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aws-irp-data-access

Use when a case involves unintended S3 access, public bucket or object exposure, permissive bucket policy or ACL changes, S3 GuardDuty/Macie findings, bulk object access, or data exposure through compromised credentials.

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TracecatHQ/gyms
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5 de septiembre de 2026 a las 01:03
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SKILL.md
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aws-irp-data-access
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Use when a case involves unintended S3 access, public bucket or object exposure, permissive bucket policy or ACL changes, S3 GuardDuty/Macie findings, bulk object access, or data exposure through compromised credentials.
# AWS IRP: data access Use this skill when a case involves unintended S3 access, public bucket or object exposure, permissive bucket policy or ACL changes, S3 GuardDuty/Macie findings, bulk object access, or data exposure through compromised credentials. ## Source The full upstream AWS incident response playbook is preserved in `REFERENCE.md`. ## BOTSv3 demo boundary - Use this as response-planning guidance only. - Do not perform live AWS changes unless the user explicitly asks for an operational runbook outside the BOTSv3 lab. - Do not use hidden evaluator tables. - Do not disclose secrets, credentials, signed URLs, or full raw logs. - Ground every case conclusion in local case context and DuckDB evidence before external enrichment. ## Response pattern For data-access cases, structure the response plan around: 1. Preserve evidence: affected bucket/object scope, access vector, requester identity, source IPs, object access timeline, and data classification. 2. Contain: enable Block Public Access, remove permissive ACLs or policies, disable compromised credentials, and stop ongoing exfiltration. 3. Eradicate: harden bucket policies, rotate credentials, remove unauthorized principals, and close related instance or identity exposure paths. 4. Recover: restore object integrity from versioning/backups where needed and validate legitimate application access. 5. Post-incident: update data classification, Macie/GuardDuty coverage, policy guardrails, owner communications, and notification requirements. ## Case output When closing a Tracecat case, write the primary analysis in the case description with: - Verdict table. - Executive summary. - Timeline table. - IoC table for buckets, object prefixes, principals, IPs, user agents, and safe access key identifiers. - MITRE mapping where supported by evidence. - Response plan table using preserve, contain, eradicate, recover, and lessons learned phases.
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