dev-security-audit

name

dev-security-audit

description

Comprehensive developer workstation security audit — scans for exposed credentials, compromised application data, persistence mechanisms, and supply chain attack indicators. Use this skill whenever the user suspects their machine may be compromised, wants to check for exposed secrets, asks about supply chain attacks, or wants a full security audit of their development environment. Also triggers on: 'am I compromised', 'check my security', 'scan for leaked keys', 'credential audit', 'supply chain attack', 'supply chain check', 'check if I was hacked'.

Developer Workstation Security Audit

A systematic, multi-phase security audit for developer workstations. Checks for supply chain compromise indicators (via case-based IoC library at references/cases/), scans for exposed credentials across 20+ categories, and generates a prioritized remediation plan.

When to Use

• User suspects their machine was compromised
• User wants to check for exposed secrets/credentials
• User heard about a supply chain attack and wants to check if affected
• User wants a general security audit of their dev environment
• Post-incident response: credential rotation planning

When NOT to Use

• Code-level security review (use /codex-security or /security-review)
• Dependency vulnerability audit (use /dep-audit)
• OWASP Top 10 web app audit (use /codex-security)
• Runtime application security testing

Workflow Overview

sequenceDiagram
    participant U as User
    participant C as Claude
    participant S as System
    C->>S: Phase 0: Supply Chain IoC Dispatch (case-driven)
    C->>S: Phase 1: Credential & Secret Exposure Scan
    C->>S: Phase 2: Application & Browser Data Scan
    C->>S: Phase 3: Persistence & Backdoor Check
    C->>U: Phase 4: Report Generation & Remediation Plan

Run phases sequentially. Each phase produces findings that feed into the final report. Use the reference files for detailed scan targets and IoC lists.

Evidence preservation: Before any cleanup or deletion, always copy/archive artifacts for forensic analysis. Never destroy evidence before the report is generated.

Phase 0: Supply Chain IoC Dispatch

Check for known supply chain compromises using the case library (references/cases/). This phase is conditional — it runs only when matching cases are found.

Dispatch Algorithm

1. Detect platform: macOS / Linux / Windows
2. Load case catalog: Read references/cases/README.md for active cases
3. Scan product presence: For each active case, check if the product is installed on the system
4. Execute matching cases: Load the case file and run its Detection Commands section

Dispatch Rules

Condition	Action
No matching case (product not installed)	Skip Phase 0, proceed to Phase 1
Single match	Load case file, run detection + interpretation
Multiple matches	Iterate: execute each case sequentially

Output Contract

For each matched case, report:

Field	Description
case_id	From case frontmatter (e.g., PRODUCT-YYYY-MM)
status	COMPROMISED / INCONCLUSIVE / CLEAN / NOT_INSTALLED
confidence	From case frontmatter + detection result

If any case returns COMPROMISED, execute evidence preservation per case file instructions before proceeding.

Phase 1: Credential & Secret Exposure Scan

Scan for ALL sensitive files an attacker with user-space read access could have exfiltrated. This scan reveals credential hygiene issues regardless of supply chain compromise status.

Read references/scan-targets.md for the complete list. Below is the execution strategy.

Scan Strategy

Run scans in parallel where possible (use subagents for independent categories). Group into 3 parallel tracks:

Track A — Cloud & Infrastructure Credentials:

• AWS (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.aws/config)
• GCP (~/.config/gcloud/ — credentials.db, access_tokens.db, application_default_credentials.json)
• Azure (~/.azure/)
• Kubernetes (~/.kube/config, ~/.kube/custom-contexts/)
• Terraform (~/.terraform.d/credentials.tfrc.json)
• Docker (~/.docker/config.json)

Track B — Development Tool Tokens:

• SSH keys (~/.ssh/)
• Git credentials (~/.git-credentials, ~/.gitconfig)
• GitHub CLI (~/.config/gh/)
• GitLab CLI (~/.config/glab-cli/)
• npm (~/.npmrc)
• GPG keys (~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/)

Track C — Application Secrets & History:

• Shell history token scan (grep for patterns below)
• .env files (find ~ -maxdepth 5 \( -name ".env" -o -name ".env.*" \) 2>/dev/null | grep -v node_modules | grep -v .git)
• Crypto wallets (Solana, Electrum, etc.)
• VPN configs (*.ovpn, WireGuard)

Parallel Scan Merge Rules

#	Rule	Description
1	Subagent parallel	Tracks A/B/C may run via subagents in parallel for speed
2	Unified output schema	All tracks emit: Category | Path | Severity | Redacted Sample | Action
3	Dedup by key	Merge results using (Path + Indicator Type + Token Prefix) as dedup key
4	Critical bubble-up	Critical/Critical+ findings surface immediately — do not wait for full scan

Token Pattern Reference

Use these regex patterns to extract tokens from shell history and .env files:

OpenAI:           sk-[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}
Anthropic:        sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}
GitHub Classic:   gh[posur]_[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}
GitHub Fine-grain: github_pat_[a-zA-Z0-9_]{20,}
GitLab PAT:       glpat-[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}
AWS Access:       AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}
AWS Temp:         ASIA[A-Z0-9]{16}
HuggingFace:      hf_[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}
npm:              npm_[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}
Docker Hub:       dckr_pat_[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}
Slack:            xox[bsrp]-[a-zA-Z0-9-]{20,}
Stripe:           [rs]k_live_[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}
Firebase:         AIza[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{30,}
JWT:              eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+
Vercel:           vercel_[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}
Supabase:         sbp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}

When displaying found tokens to the user, always partially redact them (show first 8 and last 4 chars) so they can identify which token it is without fully exposing it in conversation history.

Crypto Wallet Check

Crypto wallets deserve special urgency — asset theft is irreversible:

Wallet	Path	Key Storage
Solana CLI	~/.config/solana/id.json	Plaintext 64-byte keypair
Electrum	~/.electrum/wallets/	Encrypted (but copyable for offline brute force)
OneKey	~/Library/Application Support/@onekeyhq/desktop/	Encrypted in LevelDB
Ledger Live	~/Library/Application Support/Ledger Live/	Hardware key (safe), but addresses exposed
Tonkeeper	~/Library/Application Support/@tonkeeper/desktop/	Check LevelDB

For plaintext keys (Solana), immediately check balance via RPC. For encrypted wallets (Electrum), the wallet files could have been copied for offline cracking — advise transferring funds to a new wallet.

Phase 2: Application & Browser Data Scan

User-space RCE can read any application's local data. Electron apps are especially vulnerable because they store data in unencrypted LevelDB.

Electron App Scan

List all Electron apps by checking for LevelDB in Local Storage:

find ~/Library/Application\ Support/*/Local\ Storage/leveldb -maxdepth 0 2>/dev/null

High-priority Electron apps to check:

• Communication: Slack, Discord, Telegram, LINE, WhatsApp Desktop
• Dev tools: VS Code, GitKraken, Postman, MongoDB Compass
• Crypto: OneKey, Ledger Live, Tonkeeper
• AI: Claude Desktop, ChatGPT Desktop

For each, run strings on the LevelDB files and grep for token, secret, password, auth, session. Always pipe through redaction before output: sed -E 's/(.{8}).{4,}(.{4})/\1****\2/g'. Never print raw secrets to conversation or report — redact at the pipeline level, not as an afterthought.

Browser Data

Browsers store Login Data, Cookies, and Local Storage accessible to user-space processes:

# Chrome profiles
ls ~/Library/Application\ Support/Google/Chrome/*/Login\ Data 2>/dev/null
# Firefox
ls ~/Library/Application\ Support/Firefox/Profiles/*/logins.json 2>/dev/null
# Arc
ls ~/Library/Application\ Support/Arc/*/Login\ Data 2>/dev/null

Note: Chrome's Login Data is encrypted via macOS Keychain. Under RCE, the attacker could potentially decrypt it during an active user session via the security CLI or Chrome DevTools Protocol.

macOS Keychain

ls ~/Library/Keychains/ 2>/dev/null

Keychain files are encrypted, but during an active session with RCE, the attacker could use security dump-keychain or security find-generic-password to extract individual items. This is a medium risk — it requires the keychain to be unlocked (which it usually is during a user session).

Phase 3: Persistence & Backdoor Check

Check whether the attacker established any persistence mechanisms to survive application removal. Case-specific persistence indicators (e.g., known backdoor binaries) are checked in Phase 0 via case files.

macOS

# User LaunchAgents (most common persistence vector)
ls ~/Library/LaunchAgents/

# System LaunchDaemons (requires root, less likely for user-space attack)
ls /Library/LaunchDaemons/

# Non-Apple launchctl services
launchctl list | grep -v com.apple

# Cron jobs
crontab -l

# Login items
osascript -e 'tell application "System Events" to get the name of every login item' 2>/dev/null

Linux

crontab -l
ls /etc/cron.d/
systemctl list-unit-files --type=service | grep -v disabled

Windows (instruct user to run)

schtasks /query /fo LIST /v
sc query type=service state=all | findstr /v /i "Microsoft Windows"
reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"

Suspicious Binary Check

Scan common binary locations for unsigned or unexpected executables:

ls -la /usr/local/bin/ | head -30
# List executables modified within a suspected attack window
# Use dates from Phase 0 case match (attack_window.start/end) or user-provided window
WINDOW_START="${ATTACK_WINDOW_START:?Set ATTACK_WINDOW_START from Phase 0 case match}"
WINDOW_END="${ATTACK_WINDOW_END:?Set ATTACK_WINDOW_END from Phase 0 case match}"
find /usr/local/bin -type f -newermt "$WINDOW_START" ! -newermt "$WINDOW_END" 2>/dev/null | while read f; do
  file "$f" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "executable" && echo "SUSPECT: $f ($(stat -f '%Sm' "$f" 2>/dev/null || stat -c '%y' "$f" 2>/dev/null))"
done

Phase 4: Report Generation

After all scans complete, generate a prioritized report and save to /tmp/.

Report Output

Write the report to a secure temp file via mktemp. This keeps the report outside the repo (no accidental commit of sensitive findings) and accessible for the user to review, copy, or forward.

umask 077
REPORT_PATH="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/security-audit-$(hostname -s)-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).md"
touch "$REPORT_PATH" && chmod 600 "$REPORT_PATH"
# Write report content to $REPORT_PATH
echo "Report saved to: $REPORT_PATH"

Example output: /tmp/security-audit-macbook-pro-20260325-143052.md

Severity Classification

Severity	Criteria	Examples
Critical+	Immediate asset loss risk	Crypto wallet private keys, plaintext
Critical	Full account/infrastructure takeover	AWS keys, GCP refresh tokens, K8s admin tokens
High	Account access or data theft	Git tokens, npm tokens, API keys, VPN configs
Medium	Encrypted/protected but potentially exposed	Keychain, encrypted wallets, browser Login Data
Low	Information disclosure only	known_hosts, directory structure, git config

Report Template

# Security Audit Report

## Summary
- Scan date: YYYY-MM-DD
- Platform: macOS/Linux/Windows
- Supply Chain IoC: [per-case status from Phase 0, or "No active cases matched"]
- Total findings: N (N critical, N high, N medium, N low)

## Supply Chain Status
[Per-case results table: case_id | status | confidence]

## Critical Findings (Immediate Action Required)
| # | Category | Item | Path | Action |

## High Findings (Action Within 24h)
| # | Category | Item | Path | Action |

## Medium Findings (Evaluate & Monitor)
| # | Category | Item | Path | Action |

## Recommended Action Plan
### Tier 0 — Immediately (minutes)
### Tier 1 — Today (hours)
### Tier 2 — This Week
### Tier 3 — Contingency Triggers

## What Was NOT Found (Good News)
[List of categories that came back clean]

Remediation Priority Rules

1. Crypto wallets with plaintext keys — Check balance first, transfer if needed, then delete key
2. Cloud provider credentials (AWS/GCP/Azure) — Revoke immediately (can re-mint access)
3. Git platform tokens (GitHub/GitLab) — Revoke (can push malicious code)
4. npm/PyPI/registry tokens — Revoke (supply chain risk)
5. SSH keys — Generate new keys, update all services, then delete old
6. Shell history — Clear after extracting token list for revocation
7. VPN configs — Notify IT team
8. .env.production files — Audit and rotate all contained secrets
9. Communication app tokens — Re-login to invalidate sessions
10. Browser passwords — Evaluate scope, consider full password rotation

Verification Checklist

• Supply chain IoC cases checked (Phase 0 dispatch)
• All cloud provider credential paths checked
• Shell history scanned for token patterns
• .env files enumerated
• Crypto wallet paths checked
• SSH directory fully inventoried
• Electron app LevelDB scanned
• Browser Login Data enumerated
• Persistence mechanisms checked
• Report generated with severity classification
• Remediation plan prioritized by risk

References

File	Purpose
references/scan-targets.md	Complete list of file paths to scan per platform
references/remediation.md	Detailed remediation procedures per category
references/cases/	Supply chain incident case library (IoC + detection + cleanup per case)