supply-chain-defense

name	supply-chain-defense
description	Behavioural-first defense against poisoned npm/PyPI packages in the publish-to-advisory window CVE tools miss. Use before every install or version bump: 7-day cooldown gate, Socket.dev behavioural score, stale-OIDC audit, publish-token rotation, and a worm-persistence self-scan.
license	MIT
allowed-tools	Read Edit Write Bash Glob Grep Agent WebFetch
metadata	{"author":"claude-mods","related-skills":"security-ops, ci-cd-ops, github-ops, auth-ops"}

Supply Chain Defense

Proactive, behavioural-first defense against the 2026 software supply chain threat: self-propagating worms (Shai-Hulud / Mini Shai-Hulud) that poison popular npm and PyPI packages, steal credentials, republish from stolen tokens, and inject persistence hooks into Claude Code and VS Code settings specifically.

Helps with

Every install or version bump is a use case for this skill, not just suspected attacks — the routine cooldown gate + behavioural score is the whole point.

Deciding whether a dependency you're about to add is safe — getting a behavioural verdict on an npm or PyPI package before npm install / pip install, not days later when a CVE drops. socket package score, the depscore MCP, or scripts/preinstall-check.sh.

A teammate or CI just pulled a freshly-published package version and you need to know if it's poisoned. The Shai-Hulud / Mini Shai-Hulud worm ships malicious versions that live for only hours (axios 1.14.1 / 0.30.4 were live ~3h).

npm audit / pip-audit come back clean but you're uneasy — those are CVE/advisory-driven and blind to malware that hasn't been reported yet. You want behavioural analysis (new postinstall hooks, unexpected network calls, obfuscated payloads), not a CVE lookup.

Setting up Socket.dev on a budget — the free socket CLI, the GitHub PR app, or the depscore MCP for Claude Code (claude mcp add --transport http socket-mcp https://mcp.socket.dev/, no API key). Deciding free vs paid tiers.

Auditing GitHub Actions for the stale-OIDC / pull_request_target misconfiguration that Mini Shai-Hulud abused to mint npm publish tokens from an orphaned workflow. zizmor, or scripts/integrity-audit.sh.

Hardening installs against postinstall / preinstall lifecycle-script malware — npm config set ignore-scripts true, the socket wrapper, lockfile-lint, or the pre-install-scan.sh hook.

Checking whether this machine is already compromised — detecting worm persistence hooks injected into ~/.claude/settings.json, ~/.claude.json, or VS Code settings.json. scripts/integrity-audit.sh.

Choosing among supply-chain scanners — when to reach for Socket vs GuardDog vs OSV-Scanner vs zizmor vs Harden-Runner. See references/tooling-landscape.md.

Enforcing a release-age cooldown so production never pulls a day-zero version (Renovate minimumReleaseAge), and rotating long-lived npm/PyPI publish tokens to short-lived OIDC.

Responding to a fresh advisory — it names a poisoned package, version, or malicious VS Code / Cursor extension and you need to know whether any project or machine actually has it installed right now. scripts/exposure-check.py matches on-disk npm / PyPI / Composer / Cargo / Go / RubyGems lockfiles and installed editor extensions against an IOC catalog seeded with cited 2026 incidents (axios 1.14.1, Laravel-Lang tag rewrite, Nx Console 18.95.0 → the GitHub breach). For fleet-scale exposure response on macOS/Linux, see Bumblebee in references/tooling-landscape.md.

Watching what already-running code does on the network — an unexplained UAC prompt, a process you can't place, or just wanting a tripwire for the post-compromise phase: a stealer that already landed exfiltrates as an outbound connection (Shai-Hulud phoned home to webhook.site). On Windows, scripts/phone-home-monitor.ps1 maps every outbound TCP connection to its owning process + parent chain + signing status and flags interpreter/raw-IP/IOC/ package-manager-child patterns. See references/phone-home-monitoring.md.

Defending a repo you already own against being poisoned in place — the config-as-code / trusted-repo class (PolinRider / EtherHiding, DPRK UNC5342) where the dependency tree stays clean and an obfuscated blockchain-C2 loader is appended to your own vite.config.js / tailwind.config.js / .vscode/tasks.json, then propagated by backdated false-flag force-pushes. The dependency scanners are blind to this; scripts/config-drift-check.py (pre-commit + CI) plus the branch-protection / signed-commits / hardware-key discipline in references/repo-integrity.md cover it. Workflow L.

Wanting proof the skill covers a specific attack — the references/threat-model.md "Coverage" matrix maps every 2026 vector (maintainer compromise, OIDC theft, lifecycle scripts, persistence hooks, forged provenance, tag-rewrite, malicious extensions, MCP attacks, config-as-code / trusted-repo poisoning) to its control + caveat.

Overview

This skill is the operational complement to two siblings:

• security-ops is reactive — it runs npm audit / pip-audit / govulncheck against the CVE/advisory database. Necessary, but blind to a malicious package that hasn't been reported yet.
• supply-chain-defense (this skill) is proactive — it analyses what a freshly-published package actually does (new install scripts, network calls, obfuscation) within seconds of publication, before any CVE exists.

The defensive gap is the window between "package published" and "advisory issued" — typically 30 minutes to 6 hours. A worm does real damage in that window. Behavioural analysis is the only control that closes it. See references/threat-model.md for why lockfiles, npm audit, 2FA, and even Sigstore/SLSA provenance were each bypassed in the wild in 2026.

The layers

Layers 1–5 are dependency-integrity (is a package I pull malicious?). Layer 6 is a separate detection surface — repo-integrity (is a repo I already own being poisoned in place?). They are not the same problem; see the note below.

Layer	Control	What it stops
1. Detection	Behavioural scanner (Socket.dev) on every dependency change	Poisoned package merged via PR or pulled by an install
2. Interception	socket CLI wrapper + pre-install-scan.sh hook	Lifecycle scripts (postinstall, sdist setup.py) executing on install
3. Hygiene	Stale-OIDC audit, dep cooldown, token rotation, extension audit	The entry points worms use to mint publish access
4. Self-integrity + exposure	integrity-audit.sh (persistence hooks in AI-tool / editor configs) + exposure-check.py (am I running a named-bad package?)	Worm persistence on this machine; latent exposure to a fresh advisory
5. Post-install behavioural	postinstall-audit.py (what's already unpacked actually does) + phone-home-monitor.ps1 (what it's connecting to)	A poisoned release that slipped past layers 1–2 and is now on disk / exfiltrating
6. Repo-integrity	config-drift-check.py (config-as-code injection in build configs / tasks.json) + branch-protection / signed-commits / hardware-key discipline (references/repo-integrity.md)	Trusted-repo poisoning (PolinRider / EtherHiding) — a build-config loader + backdated false-flag force-push that the dependency scanners never see

Layers 1–3 act before code runs; 4–5 assume something already got through and hunt for it on disk and on the wire. exposure-check.py answers "do I have a named-bad package?"; postinstall-audit.py answers "is any installed package behaving like malware?" — the unknown-bad case a fresh advisory hasn't caught up to yet.

Layer 6 is a different axis, not a deeper layer. Layers 1–5 all reason about the dependency tree — Socket, depscore, the cooldown, exposure-check.py, and postinstall-audit.py are structurally blind to a poisoned vite.config.js / tailwind.config.js / .vscode/tasks.json, because that code never enters as a package. The 2026 PolinRider / EtherHiding campaign (DPRK UNC5342) reached at least one company via a clean dependency tree and a single shared deploy key. Layer 6 — content-diffing first-party config files plus git-provenance discipline — is the only thing that catches it. Workflow L and references/repo-integrity.md.

Cost reality — free is enough to start

The Socket CLI is open-source and free. The free account tier defends against this exact campaign at $0. Paid tiers buy noise-reduction and scale, not the core malware detection.

Capability	Free ($0)	Paid (Team $25/dev → Enterprise)
socket CLI (open source)	✅	✅
Malware / behavioural blocking, 70+ risk types	✅	✅
Private repos (unlimited)	✅	✅
Scans / month	1,000	5,000 → unlimited
Members	3	10 → unlimited
depscore MCP for Claude Code (no API key)	✅	✅
Reachability analysis (cuts CVE false positives)	❌	✅ (Team+)
SSO/SAML, SBOM, GitHub Actions + AI-model scanning	❌	✅ (Business+)
OSS projects	Free Team account on request	—

Start free. Move to Team only when CVE false-positive noise or seat count justifies it. Full breakdown + exact commands in references/socket-cli.md.

Setup (one-time)

All free, in priority order. The scripts in this skill need no setup — run them directly. What you switch on is the live tooling:

1. depscore MCP — behavioural package scoring inside Claude Code, no API key: claude mcp add --transport http socket-mcp https://mcp.socket.dev/
2. Install-scan hook — advisory on every dependency install. Wire pre-install-scan.sh into ~/.claude/settings.json (see "Hook setup" below); set SUPPLY_CHAIN_BLOCK=1 for a hard gate. Restart Claude Code after editing.
3. Socket CLI wrapper (optional, zero-auth): npm i -g socket, then socket npm install <pkg> or socket wrapper on. socket login is only needed for scan / score / ci, not the install wrapper.
4. Behavioural engine (optional, on-demand) for scan-extensions.sh --deep: uv tool install guarddog semgrep. Not installed by default — stay lean. --deep auto-detects it; if absent, that mode runs inventory + recency and loudly recommends installing rather than reporting a scan it didn't run. On Windows GuardDog needs PYTHONUTF8=1 (the script sets it for you).

Situational extras — install only when the need arises (references/tooling-landscape.md): the behavioural engine above, OSV-Scanner (CVE breadth), zizmor + Harden-Runner (CI hardening). The minimum viable set is Socket's MCP + the cooldown + ignore-scripts; everything else is on-demand.

Safety tiers

Operation	Tier	Execution
Score / scan a package before adding it	T1	Inline (depscore MCP or socket package score)
Detect project stack + installed tools	T1	Inline
Run integrity-audit.sh (read-only)	T1	Inline
Run preinstall-check.sh on a package spec	T1	Inline
Behavioural scan of full manifest (socket scan)	T2	Inline / background
Audit GitHub Actions for stale OIDC trust	T2	Inline (read workflows)
Install / upgrade a dependency	T3	Confirm + scan first
Rotate publish tokens / revoke OIDC trust	T3	Confirm — changes live infra
Remove a flagged persistence hook from settings	T3	Confirm — edits user config

Workflows

These map 1:1 to the briefing's recommended actions, ordered effort→value.

A. Score a package before suggesting it (do this proactively)

When considering adding a dependency, get a behavioural verdict first:

• With the depscore MCP (free, no key): ask the socket-mcp server for the package score. Setup is a one-liner — see references/socket-cli.md.
• With the CLI: socket package score <ecosystem> <name> <version>
• Cooldown check: scripts/preinstall-check.sh <pkg>[@version] … flags any package published inside the 7-day cooldown window and routes to socket if installed.

Never recommend a brand-new (@latest, day-zero) release for a production path.

Score the whole current project, not just one package — the depscore MCP takes a list, so read every dependency from the manifest and score them in one call: parse package.json (dependencies + devDependencies), requirements.txt, composer.json, Cargo.toml, etc., then pass the full {depname, ecosystem, version} set to depscore. Triage anything with a low supplyChain / quality score before the next install or commit. This is the highest-value recurring local move — do it when opening a repo and after any dependency change.

B. Trial Socket.dev on one repository (≈1 hour)

1. Pick the lowest-risk repo (small surface, low client exposure).
2. Install the GitHub app (free tier, private repos included) — it comments a risk report on any PR that adds/bumps a dependency.
3. Optionally npm install -g socket && socket login for terminal scanning.
4. Run for two weeks, review what it flags during PRs, then expand.

C. Wrap installs at the terminal (layer 2)

Route risky installs through Socket so they're intercepted before lifecycle scripts run:

• One-off: socket npm install <pkg> / socket npx <pkg>
• Workspace-wide: socket wrapper on (aliases npm/npx → routed through Socket; socket wrapper off to disable; socket raw-npm to bypass once).
• Claude Code reinforcement: enable the pre-install-scan.sh hook (advisory by default) — see Hook setup below.
• Cheapest possible mitigation — disable lifecycle scripts entirely where the project doesn't need them: npm config set ignore-scripts true (npm), or pnpm enable-pre-post-scripts=false. This neuters the postinstall vector outright.
• Validate the lockfile itself with lockfile-lint — catches a lockfile whose resolved URLs point at a non-registry host (lockfile injection). See references/tooling-landscape.md.

D. Audit GitHub Actions for stale OIDC trust (≈half a day)

The Mini Shai-Hulud entry point was an orphaned commit with live OIDC trust federation to npm. No phished human. Audit and revoke:

• Find workflows requesting an OIDC token: search for id-token: write and permissions: blocks, plus npm publish / pypi / twine / trusted-publisher steps. scripts/integrity-audit.sh flags these.
• For each: is publish trust still needed? If not, revoke the trust relationship on the registry side (npm trusted publisher / PyPI publisher) and remove the workflow permission.

E. Pin and freeze production dependencies

Commit lockfiles. Pin exact versions for anything in CI/prod. Apply a 7-day cooldown: don't auto-update production deps until a release has aged a week, so the ecosystem has time to detect and remediate a compromise. (Axios poisoned versions were live ~3 hours — a 7-day lag would have caught it.)

F. Rotate publish tokens → short-lived OIDC

Audit who holds standing npm/PyPI publish tokens. Prefer short-lived OIDC trusted publishing over long-lived tokens. Rotate any long-lived token; tighten the set of accounts with publish access. (T3 — confirm before rotating, it can break CI.)

G. Editor extension / plugin audit (Nx Console / GitHub-breach vector)

Three layers, in order — known-bad, then visibility, then behavioural:

1. Known-bad (IOC): python scripts/exposure-check.py matches installed extensions (VS Code/Cursor/Windsurf/VSCodium) against the catalog — e.g. Nx Console nrwl.angular-console@18.95.0, the backdoor behind the GitHub 3,800-repo breach. Catches what's already named in an advisory.
2. Inventory + recency: bash scripts/scan-extensions.sh lists every extension, Claude plugin (with pinned commit SHA), and skill, flagging what changed inside the recency window — the exact "no visibility into what's installed or how recently" gap the campaign exploits (Nx Console was live 11 min). Zero-dependency, no false positives.
3. Unknown-bad (behavioural): bash scripts/scan-extensions.sh --deep runs GuardDog's semgrep rules against recently-changed extensions when guarddog + semgrep are present (uv tool install guarddog semgrep, on-demand — not kept installed). If absent it runs inventory only and recommends the install — never a false-clean. Best-effort on minified bundles — layers 1–2 stay the backbone for extensions; layer 3 is strongest on source (plugins/skills).

Verified-publisher status is not sufficient — Nx Console was a verified publisher with 2.2M installs. Pause anything recently published by a non-verified publisher until it ages.

H. Self-integrity scan (layer 4 — the one the briefing didn't have to worry about)

Run scripts/integrity-audit.sh. It is read-only and reports:

• New/unexpected hooks or mcpServers entries in ~/.claude/settings.json, ~/.claude/settings.local.json, ~/.claude.json, and project .claude/.
• Suspicious entries in VS Code settings.json (startup commands, task autoruns).
• Workflows with live OIDC publish trust (feeds workflow D).

A worm's persistence hook into Claude Code settings is the IOC from the briefing's most-quoted line. If the scan flags something you didn't add, treat it as an incident: isolate, rotate credentials, and investigate before continuing.

I. Exposure response — "an advisory just dropped; are we running it?"

When an advisory names a poisoned package + version, the urgent question is which projects/machines already have it. Match local state against an IOC catalog:

python scripts/exposure-check.py --root ~/code --root ~/work
python scripts/exposure-check.py --root . --json | jq '.data.findings[]'

It reads npm lockfiles and Python installed metadata (no execution, no network), exits 10 if anything matches. The bundled assets/exposure-catalog.json is seeded with cited 2026 IOCs (axios 1.14.1 / 0.30.4) and is meant to be extended from advisories — add {ecosystem, package, versions[]} entries as incidents break. A match is an incident: isolate, rotate, remove the package.

For fleet-scale exposure response across many macOS/Linux endpoints (with far broader ecosystem + extension + MCP coverage), use Perplexity's Bumblebee — whose catalog format this borrows. It does not run on Windows; exposure-check.py is the cross-platform local equivalent. See references/tooling-landscape.md.

J. Outbound phone-home monitoring (Windows — the post-compromise tripwire)

Layers 1–4 act at install time or at rest; nothing above watches what running code does on the network. scripts/phone-home-monitor.ps1 closes that gap:

pwsh -NoProfile -File scripts/phone-home-monitor.ps1            # one snapshot, exit 10 on findings
pwsh -NoProfile -File scripts/phone-home-monitor.ps1 -Status    # which capture sources exist here?
pwsh -NoProfile -File scripts/phone-home-monitor.ps1 -Watch -IntervalSeconds 30   # continuous, ring-buffer log
pwsh -NoProfile -File scripts/phone-home-monitor.ps1 -InstallTask                 # logon daemon (T3 — confirm)

Flags: IOC endpoints (assets/network-ioc.json — webhook.site is the cited Shai-Hulud exfil drop), binaries under node_modules/Temp, children of package managers (lifecycle-script behaviour), interpreters hitting raw public IPs, unsigned userland binaries. Tool-first: the preferred continuous source is Sysmon Event ID 3 with the SwiftOnSecurity config (-Sysmon consumes it; exit 5 with the install one-liner when absent); TCP-table polling is the zero-install default. Full evaluation (Sysmon vs WFP 5156 vs polling vs tshark), wiring, and triage playbook: references/phone-home-monitoring.md. A finding routes back into H/I: integrity-audit.sh + exposure-check.py + credential rotation.

K. Post-install behavioural sweep — "is anything already on disk misbehaving?"

exposure-check.py (workflow I) answers the known-bad question; this answers the unknown-bad one. scripts/postinstall-audit.py walks installed node_modules and Python site-packages and flags what packages actually do — not what an advisory named:

python scripts/postinstall-audit.py --root ~/code              # exit 10 on a finding
python scripts/postinstall-audit.py --root . --json | jq '.data.findings[]'
python scripts/postinstall-audit.py --root . --deep            # GuardDog confirms each flag
python scripts/postinstall-audit.py --root . --live            # is a flagged npm version still published?

It flags shell/downloader lifecycle scripts, credential-path reads paired with exfil endpoints, env harvesting, obfuscation, persistence writes, and files modified after install. Findings need a two-signal combo (cred+net, env+net) so real node_modules trees don't false-alarm — the lesson from an earlier cut that lit up three.js/vite on eval+base64 alone. An incremental fingerprint cache makes it daily-runnable (only changed trees rescan), so wire it as a scheduled task — see references/postinstall-audit.md for the Task Scheduler / Claude Code cron recipes and the GuardDog/OSV/Socket tool evaluation. A high finding is an incident: isolate → read the flagged file → rotate credentials → confirm with --deep + exposure-check.py.

L. Repo-integrity / config-drift — "is a repo I own being poisoned in place?"

Workflows A–K all defend the dependency tree (or watch its network egress). This one defends a different surface: the trusted-repo / config-as-code class (PolinRider / EtherHiding, DPRK UNC5342), where the dependency tree stays clean and the payload is committed into your own build configs. The dependency scanners are structurally blind to it — see the Layer-6 note above and references/threat-model.md vector #12.

scripts/config-drift-check.py is the on-disk detector. Run it two ways:

python scripts/config-drift-check.py --root .             # CI / full-repo sweep, exit 10 on finding
python scripts/config-drift-check.py --staged             # pre-commit: only staged config files
python scripts/config-drift-check.py --root . --json | jq '.data.findings[]'

It scans build configs (vite/tailwind/webpack/next/rollup/postcss/svelte/astro.config.*), .vscode/tasks.json, and package.json scripts for the Stage-2 injection signatures: blockchain explorer-API / RPC dead-drop endpoints (the EtherHiding payload read — assets/network-ioc.json ETHERHIDING-BLOCKCHAIN-C2), eval / new Function / shell-exec, Buffer-XOR decode loops, outbound network in a config that shouldn't have any, hex-var (_0x..) / long-escape obfuscation, an obfuscated appended blob, and tasks.json runOn:folderOpen auto-run. Zero-dependency, read-only.

Wire it as a pre-commit hook (--staged, catches it before it's committed) and a CI status check (catches a force-pushed injection at the gate). A finding is an incident: read the flagged file, check the commit's signature + server-side push timestamp (a backdated author date lies; the push event doesn't), and rotate any credential the build could have touched.

The detector is half the defense. The other half is prevention + attribution — no shared/standing keys, hardware-backed signing keys a RAT can't read, branch protection requiring signed commits and blocking force-push, server-side push-log as ground truth, build/env isolation, and VS Code Workspace Trust with auto-run tasks disabled. The full kill-chain-mapped playbook is references/repo-integrity.md.

Hook setup — two checkpoints for the two ways a dep enters

A dependency reaches a local machine two ways, and each gets an advisory hook:

• pre-install-scan.sh (PreToolUse / Bash) — fires on install verbs (npm/pnpm/yarn/bun install|add, pip install, uv add, composer require|install|update, gem install, cargo add). Surfaces the cooldown + socket equivalent. Set SUPPLY_CHAIN_BLOCK=1 for a hard gate; otherwise advisory.
• manifest-dep-scan.sh (PostToolUse / Write|Edit) — fires when the agent edits a manifest (package.json, requirements*.txt, composer.json, Cargo.toml, go.mod, Gemfile, pyproject.toml) and the change adds a version spec — the Claude-Code path the install hook misses. Advises depscore + cooldown before install. High-signal: silent on version bumps / metadata edits.

Both read the tool call as JSON on stdin (.tool_input), falling back to $1.

{
  "hooks": {
    "PreToolUse": [
      { "matcher": "Bash", "hooks": [
        { "type": "command", "command": "bash \"$HOME/.claude/hooks/pre-install-scan.sh\"", "timeout": 5 } ] }
    ],
    "PostToolUse": [
      { "matcher": "Write|Edit", "hooks": [
        { "type": "command", "command": "bash \"$HOME/.claude/hooks/manifest-dep-scan.sh\"", "timeout": 5 } ] }
    ]
  }
}

Anti-patterns

Anti-pattern	Why it fails	Do instead
"We run npm audit in CI, we're covered."	Advisory-driven; blind to malware in the publish-to-CVE window — the exact gap the 2026 worms exploit.	Add a behavioural scan (Socket / GuardDog) gating the merge, not just a CVE check.
Trusting valid provenance / SLSA attestation as proof of safety.	Mini Shai-Hulud minted valid Build L3 attestations from stolen OIDC tokens. Valid ≠ safe.	Treat provenance as one signal; require behavioural verdict too.
Auto-updating production deps the day a release lands.	Poisoned versions live for hours; you become an early victim.	7-day release-age cooldown (Renovate minimumReleaseAge).
Treating a verified-publisher VS Code extension as trustworthy.	Nx Console: verified publisher, 2.2M installs, backdoored.	Check publication recency; pause <7-day non-verified; audit on a schedule.
Leaving id-token: write on workflows that no longer publish.	The orphaned-OIDC entry point — a token minted from a stale workflow.	Revoke registry trust + drop the permission. Run zizmor.
Deleting a found persistence hook and moving on.	The worm stole credentials before it persisted; the hook is the symptom.	Treat as an incident: isolate, rotate every reachable credential, then investigate.

Verification checklist

• A behavioural verdict (not just npm audit) exists for every newly added/bumped dependency
• Production deps respect a release-age cooldown (≥7 days)
• Lockfiles committed; exact pins for anything in CI/prod
• No workflow carries id-token: write it doesn't need (zizmor clean)
• Long-lived publish tokens rotated or replaced with short-lived OIDC
• scripts/integrity-audit.sh exits 0 (no unexplained hooks/MCP servers in .claude/ or VS Code settings)
• ignore-scripts enabled where lifecycle scripts aren't needed
• depscore MCP or socket CLI available so packages can be scored before they're suggested

Scripts

All seven follow the Axiom Tool Protocol: --help with EXAMPLES, --json for machine-readable output, stdout = data / stderr = progress, semantic exit codes (0 ok, 2 usage, 3 not-found, 4 invalid, 5 missing-dep, 7 unavailable, 10 = signal found — review items / inside-cooldown / exposed / behavioural finding). Pipe-friendly: --json | jq.

Dependencies. The skill is markdown + bash and every script's default mode is zero-dep (bash, coreutils, curl; jq only for --json). scan-extensions.sh --deep auto-detects guarddog+semgrep and uses them when present; when absent it runs inventory + recency and loudly recommends the on-demand install rather than reporting a behavioural scan it never ran (which would be the same false-clean GuardDog itself hits without semgrep). Nothing heavyweight is kept on the machine by default. All named tools (socket, guarddog, semgrep, zizmor, OSV-Scanner) are an optional menu — see references/tooling-landscape.md → "How the controls interact" for the minimum viable set.

Script	Purpose	Side effects
scripts/integrity-audit.sh	Scan AI-tool configs (Claude Code/Desktop, Gemini, MCP host JSON) + editor settings (VS Code, Cursor, Windsurf, VSCodium) for injected persistence hooks/MCP servers; flag workflows with live OIDC publish trust (uses zizmor if installed). Exit 10 if anything to review.	Read-only
scripts/preinstall-check.sh	Given package specs, report registry publish age (npm/PyPI), flag any inside the cooldown window, route to socket if available. Exit 10 if any inside cooldown.	Read-only (queries registries)
scripts/exposure-check.py	Match on-disk npm (package-lock/pnpm/yarn) / PyPI / Composer / Cargo / Go / RubyGems lockfiles and installed editor extensions against an IOC catalog (assets/exposure-catalog.json) — the "are we running a named-bad version/extension?" check. Supports a * wildcard for tag-rewrite attacks. Exit 10 if exposed. Catalog format borrowed from Bumblebee.	Read-only
scripts/phone-home-monitor.ps1	Windows outbound-connection tripwire — map every outbound TCP connection to owning process + parent chain + signing status; flag IOC endpoints (assets/network-ioc.json), node_modules/Temp binaries, package-manager children, interpreter→raw-IP. Sources: Sysmon EID 3 (-Sysmon, preferred) or TCP-table polling (default). -Watch/-InstallTask for continuous capture with a ring-buffer JSONL log. Exit 10 on medium+ findings.	Read-only (except -InstallTask, which registers a logon scheduled task)
scripts/postinstall-audit.py	On-disk behavioural scan — walks installed node_modules + Python site-packages under --root dirs and flags what already-unpacked packages do: shell/downloader lifecycle scripts, credential-path reads paired with exfil endpoints, env harvesting, obfuscation, persistence writes, files modified after install (tamper). Two-signal combos to avoid node_modules false-positives. Incremental per-package fingerprint cache (daily-runnable); --deep confirms flags with GuardDog; checks the registry still serves a flagged npm version (unpublished = IOC). Exit 10 on findings ≥ , 7 if registry unreachable. See .

scripts/integrity-audit.sh --json | jq '.data.review[]'
scripts/preinstall-check.sh --pip requests fastapi@0.110.0 --json | jq '.data[] | select(.inside_cooldown)'
pwsh -NoProfile -File scripts/phone-home-monitor.ps1 -Json | jq '.data.findings[]'

tests/run.sh is an offline-deterministic self-test (107 assertions) covering all seven scripts + the hooks against crafted fixtures — run it after any edit: bash tests/run.sh (exit 0 = all pass).

Reference files

File	Contents
references/threat-model.md	2026 timeline (axios, Shai-Hulud, durabletask, Nx, GitHub breach), worm mechanics, IOCs, and why each legacy control failed
references/socket-cli.md	Accurate Socket CLI + depscore MCP command surface, free-vs-paid table, Claude Code setup, source links, briefing corrections
references/tooling-landscape.md	The wider (mostly free/OSS) defender ecosystem — GuardDog, OSV-Scanner, zizmor, Harden-Runner, lockfile-lint, ignore-scripts — mapped to the four layers, with a when-to-use-which matrix
references/phone-home-monitoring.md	Outbound-monitoring tooling evaluation (Sysmon EID 3 + SwiftOnSecurity config vs WFP 5156 vs TCP-table polling vs tshark), Sysmon wiring, the monitor's rule/severity table, daemon tiers, triage playbook, honest limitations
references/postinstall-audit.md	On-disk behavioural scan rationale — the post-install gap, the finding/severity table, the false-positive lesson (combos not singletons), incremental cache, --deep/--live modes, GuardDog/OSV/Socket tool evaluation, daily scheduling (Task Scheduler + Claude Code cron), incident response
references/repo-integrity.md	Repo-integrity / config-as-code defense (PolinRider / EtherHiding) — the kill-chain-mapped playbook for trusted-repo poisoning: no shared/standing keys, hardware-backed signing keys, branch protection requiring signed commits + no force-push (why signing defeats the backdated false-flag), server-side push-log as ground truth, build/env isolation, VS Code Workspace Trust, and the config-drift-check.py pre-commit + CI gate
references/hardening-checklist.md	Step-by-step OIDC audit, token rotation, dep cooldown policy, extension audit, persistence detection, client-proposal language

See also

Skill	When to combine
security-ops	Reactive CVE/SAST/auth audit — run alongside; they solve different problems
ci-cd-ops	Hardening GitHub Actions, OIDC trusted publishing setup
github-ops	Release flow, repo security settings
auth-ops	Credential/token handling patterns after a rotation