Analyze Windows LNK shortcut files and Jump List artifacts to establish evidence of file access, program execution, and user activity using LECmd, JLECmd, and manual binary parsing of the Shell Link Binary format.
Instrucciones de origen · Vista previa de solo lectura
name
analyzing-lnk-file-and-jump-list-artifacts
description
Analyze Windows LNK shortcut files and Jump List artifacts to establish evidence of file access, program execution, and user activity using LECmd, JLECmd, and manual binary parsing of the Shell Link Binary format.
Windows LNK (shortcut) files and Jump Lists are critical forensic artifacts that provide evidence of file access, program execution, and user behavior. LNK files are created automatically when a user opens a file through Windows Explorer or the Open/Save dialog, storing metadata about the target file including its original path, timestamps, volume serial number, NetBIOS name, and MAC address of the host system. Jump Lists, introduced in Windows 7, extend this by maintaining per-application lists of recently and frequently accessed files. These artifacts persist even after the target files are deleted, making them invaluable for establishing that a user accessed specific files at specific times.
When to Use
When investigating security incidents that require analyzing lnk file and jump list artifacts
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Detection Gaps & Validation
Most-missed artifacts: don't stop at Recent\*.lnk. Parse both AutomaticDestinations (per-app MRU, OLE compound files keyed by AppID hash) and CustomDestinations (pinned/task items), plus Office MRU LNKs under ...\Office\Recent\, and the embedded target IDList/shellbag that survives even when the path string is wiped. Feed LECmd/JLECmd the whole Recent\ tree, AutomaticDestinations, and CustomDestinations - they only cover what you point them at.
Persistence even after deletion: LNK files and Jump List entries survive deletion of the target, recording the target's $STANDARD_INFORMATION times, volume serial, drive type, NetBIOS name, and TrackerDataBlock MAC - proving access to a file that no longer exists. A Drive Type=Removable + volume serial, or a MAC differing from the host, indicates a file opened from external/network media.
Anti-forensics that defeats this analysis: wiping Recent\ or an AutomaticDestinations .ms file removes the live view - recover deleted LNKs from $MFT/unallocated and Volume Shadow Copies, and treat a near-empty Recent folder on an active account as itself suspicious.
Validate with a second source: corroborate LNK-claimed access against $UsnJrnl/$MFT entries for the target, Prefetch/Amcache for the launching program, Shellbags for the parent folder, and registry MountPoints2/USBSTOR when the LNK points at a removable volume serial.
Interpretation pitfalls (false positives): a LNK proves the target was referenced (Explorer preview, Open/Save dialog, recent-docs enumeration), not necessarily opened by the user; Windows 11/UWP apps generate fewer LNK/Jump List entries; and the LNK's own timestamps describe the shortcut, not the file. Confirm system timezone and clock skew before timelining.
Prerequisites
LECmd (Eric Zimmerman) for LNK file parsing
JLECmd (Eric Zimmerman) for Jump List parsing
Python 3.8+ with pylnk3 or LnkParse3 libraries
Forensic image or triage collection from Windows system
