/1155 Callback Reentrancy
Vulnerable Pattern:
// DANGEROUS: safeTransfer triggers callback
function claimNFT(uint256 tokenId) external {
nft.safeTransferFrom(address(this), msg.sender, tokenId);
// onERC721Received callback runs HERE
claimed[tokenId] = true; // State update after callback!
}
Callback Functions:
onERC721Received() - ERC721 safeTransfer
onERC1155Received() - ERC1155 safeTransfer
onERC1155BatchReceived() - ERC1155 safeBatchTransfer
Detection:
Grep("safeTransferFrom|safeMint|safeTransfer", glob="**/*.sol")
5. Missing Return Value (USDT)
Vulnerable Pattern:
// DANGEROUS: USDT doesn't return bool
function deposit(uint256 amount) external {
bool success = token.transfer(address(this), amount);
require(success, "Transfer failed"); // USDT reverts here!
}
Secure Pattern:
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol";
function deposit(uint256 amount) external {
token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
}
Tokens Without Return:
- USDT
- BNB
- Some older tokens
Detection:
Grep("transfer\\(|transferFrom\\(", glob="**/*.sol")
Check if using SafeERC20 wrapper.
6. Blacklist/Pausable Tokens
Risk: Transfers can be blocked, causing DoS.
Affected Tokens:
- USDC (blacklist)
- USDT (blacklist + pausable)
- DAI (pausable)
Vulnerable Pattern:
// DANGEROUS: Can be blocked if recipient blacklisted
function withdraw() external {
token.transfer(msg.sender, balances[msg.sender]); // May revert!
}
Mitigation:
- Use pull-over-push pattern
- Allow alternate withdrawal addresses
- Handle transfer failures gracefully
7. Low Decimal Tokens
Vulnerable Pattern:
// DANGEROUS: Precision loss with low decimals
// WBTC has 8 decimals, not 18
uint256 priceInWei = wbtcAmount * ethPrice / 1e18; // Wrong scale!
Common Low Decimal Tokens:
- WBTC (8 decimals)
- USDC (6 decimals)
- USDT (6 decimals)
Detection:
Grep("decimals|1e18|1e6|1e8", glob="**/*.sol")
8. Approval Race Condition
Vulnerable Pattern:
// DANGEROUS: Front-runnable approve
token.approve(spender, newAmount);
Attack:
- User has 100 approved
- User calls approve(50) to reduce
- Attacker front-runs: transferFrom(100)
- Approve(50) executes
- Attacker calls: transferFrom(50)
- Total stolen: 150
Secure Pattern:
// Reset to 0 first, or use increaseAllowance
token.approve(spender, 0);
token.approve(spender, newAmount);
// Or use OZ increaseAllowance/decreaseAllowance
token.increaseAllowance(spender, amount);
Token Compatibility Matrix
| Token | Fee | Rebase | Blacklist | Callback | Return |
|---|
| USDT | No* | No | Yes | No | None |
| USDC | No | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| DAI | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| stETH | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| WBTC | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| PAXG | Yes | No | No | No | Yes |
| ERC777 | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
*USDT has fee mechanism but set to 0
Token Audit Checklist
Severity Classification
Critical
- ERC777 reentrancy
- ERC721/1155 callback reentrancy
- Fee token accounting mismatch
High
- Rebasing token balance caching
- Missing return value handling
- Decimal precision errors
Medium
- Blacklist DoS potential
- Approval race condition
- No zero-amount validation