| namespace | aiwg |
| name | chain-of-trust-design |
| platforms | ["all"] |
| description | Decision-aid skill for bootstrap and verification chains; forces the "what authenticates the code that authenticates everything else" question and provides patterns for signed bootstrap, measured boot, signed live images, and recovery |
chain-of-trust-design
Decision aid for the integrity chain that protects a system from first byte executed to first secret derived. Use this skill when designing or reviewing any system that has a "boot" step, an "unlock" step, or a "first run" step where code outside your trust boundary must be trusted to load code inside it.
The skill exists to force the question almost everyone forgets: what authenticates the code that authenticates everything else?
Triggers
Primary phrases match automatically. Alternates:
- "bootstrap signing" / "signed bootstrap"
- "evil maid" / "physical access attacker"
- "measured boot" / "TPM attestation"
- "verify the verifier"
- "unsigned scripts" / "is this script trusted"
- "first-run integrity"
- "USB boot integrity"
When NOT to use this skill
- Networked TLS chain-of-trust (different domain — use a peer-reviewed PKI design)
- Code-signing for application updates after boot (use Sigstore, signify, or platform store; this skill is about the layer below)
- Software-supply-chain trust upstream of build (handled by
supply-chain-trust skill — Tier 2)
Section 1: The core question
Every system that processes secrets has a chain of code, where each link must trust the previous one. The chain typically looks like:
firmware → bootloader → kernel → init/userland → application → secrets
Or, in a portable-secrets context:
travel-host firmware → BIOS → USB boot → unlock.sh → LUKS unlock → install-pkgs.sh → secrets pipeline
For each arrow, ask: what authenticates the next link?
If the answer is "the previous link verifies a manifest" — fine, but then ask: what authenticates the previous link? Trace it all the way back. The chain MUST terminate at:
- A hardware root of trust (TPM PCR measurement, Secure Boot pubkey in firmware), OR
- An operator-carried secret (a printed hash card, a signed binary on a piece of media you carry physically), OR
- An assumption (e.g., "the firmware is trusted") that is documented and accepted
If the chain terminates in a circular reference — "the manifest verifies the scripts, the scripts verify the manifest" — you have no chain of trust at all. This is the failure mode in review finding B3.
Section 2: Anti-patterns (BLOCK on these)
Circular trust
unlock.sh on FAT32 partition
↓ (verifies)
manifest.sha256 on FAT32 partition
↓ (lists hash of)
unlock.sh on FAT32 partition
Both files live on unauthenticated media. An evil-maid attacker swaps unlock.sh AND manifest.sha256 consistently. Detection: zero. → BLOCK
Unsigned bootstrap on writable media
Any executable on writable storage that runs before the integrity chain is established. → BLOCK
"Override" prompt on integrity failure
[!] Manifest verification failed. Type Y to continue:
Operators learn to autoresponse-Y. The override defeats the integrity check on the exact pathway integrity matters most: when something is wrong. → BLOCK (see degraded-mode-design skill, Tier 2, for the multi-step ceremony alternative)
"We use SHA-256 of the scripts" without offline-signed pubkey
Hashing is not signing. Anyone with write access to the manifest can replace it. Hashing only authenticates if the hash itself is delivered through a separately-trusted channel (printed card, hardware-fused).
Scripts that mount LUKS before integrity is verified
The unlock script IS the high-value target. Verify its integrity before running it, or you've gained no security from LUKS.
Section 3: Pattern catalog
Pick at least one. The patterns are not mutually exclusive — defense in depth combines two or more.
Pattern A: Signed bootstrap blob with offline key
Shape: Ship bootstrap.tar plus bootstrap.tar.sig plus a small static-linked verifier (verify) on the same media. The verifier has an embedded ed25519 public key. The private key is offline (HQ, hardware-stored).
USB layout:
/verify ← static, ~50 KB, embedded pubkey
/bootstrap.tar ← contains unlock.sh, install-pkgs.sh, .deb files, manifests
/bootstrap.tar.sig ← Ed25519 signature over bootstrap.tar
Operator runs:
./verify bootstrap.tar bootstrap.tar.sig && tar xf bootstrap.tar && ./unlock.sh
What this gives you: Evil-maid swap of unlock.sh requires also forging an Ed25519 signature → infeasible without HQ private key.
What this does NOT give you: Trust in verify itself. The verifier is on the unauthenticated media. Mitigations:
- Make
verify minimal and reproducibly built — anyone can audit it
- Print a SHA-256 of
verify on a card the operator carries; check before running
- Better: combine with Pattern B or C
Suggested defaults:
- Signature: Ed25519 via libsodium or Rust
ring
- Verifier build: Rust with
#![no_std], statically linked, reproducibly built
- Key custody: offline, hardware-token-protected (FIDO2 PRF or HSM)
Vetted alternatives:
signify (OpenBSD) — minimal verifier already exists; use if you want zero custom codeminisign — signify with extras (prehashed mode)- Sigstore Cosign — heavier, network-aware; pick when you want transparency log integration
Pattern B: Signed live image (Tails-style)
Shape: The "operating environment" is itself the signed thing. Boot from a signed read-only image; the USB you carry only contributes data, not code.
Travel host:
→ BIOS verifies bootloader signature (Secure Boot)
→ Bootloader verifies live-image signature
→ Live image kernel + userland is read-only
→ User USB plugs in for data only
Threat collapses to: trusted firmware + your USB.
What this gives you: Massive blast-radius reduction (review finding H4). The travel host stops being a trust dependency.
What this does NOT give you: Protection against firmware-level adversary or hardware implant. Combine with Pattern C.
Suggested defaults:
- Build: NixOS image (reproducible by construction) OR Tails (community-vetted, anonymity-focused)
- Signing: integrate with the distro's existing signing (NixOS:
nix-store --verify; Debian-based: signed Release file)
- Boot: Secure Boot with operator-controlled keys (sbctl), not Microsoft's defaults
Pattern C: Measured boot + TPM remote/local attestation
Shape: TPM measures every stage of boot into PCRs. Refuse to derive secrets if PCRs don't match a known-good set.
PCR measurements taken at:
PCR 0 — firmware
PCR 4 — bootloader
PCR 7 — Secure Boot policy
PCR 8 — kernel + initrd
PCR 9 — kernel command line
Unlock requires: TPM2_Unseal succeeds against the known-good PCR set
What this gives you: Binds secret access to a non-tampered boot chain. Evil-maid swap → PCRs change → unseal fails → no secrets.
What this does NOT give you: Anything if the TPM is compromised, the firmware is malicious, or the operator is coerced into running with sealed values that match a malicious chain ("seal your secret to my malicious kernel").
Suggested defaults:
- Tooling:
systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-pcrs=..., tpm2-tools, clevis for higher-level sealing
- PCR set: 0, 2, 4, 7, 8 (firmware, option ROMs, bootloader, Secure Boot policy, kernel)
- Backup unseal: secondary path with hardware token (review finding H5: backup story)
Pattern D: Printed hash card (operator-carried)
Shape: The operator carries a piece of paper (or laminated card) with a SHA-256 of the bootstrap blob. Manually compares before running.
Card:
bootstrap.tar.sig SHA-256:
a1b2 c3d4 e5f6 0708 1a2b 3c4d 5e6f 7081
9a8b 7c6d 5e4f 3021 1a2b 3c4d 5e6f 7080
Operator runs:
sha256sum bootstrap.tar.sig
# compares first/last 4 groups against card
What this gives you: A truly out-of-band trust anchor, immune to USB tampering.
What this does NOT give you: Operational ergonomics; it's tedious and skipped under time pressure. Use as a SECONDARY check, not the only one.
Suggested defaults:
- Compare a prefix and suffix (first 4 + last 4 hex groups), not the full hash — operators won't read 64 hex digits accurately
- Card laminated, signed by HQ, dated, with revocation procedure documented
Section 4: Decision matrix
Pattern A Pattern B Pattern C Pattern D
(signed (signed live (measured (printed
blob) image) boot/TPM) hash card)
Defeats evil-maid swap YES YES YES partial*
Defeats compromised host no YES YES no
Defeats firmware compromise no no partial** YES
Recovery if hardware fails moderate easy hard moderate
Operator burden low lowest low HIGH
Hardware dependency none UEFI/SB TPM 2.0 none
Greenfield-friendly YES YES YES yes
Retrofit-friendly yes moderate moderate yes
* Pattern D detects evil-maid only if the operator actually checks
** Pattern C with operator-controlled Secure Boot keys; otherwise firmware compromise unseals secrets
Recommended starting point: combine Pattern B (signed live image) + Pattern A (signed user-data blob). The live image is the trusted environment; the USB user-data has a signed manifest validated against an HQ Ed25519 pubkey embedded in the live image. This is the answer for review finding B3 + H4.
Section 5: Trust anchor inventory (mandatory exercise)
Before declaring any chain-of-trust design complete, fill out:
| Anchor | What is it? | Who controls it? | Compromise impact |
|---|
| HQ signing key | Ed25519 private key for bootstrap signing | HQ ops, hardware token | Total: attacker can sign malicious bootstrap |
| Operator USB | The physical USB device | Operator | Loss alone: nothing (LUKS at rest); loss + travel host compromise: partial |
| Travel host firmware | UEFI + Secure Boot keys | … | … |
| TPM PCR baseline | Known-good PCR set sealed at provisioning | HQ + per-device | … |
| Operator-carried card | Printed hash | Operator | Detection of out-of-band tampering |
Every anchor MUST be:
- Identified: who or what holds it
- Protected: how is it kept from being lost or copied
- Rotatable: what is the procedure when it's lost or compromised
- Tested: have you actually run the rotation procedure?
If any row has "TBD" in any column, the design is not complete.
Section 6: The "verify the verifier" recursion
For every signed component, you have to answer "what verifies the signer?". The recursion terminates at one of:
- Hardware — a key fused into firmware (Secure Boot, TPM endorsement key)
- Physical — something the operator carries (a printed key fingerprint, a signed binary on physically separate media)
- Documented assumption — explicitly stated and accepted
A common failure mode is incomplete recursion: stating "the bootstrap is signed by HQ" without saying how the operator validates HQ's pubkey. The pubkey must:
- Be embedded in a verifier whose integrity is established by some other means (Pattern D card, Secure Boot embedded firmware, etc.), AND
- Be rotatable when compromise is suspected
If you can't draw this recursion ending at hardware or physical, the chain is incomplete.
Section 7: Recovery and rotation
A chain of trust must include:
| Procedure | Documented? | Tested? |
|---|
| Operator USB lost | … | … |
| Travel host fails / unavailable | … | … |
| HQ signing key compromise | … | … |
| TPM hardware failure | … | … |
| Firmware update breaks PCR seal | … | … |
| Bootstrap pubkey rotation | … | … |
Untested procedures don't exist. Every project should run a tabletop exercise (review recommendation #10) walking through "USB stolen but keys retained" and "USB plus one key stolen" before declaring the design production-ready.
Section 8: Worked example — review finding B3
Original design:
unlock.sh + install-pkgs.sh on FAT32 (unencrypted)
checksum.manifest on FAT32 (unencrypted)
unlock.sh "verifies" checksum.manifest — but checksum.manifest names unlock.sh
What this skill flags:
- Section 2 anti-pattern: circular trust → BLOCK
- Section 5: no trust anchor inventory exists
- Section 6: recursion does not terminate at hardware or physical anchor
Remediation options (review's "pick at least one"):
- Pattern A only: ship
unlock.sh.sig + a static verify binary + an embedded Ed25519 pubkey. Operator runs ./verify first.
- Pattern B: boot the travel host from a signed live image. The image embeds the HQ pubkey. The USB only carries
unlock.sh.sig + encrypted data.
- Pattern C: enroll the LUKS unlock against TPM PCR measurements; if
unlock.sh is swapped, PCRs change, unseal fails.
- Pattern D as backup: print SHA-256 of
verify (or of unlock.sh.sig) on a card the operator carries.
The strongest combination: B + A + D. Live image gives you trusted environment; signed user-data gives you tamper-evidence on the USB; printed card gives you an out-of-band sanity check.
Section 9: Output format
When this skill is invoked as part of a review, produce findings in this format:
### Finding: <SHORT-NAME>
**Severity**: BLOCK | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW
**Location**: <file or component>
**Section**: Chain-of-trust design, <section reference>
**Issue**: <what's broken in the chain>
**Trust anchor inventory** (if relevant):
- Anchor 1: …
- Anchor 2: …
- Missing: <what isn't anchored>
**Remediation**:
<concrete pattern recommendation, A/B/C/D combination>
**References**:
- <NIST SP 800-193, NIST SP 800-147, RFC, etc.>
When a chain-of-trust-design.md (template — see templates/chain-of-trust-design.md) is being created, this skill drives the Trust anchors, Boot chain diagram, Verification matrix, Recovery and rotation, and Open assumptions sections.
Related
- Companion skill:
crypto-primitive-selection (you'll use it for choosing the signing primitive)
- Tier 2 skill:
physical-threat-modeling (enumerates evil-maid, DMA, hostile peripheral threats this skill mitigates)
- Tier 2 skill:
degraded-mode-design (override-prompt anti-pattern remediation)
- Agent:
secure-bootstrap-reviewer — narrow-scope reviewer that loads this skill on activation
- Template:
chain-of-trust-design.md
Standards referenced
- NIST SP 800-147 (BIOS Protection Guidelines)
- NIST SP 800-155 (BIOS Integrity Measurement Guidelines)
- NIST SP 800-193 (Platform Firmware Resiliency Guidelines)
- TCG TPM 2.0 Library Specification
- UEFI Secure Boot specification
- Reproducible Builds (
reproducible-builds.org)
