name	secret-scan
description	Before a commit, push, paste, or share, scan the diff/text for leaked secrets (API keys, tokens, private keys, passwords, connection strings) and block them, instead of leaking and rotating later. Use before any git push, before sharing logs/config, before pasting output. Trigger with /secret-scan or "check for secrets", "is there a key in this", "scan before push".
version	0.1.0
user-invocable	true
metadata	{"emoji":"🔑"}

secret-scan

A leaked secret is committed once and exposed forever (history, forks, mirrors). This skill scans a diff or blob for secrets BEFORE it leaves your machine, and blocks rather than trusts.

Why this exists (evidence)

Secret leakage on public GitHub is massive and persistent (GitGuardian's annual reports count millions of new exposed secrets per year). A key in one commit must be assumed compromised and rotated, even if you delete it next commit, because history and forks retain it.
Agents make it worse: they paste logs, echo env, and commit broadly. A pre-flight scan is far cheaper than rotation + incident.

When to use

Before EVERY git push / git commit of changed files (especially configs, scripts, notebooks).
Before sharing logs, error output, or config in chat/issues/PRs.
Before publishing a repo (we publish a lot, run it first).

What to flag

Scan the staged diff / target text for:

Known key formats: AWS AKIA.../secret keys, GitHub ghp_/github_pat_, OpenAI sk-..., Anthropic sk-ant-..., Google API keys, Stripe sk_live_, Slack xox..., JWTs, Render/Vercel tokens.
Private keys: -----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----.
Connection strings / URLs with creds: postgres://user:pass@, mongodb+srv://...:...@.
High-entropy strings assigned to suspicious names (*_KEY, *_TOKEN, *_SECRET, PASSWORD, *_PWD).
.env-style KEY=value with secret-looking values being committed (.env should be gitignored).

Output: per finding, file:line + secret TYPE + a MASKED preview (never echo the full secret). Verdict: BLOCK (real secret -> remove, rotate if it ever left the machine, add to .gitignore) / REVIEW (high-entropy but maybe not secret) / CLEAN.

How to run it

git diff --staged (or the target file/text) and apply the patterns above.
If a tool like gitleaks/trufflehog is available, run it and pass through the findings.
On a hit pre-push: do NOT push. Remove the secret, move it to env/.gitignore; if it was ever committed/pushed, treat it as compromised and rotate.

Composes with

safety-net: reversible checkpoints; but a pushed secret is NOT undone by local rollback (history persists) -> scan BEFORE push.
dep-guard / mcp-warden / skill-security-scan: the supply-chain & trust family; secret-scan is the outbound-leak side.

Honest limits

Pattern + entropy scanning has false negatives (novel/obfuscated secrets) and false positives (random high-entropy IDs). It lowers risk; it is not a guarantee. Prefer a real scanner (gitleaks) in CI as the backstop.
It cannot un-leak an already-pushed secret; for those, rotate. This is prevention, not cleanup.

secret-scan

A leaked secret is committed once and exposed forever (history, forks, mirrors). This skill scans a diff or blob for secrets BEFORE it leaves your machine, and blocks rather than trusts.

Why this exists (evidence)

Secret leakage on public GitHub is massive and persistent (GitGuardian's annual reports count millions of new exposed secrets per year). A key in one commit must be assumed compromised and rotated, even if you delete it next commit, because history and forks retain it.

Agents make it worse: they paste logs, echo env, and commit broadly. A pre-flight scan is far cheaper than rotation + incident.

When to use

Before EVERY git push / git commit of changed files (especially configs, scripts, notebooks).

Before sharing logs, error output, or config in chat/issues/PRs.

Before publishing a repo (we publish a lot, run it first).

What to flag

Scan the staged diff / target text for:

Known key formats: AWS AKIA.../secret keys, GitHub ghp_/github_pat_, OpenAI sk-..., Anthropic sk-ant-..., Google API keys, Stripe sk_live_, Slack xox..., JWTs, Render/Vercel tokens.

Private keys: -----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----.

Connection strings / URLs with creds: postgres://user:pass@, mongodb+srv://...:...@.

High-entropy strings assigned to suspicious names (*_KEY, *_TOKEN, *_SECRET, PASSWORD, *_PWD).

.env-style KEY=value with secret-looking values being committed (.env should be gitignored).

How to run it

git diff --staged (or the target file/text) and apply the patterns above.

If a tool like gitleaks/trufflehog is available, run it and pass through the findings.

On a hit pre-push: do NOT push. Remove the secret, move it to env/.gitignore; if it was ever committed/pushed, treat it as compromised and rotate.

Composes with

safety-net: reversible checkpoints; but a pushed secret is NOT undone by local rollback (history persists) -> scan BEFORE push.

dep-guard / mcp-warden / skill-security-scan: the supply-chain & trust family; secret-scan is the outbound-leak side.

Honest limits

Pattern + entropy scanning has false negatives (novel/obfuscated secrets) and false positives (random high-entropy IDs). It lowers risk; it is not a guarantee. Prefer a real scanner (gitleaks) in CI as the backstop.

It cannot un-leak an already-pushed secret; for those, rotate. This is prevention, not cleanup.