cloud-security

name	cloud-security
description	Cloud security covers security assessment for major cloud platforms including AWS, Azure, and GCP, with core focus on IAM misconfiguration detection, storage bucket exposure scanning, metadata service attacks, container escape, and Kubernetes RBAC auditing.
origin	openclaw
version	0.2.0.2
compatibility	["openclaw","claude-code","cursor","windsurf"]
allowed-tools	["Bash","Read","Write","Edit","WebSearch","WebFetch"]
metadata	{"domain":"cloud","tool_count":6,"guide_count":8,"mitre":"TA0008-Lateral Movement","last_reviewed":"2026-08-19"}

Skill: Cloud Security

Supplementary Files:

• payloads.md -- Cloud security attack payloads organized by category (AWS/Azure/GCP enumeration, IAM analysis, S3 exposure, metadata exploitation, container/K8s exploitation)
• test-cases.md -- Structured test cases covering cloud reconnaissance, IAM & access testing, storage security, network security, and advanced exploitation

Summary

Cloud Security skill domain covering cloud operations.

Tools: pacu, scoutsuite, awscli, s3scanner, kubeaudit, trivy

Domain: cloud

MITRE ATT&CK: TA0008-Lateral Movement

Description

Cloud security covers security assessment for major cloud platforms including AWS, Azure, and GCP, with core focus on IAM misconfiguration detection, storage bucket exposure scanning, metadata service attacks, container escape, and Kubernetes RBAC auditing. The fundamental difference between cloud environments and traditional networks is: blurred boundaries, API-driven everything, and identity as the perimeter.

Mastering this skill requires deep understanding of cloud service architecture and the Shared Responsibility Model, the ability to identify cloud misconfigurations, abuse overly permissive IAM policies, and leverage metadata services and SSRF chains to complete attack chains from information leakage to lateral movement.

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Use Cases

1. Cloud Environment Security Assessment - Conduct comprehensive security audits of AWS/Azure/GCP accounts to discover configuration flaws and excessive permissions
2. IAM Permission Audit - Enumerate and analyze IAM users, roles, and policies to identify over-privilege and privilege escalation paths
3. Storage Bucket Exposure Detection - Scan publicly accessible S3/Azure Blob/GCS storage buckets, assess data leakage risk
4. Container and Orchestration Security - Assess Docker container escape risks and Kubernetes cluster RBAC configurations
5. Cloud Metadata Attack Verification - Test IMDSv1 exposure risk and IAM credential theft feasibility through SSRF

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Core Tools

Tool	Purpose	Command Example
pacu	AWS penetration testing framework, modular IAM enumeration and exploitation	pacu -> run iam__enum_users
scoutsuite	Multi-cloud security audit, generates compliance reports	scout aws -p default
awscli	AWS CLI operations, IAM/S3/EC2 manual enumeration	aws iam list-users --output json
s3scanner	S3 bucket public access scanning	s3scanner scan --bucket target-bucket
kubeaudit	Kubernetes security audit, detects RBAC and Pod configuration issues	kubeaudit all
trivy	Container image and IaC vulnerability scanning	trivy image alpine:latest

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Methodology

Attack Chain

Cloud Asset Discovery -> IAM Enumeration -> Storage Bucket Exposure -> Network Misconfig
(awscli, cloud enum)     (pacu, iam__enum)   (s3scanner, awscli)       (scoutsuite, nmap)
      |                      |                      |                      |
      v                      v                      v                      v
Metadata Attack       Container Security      Kubernetes Audit        Lateral Movement
(IMDSv1 SSRF,        Assessment              (kubeaudit, RBAC)       (stolen credentials,
 credential theft)    (trivy, docker escape)                           cross-service exploit)

Phase Details:

1. Cloud Asset Discovery - Enumerate EC2, S3, Lambda, RDS, and other resources in AWS accounts, build cloud asset inventory
2. IAM Enumeration - Analyze users, roles, policies, and trust relationships, identify privilege escalation paths and over-privilege
3. Storage Bucket Exposure - Detect publicly accessible S3 buckets, assess data leakage scope and sensitive information exposure
4. Network Misconfiguration - Audit security groups, NACLs, VPC configurations, discover overly permissive network rules
5. Metadata Attacks - Leverage SSRF to access IMDSv1 and obtain IAM temporary credentials
6. Container Security Assessment - Scan container image vulnerabilities, detect privileged containers and mount risks
7. Kubernetes Audit - Check RBAC rules, Pod security policies, and secrets management

Defense Perspective

• Least Privilege IAM - Each role should only be granted the precise permissions needed to complete its tasks; disable wildcard *:*
• Encryption at Rest and in Transit - S3 SSE-KMS encryption, RDS TDE, TLS enforcement, full-chain data protection
• Security Group Minimization - Inbound rules should only open necessary ports and IP ranges; outbound rules restricted by default
• CSPM Continuous Monitoring - Use ScoutSuite or AWS Config for continuous detection of configuration drift and violations
• IMDSv2 Enforcement - Disable IMDSv1, require PUT request to obtain token, block SSRF metadata attacks
• CloudTrail Full Logging - Enable multi-region, global service logging; record all API calls for forensics

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Practical Steps

For detailed payloads see payloads.md, and for the complete test checklist see test-cases.md.

AWS IAM Enumeration and Privilege Escalation

Use pacu or awscli to enumerate IAM users, roles, and policies, scan for privilege escalation paths. Key operations: set_keys to configure credentials, iam__privesc_scan to discover escalation paths, sts get-caller-identity to confirm current identity.

S3 Storage Bucket Security Assessment

Check bucket ACLs and policies, test anonymous access, bulk scan public buckets. Core commands are in the "S3 bucket enumeration" section of payloads.md.

Multi-Cloud Security Audit

Use ScoutSuite for comprehensive security audits of AWS/Azure/GCP, with focus on IAM policies, bucket public status, security group rules, and encryption configurations.

Container and Kubernetes Security

Use trivy to scan image vulnerabilities and IaC configurations, use kubeaudit to audit RBAC rules and Pod security contexts. Detect privileged containers and anonymous bindings.

Kubernetes Attack Tree

K8s Cluster
├── API Server
│   ├── Unauthenticated access (anonymous auth)
│   ├── Service account token theft
│   ├── RBAC privilege escalation
│   └── Webhook bypass
├── etcd
│   ├── Unauthenticated access (default port 2379)
│   └── Keyspace enumeration
├── Kubelet
│   ├── Exec into pods (10250)
│   ├── Running pods enumeration
│   └── Container logs access
├── Pods
│   ├── Privileged container escape
│   ├── hostPath mount escape
│   ├── hostPID/hostNetwork abuse
│   └── Service account token mount
└── Network
    ├── No network policy (default allow)
    ├── Service mesh bypass
    └── Ingress controller misconfig

Serverless Attack Chain

Serverless functions introduce unique attack vectors through event sources:

1. Event Injection: Malicious data in trigger events (S3 object names, SQS messages, HTTP bodies)
2. Permission Chain: Function -> Service Account -> Cross-service access
3. Data Flow: Sensitive data processed by functions without encryption
4. Cold Start Leak: Residual data from previous invocations

Infrastructure as Code Risks

IaC templates define cloud infrastructure -- vulnerabilities here are infrastructure-scale:

Risk	Impact	Detection Tool
Public S3 buckets	Data exposure	tfsec, checkov
Open security groups	Network exposure	scoutsuite
Hardcoded secrets	Credential theft	git-secrets, trufflehog
Overprivileged IAM	Privilege escalation	pmapper
Unencrypted resources	Data at rest exposure	cfsec

See guides/kubernetes-security-deep-dive.md, guides/serverless-security.md, and guides/infrastructure-as-code-security.md.

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Hacker Laws

Law	Manifestation in Cloud Security
Least Privilege	*:* in IAM policies is the biggest enemy. Each role should only have the precise permissions needed for its function; pacu's privesc_scan is specifically designed to find paths that violate this principle
Assume Breach	Assume Breach means cloud architecture design must assume attackers have already gained initial access. VPC segmentation, IMDSv2, temporary credentials (STS) are all defenses based on this assumption
Minimize Attack Surface	Public S3 buckets, open security groups, IMDSv1 reachability — each is an unnecessary attack surface. The core of ScoutSuite reports is enumerating these overexposures
Defense in Depth	IAM alone is not enough. Need IAM + encryption + network segmentation + log monitoring + CSPM in multiple layers, ensuring a single misconfiguration does not lead to total compromise
Trust but Verify	Do not trust cloud provider default configurations. S3 is not public by default but policies may change it to public; IMDSv1 is enabled by default but can be upgraded to v2 — always verify
First Principles	Understand how cloud APIs work. Without understanding IAM policy evaluation logic, you cannot understand privilege escalation; without understanding metadata services, you cannot understand SSRF credential theft

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Detection Methods

Cloud security detection relies on CloudTrail / Audit Logs, Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM), Cloud Workload Protection (CWP), and Cloud Detection & Response (CDR). Understanding attacker patterns helps defenders prioritize monitoring.

Cloud Provider Audit Logs

• AWS CloudTrail: All API calls; alert on DeleteTrail, UpdateTrail, StopLogging (attacker trying to blind monitoring).
• AWS ConsoleLogin: Alert on root logins, logins without MFA, logins from new geographies.
• AWS IAM events: CreateAccessKey, CreateUser, AttachUserPolicy, AssumeRole chains; correlate with source IP & UA.
• Azure Activity Log: Alert on Microsoft.Authorization/elevate/elevate (PIM activation), new Role Assignments.
• GCP Audit Logs: Alert on SetIamPolicy, iam.serviceAccountKeys.create, gce.instances.setMetadata (SSH key injection).
• Kubernetes Audit Log: kubectl exec, privileged pod creation, RBAC modifications, ServiceAccount token creation.

Identity & Access Anomalies

• IMDS access: EC2 making IMDS calls from non-ECS-workload processes (credential theft via SSRF).
• STS AssumeRole chains: Long assume role chains (role A → B → C); indicates privesc lateral movement.
• Service Account key creation: GCP serviceAccount.keys.create spikes — long-lived keys are discouraged; alert.
• Admin role grant: Newly created user immediately assigned roles/owner or AdministratorAccess.
• SSRF metadata access: EC2 outbound to 169.254.169.254 from web app logs; metadata extraction attempt.

Storage / Data Exfiltration

• S3 GET spike: One principal requesting s3:GetObject across many buckets in short window (mass download).
• S3 bucket policy changes: s3:PutBucketPolicy making bucket public; s3:PutBucketAcl granting AllUsers.
• EBS snapshot sharing: ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute adding shared-with:external-account.
• AMI publishing: ec2:ModifyImageAttribute making AMI public (data exfil via AMI sharing).
• Cloud Storage egress: GCS / Azure Blob download volume exceeding baseline (>10 GB/day per principal).
• Snowball / Transfer Family: Data transfer to physical media; correlate with budget alerts.

Compute / Container Indicators

• EC2 instance metadata: EC2 launched with UserData containing reverse shell or IAM role over-privilege.
• Lambda function creation: New Lambda with LambdaFullAccess or AmazonS3FullAccess permission; data exfil vector.
• ECS task privileged: ECS task definition with privileged: true; container escape risk.
• EKS pod creation: Pod with hostPath, hostPID, hostNetwork mounts; node-level access.
• Instance launch anomalies: Burst of EC2 launches in unusual region (cryptomining).

SIEM Detection Rules

• Splunk SPL (AWS): index=aws sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail eventName=ConsoleLogin sourceIPAddress=*NOT-DEFAULT* | stats count by userIdentity.arn
• Splunk SPL (K8s): index=k8s verb=create resource=pods AND requestObject.spec.securityContext.privileged=true
• Sigma rule: sigma/rules/cloud/aws_root_login.yml
• GuardDuty: Native AWS threat detection — enable all detector types (especially UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration).
• Microsoft Defender for Cloud: Enable all plans (Servers, Containers, SQL, Storage, Key Vault).
• Falco (runtime K8s): Default ruleset catches container escapes, reverse shells, privilege escalations.

CSPM / Posture Management

• Public S3 buckets: Continuous scan via Prowler / CloudSploit / ScoutSuite; alert on new public buckets.
• Security groups open to internet: 0.0.0.0/0 on ports 22, 3389, 3306, 5432, 6379; alert on creation.
• Missing encryption: EBS volumes, S3 buckets, RDS instances without KmsKeyId or ServerSideEncryption.
• IAM keys > 90 days: Alert on long-lived access keys; encourage rotation.
• CloudTrail disabled: Alert on CloudTrail deletion, S3 bucket policy changes affecting logs.

Defense Evasion Techniques

CloudTrail / Logging Evasion

• Disable CloudTrail: aws cloudtrail delete-trail or stop-logging (loud; needs cloudtrail:DeleteTrail).
• Event selector manipulation: Modify trail event selectors to exclude ReadWriteType events or specific keys (subtle).
• Logging by service bypass: Use services that don't emit CloudTrail events (e.g., s3:ListAllMyBuckets on global endpoint).
• Data events exclusion: Ensure S3/Lambda data events are NOT enabled; attacker's s3:GetObject won't be logged.
• Log file encryption/key disablement: Disable the KMS key used to encrypt CloudTrail logs (kms:DisableKey).
• VPC Flow Logs tampering: Disable VPC Flow Logs (ec2:DeleteFlowLogs); add deny for logging services in SCP.
• Region hopping: Operate in regions where CloudTrail is not configured (need to verify multi-region trail).

Identity Evasion

• STS role chaining: Use assume role multiple times to launder credentials across accounts (harder to track origin).
• Cross-account role assumption: Use role in target account; trail in target account shows different identity than attacker.
• Service role abuse: Use EC2 instance profile credentials; appears as legit workload in CloudTrail.
• Long-lived keys over STS: Use IAM user keys (no session token) — easier to hide among legitimate long-lived key usage.
• Federation abuse: Use SAML federation with forged assertion; appears as legit SSO user in logs.
• Web identity federation: Use OIDC tokens from GitHub / Google; exploit trust relationships.

Compute Stealth

• Lambda in same region as target: Use Lambda in target's region for credentialed API calls; blends with legit Lambda traffic.
• ECS Fargate over EC2: Fargate leaves no EC2 host logs; harder to detect runtime activity.
• Spot Instance over On-Demand: Spot instances are transient; less monitoring baseline.
• Lightsail over EC2: Lightsail has less detailed CloudTrail events; defenders may not monitor it.
• Lambda layer obfuscation: Hide malicious code in Lambda layer (less visible than function code).

Data Exfiltration Stealth

• S3 cross-region replication: Set up replication to attacker-controlled bucket (looks like legitimate DR config).
• EBS snapshot copy: ec2:CopySnapshot to external account; defender must check CreateVolumePermission.
• AMI copy: ec2:CopyImage to external account; defender must check LaunchPermission.
• Snowball: Physical data exfil via Snowball; bypasses network DLP.
• AWS Transfer Family: SFTP / FTPS data exfil using legitimate service.
• VPC endpoint to external service: Use PrivateLink to attacker's VPC service; appears as private network traffic.

Container / Kubernetes Evasion

• Sidecar over new pod: Inject into existing pod via kubectl exec; avoids new pod creation alert.
• ServiceAccount token theft over creation: Steal mounted SA token; appear as legit pod to API server.
• Anonymous auth abuse: Kubelet / API server with --anonymous-auth=true; appear as anonymous system user.
• kubeconfig in ConfigMap: Embed kubeconfig in ConfigMap (no Secret creation event); attacker fetches via API.
• Privileged pod via cron: Schedule one-shot pod via CronJob; short-lived, may evade runtime detection.
• Host PID/Network only (no Privileged): Pods with hostPID / hostNetwork get many capabilities without privileged: true flag.
• Capability drop evasion: Drop all caps, then add CAP_SYS_ADMIN via setcap; appears benign on initial inspection.
• Container layer obfuscation: Use multi-layer images with payload in lower layers; evades simple image scans.

Network Stealth

• VPC peering to external account: Use peering connection; traffic appears as private VPC traffic.
• Transit Gateway: Use TGW with complex routing; harder to trace east-west traffic.
• PrivateLink: Exfiltrate via AWS PrivateLink (private IP space); evades internet-facing DLP.
• Direct Connect: Use Direct Connect for high-bandwidth exfil; bypasses internet egress monitoring.
• CloudFront / API Gateway: Use CloudFront as reverse proxy; appears as legit CDN traffic.

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Orchestration

ECC Loop Pattern

• Pattern: Batch Processing
• Rationale: Cloud environments typically have many resources (instances, buckets, functions) that can be audited in parallel batches
• Integration: codebase-onboarding (IaC template analysis), data-scraper-agent (CVE collection), verification-loop (finding confirmation)

Cross-Skill Pipeline

codebase-onboarding -> cloud-security -> verification-loop -> article-writing

Quality Gate

• Pre-condition: Cloud credentials configured, scope defined (which accounts/subscriptions)
• Post-condition: All resources audited, misconfigurations documented with evidence
• Verification: Use verification-loop Phase 4 (confirm with different tool -- e.g., ScoutSuite + Prowler cross-check)

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Learning Resources

• Pacu Official Repository - AWS penetration testing framework, modular attack tools
• ScoutSuite Official Documentation - Multi-cloud security audit tool
• Trivy Official Documentation - Container and IaC vulnerability scanning
• AWS IAM Best Practices - Authoritative guide for IAM security configuration
• Kubernetes Security Documentation - K8s security model and RBAC
• Cloud Security Alliance - Cloud security industry standards and whitepapers

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Supplementary files for this skill: payloads.md, test-cases.md, guides/kubernetes-security-deep-dive.md, guides/serverless-security.md, guides/infrastructure-as-code-security.md Related skills: skills/container-security/SKILL.md, skills/network-pentest/SKILL.md External resources: https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu, https://github.com/nccgroup/ScoutSuite, https://aquasecurity.github.io/trivy/, https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/