web3-grep-arsenal

# GREP ARSENAL — MASTER REFERENCE > All grep commands in one place. Run in the first 30 minutes of any new target. > Replaces: 03-grep-surface-map, 14-grep-master-patterns + grep sections from 04-13 --- ## HOW TO USE THE SURFACE MAP **Process:** 1. Run ALL 10 blocks below (takes ~5 min) 2. Collect all results in a notes file 3. Tier-rank the hits (see Tier System below) 4. In pass 1: READ everything, DON'T investigate yet 5. In pass 2: Deep-dive on Tier 1 + 2 items **Tier System:** - **Tier 1** — Near privileged code, external calls, or state changes with no guards → Investigate first - **Tier 2** — Interesting patterns that need context before judging → Investigate after Tier 1 - **Tier 3** — Informational only (documentation, test files, comments) → Skip unless Tier 1+2 exhausted --- ## THE 10 GREP BLOCKS (Copy-Paste Each) ### Block 1 — Access Control ```bash echo "=== ACCESS CONTROL ===" && \ grep -rn "tx\.origin" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "msg\.sender == owner\b" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "modifier only" src/ --include="*.sol" -A5 && \ grep -rn "onlyOwner\|onlyAdmin\|onlyRole" src/ --include="*.sol" | wc -l && \ grep -rn "def admin_\|router\..*admin\|function.*[Aa]dmin" src/ --include="*.sol" ``` **Red flags:** - `tx.origin` used for auth → Tier 1 (phishing vector) - Modifier uses `if (condition) { _; }` without else → Tier 1 (silent bypass — function still executes for unauthorized callers) - `onlyOwner` count << total external function count → likely missing guards on siblings ### Block 2 — Reentrancy ```bash echo "=== REENTRANCY ===" && \ grep -rn "\.call{value\|\.call(" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "\.transfer(\|\.send(" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "safeTransfer\|safeTransferFrom" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "onERC721Received\|onERC1155Received\|tokensReceived" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "nonReentrant\|ReentrancyGuard" src/ --include="*.sol" ``` **Red flags:** - `.call{value:}` or `safeTransfer` BEFORE state updates in same function → Tier 1 (CEI violation) - `onERC721Received`/`onERC1155Received` hooks present → check for reentrancy path - External calls present but `nonReentrant` missing → verify CEI is followed ### Block 3 — Oracle / Price ```bash echo "=== ORACLE / PRICE ===" && \ grep -rn "slot0\b" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "getReserves()" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "latestRoundData\|latestAnswer" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "updatedAt" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "block\.timestamp" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "//\|test\|Test" | head -20 ``` **Red flags:** - `slot0()` used for price → Tier 1 (Uniswap V3 spot, flash-loan manipulable) - `getReserves()` used for price → Tier 1 (Uniswap V2 spot, flash-loan manipulable) - `latestRoundData` without `updatedAt` check → Tier 1 (stale Chainlink price) - `latestAnswer` → Tier 1 (deprecated, no round validation) ### Block 4 — Arithmetic / Math ```bash echo "=== ARITHMETIC ===" && \ grep -rn "unchecked {" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "/ \|/=" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "//\|test\|Test" | head -30 && \ grep -rn "mulDiv\|FullMath\|PRBMath" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "\* 10\*\*\|* 1e18\|* WAD\|* RAY" src/ --include="*.sol" ``` **Red flags:** - `unchecked {}` blocks → manually verify each (Solidity 0.8+ unwraps here) - Division before multiplication (`a / b * c`) → precision loss - `/ 1e18` in contract that handles 6-decimal tokens → decimal mismatch ### Block 5 — Input Validation ```bash echo "=== INPUT VALIDATION ===" && \ grep -rn "address(0)\b" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "require.*length\|\.length ==" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "delegatecall" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "abi\.decode\|abi\.encodePacked" src/ --include="*.sol" | head -20 ``` **Red flags:** - `delegatecall` with user-controlled target → Tier 1 (arbitrary code execution) - `abi.decode` on user-supplied calldata without length validation → Tier 1 - Array params in batch functions without dedup check → Tier 1 (double-count attack) ### Block 6 — Token Handling ```bash echo "=== TOKEN HANDLING ===" && \ grep -rn "IERC20\.\|ERC20\." src/ --include="*.sol" | grep "transfer\b\|transferFrom\b" && \ grep -rn "SafeERC20\|safeTransfer\b" src/ --include="*.sol" | head -10 && \ grep -rn "balanceOf(address(this))" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "permit(" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "//\|IERC20Permit" && \ grep -rn "try.*permit\|catch.*permit" src/ --include="*.sol" ``` **Red flags:** - `token.transfer()` without `SafeERC20.safeTransfer()` → Tier 1 (return value unchecked, fails silently on old USDT) - `balanceOf(address(this))` for pricing/shares → Tier 1 (donation attack vector) - `permit()` without try/catch wrapper → Tier 2 (frontrun DoS possible) ### Block 7 — ERC4626 / Vault ```bash echo "=== ERC4626 / VAULT ===" && \ grep -rn "totalAssets\|convertToShares\|previewDeposit\|previewMint" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "_decimalsOffset\|decimalsOffset\|virtual_shares\|dead.*shares" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "shares.*supply\|totalSupply\|mint.*shares" src/ --include="*.sol" | head -20 ``` **Red flags:** - ERC4626 present but `_decimalsOffset()` NOT present → Tier 1 (first depositor inflation) - `totalAssets()` uses `balanceOf(address(this))` → Tier 1 (donation attack) - `mint()` or `deposit()` called without same validation path → Tier 1 (MetaPool bug: mint skipped receipt check) ### Block 8 — Proxy / Upgradeable ```bash echo "=== PROXY / UPGRADE ===" && \ grep -rn "_authorizeUpgrade\|upgradeTo\|upgradeToAndCall" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "initialize(" src/ --include="*.sol" | grep -v "//\|test\|Test" && \ grep -rn "_disableInitializers\|initializer\b\|Initializable" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "StorageSlot\|ERC1967\|TransparentProxy\|UUPSUpgradeable" src/ --include="*.sol" ``` **Red flags:** - `_authorizeUpgrade()` without `onlyOwner` or role check → Tier 1 (anyone can upgrade) - `initialize()` without `initializer` modifier → Tier 1 (re-initialization possible) - Proxy present but `_disableInitializers()` NOT in impl constructor → Tier 1 (impl attackable) ### Block 9 — Signature / Replay ```bash echo "=== SIGNATURES ===" && \ grep -rn "ecrecover\|ECDSA\.recover" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "chainId\|block\.chainid\|DOMAIN_SEPARATOR" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "nonces\[" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "keccak256.*abi\.encode" src/ --include="*.sol" | head -20 ``` **Red flags:** - `ecrecover` present but `chainId`/`DOMAIN_SEPARATOR` NOT present → Tier 1 (cross-chain replay) - `ecrecover` without nonce → Tier 1 (same-chain replay) - `ecrecover` return not checked against `address(0)` → Tier 1 (invalid sigs succeed) ### Block 10 — State Completeness / Access ```bash echo "=== STATE COMPLETENESS ===" && \ grep -rn "grantRole\|revokeRole\|hasRole" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "bytes32.*ROLE\s*=" src/ --include="*.sol" && \ grep -rn "function.*migrate\|function.*batch.*stake\|function.*multiStake" src/ --include="*.sol" -A10 && \ grep -rn "} catch" src/ --include="*.sol" -A5 | grep -A5 "revert\|Error" && \ grep -rn "cached\|_cache\|lastKnown\|storedBalance" src/ --include="*.sol" ``` **Red flags:** - Role defined but `grantRole()` call for that role NOT found anywhere → Tier 1 (role permanently empty) - Array-based function: `flag = true` OUTSIDE/AFTER loop → Tier 1 (empty array bypass) - `} catch { revert }` on critical path → Tier 2 (liveness DoS if external changes) - Cache variable initialized to 0 with no first-access guard → Tier 1 (uninitialized cache) --- ## PROTOCOL-SPECIFIC PATTERNS ### Yield Aggregator (like Ern, Yearn, Beefy) ```bash grep -rn "cumulativeReward\|rewardPerShare\|accRewardPerShare" src/ --include="*.sol" grep -rn "harvestCooldown\|canHarvest\|performHarvest\|_harvest" src/ --include="*.sol" grep -rn "totalDeposited\|totalPrincipal" src/ --include="*.sol" # Check: does cumulativeReward always update before user checkpoint? ``` ### Lending Protocol (like Aave, Compound) ```bash grep -rn "collateral\|borrow\|liquidat" src/ --include="*.sol" grep -rn "healthFactor\|isSolvent\|isLiquidatable" src/ --include="*.sol" grep -rn "interest.*accrual\|accrueInterest\|indexIncrease" src/ --include="*.sol" grep -rn "amplification\|A_PARAMETER\|getA()" src/ --include="*.sol" # Check: is price oracle manipulation possible? Is interest accrual order correct? ``` ### AMM / DEX ```bash grep -rn "getReserves\|reserve0\|reserve1" src/ --include="*.sol" grep -rn "slot0\|sqrtPriceX96\|tick\b" src/ --include="*.sol" grep -rn "K\s*=\|invariant\|_invariant" src/ --include="*.sol" grep -rn "amountOutMin\|minAmountOut\|deadline" src/ --include="*.sol" # Check: is spot price used for any security decision? Missing slippage? ``` ### Staking / Restaking ```bash grep -rn "epoch\|currentEpoch\|lastEpoch\|epochId" src/ --include="*.sol" grep -rn "unstake\|migrate\|slash\|jailValidator" src/ --include="*.sol" grep -rn "validatorIds\|stakeIds\|delegateIds" src/ --include="*.sol" # Check: can same ID be passed twice? Empty array skips state reset? ``` ### ZK / Proof Contracts ```bash grep -rn "verifyProof\|IVerifier\|publicInputs\b" src/ --include="*.sol"