| name | pipeline-security-architect |
| description | Design and review secure CI/CD pipelines with isolated runners, minimal rights, OIDC, signed artifacts, protected environments, and approval gates. |
| version | 1.1.0 |
| since | 2026-06-17 |
| last_modified | 2026-06-17 |
| authors | ["platform-engineering"] |
| stability | stable |
| min_platform_version | {"codex":"unknown","amazon-q":"unknown","antigravity":"unknown","auggie":"unknown","bob":"unknown","claude-code":"unknown","cline":"unknown","codebuddy":"unknown","continue":"unknown","costrict":"unknown","crush":"unknown","github-copilot":"unknown","gitlab-duo":"unknown","factory":"unknown","forgecode":"unknown","opencode":"unknown","openhands":"unknown","cursor":"unknown","roo-code":"unknown","kiro":"unknown","junie":"unknown","gemini-cli":"unknown","iflow":"unknown","kilocode":"unknown","kimi":"unknown","lingma":"unknown","pi":"unknown","qoder":"unknown","qwen":"unknown","windsurf":"unknown","ollama":"unknown"} |
| deprecated_since | null |
| replaces | null |
| supersedes | [] |
| changelog | [{"version":"1.1.0","date":"2026-06-17","change":"Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill"}] |
Pipeline Security Architect
Purpose
Design and review secure CI/CD pipelines with isolated runners, minimal rights, OIDC, signed artifacts, protected environments, approval gates, and safe deployments. Treat regulatory, security, and operational references as review and evidence guidance, not legal advice.
When to use
- pipeline security architecture decisions, controls, or operating practices need independent review.
- A change affects pipeline security architecture artifacts such as workflow file, runner pool, OIDC trust policy, artifact signing step, protected environment, approval gate.
- The user needs evidence-oriented findings for risks such as overprivileged token, untrusted runner, artifact tampering, environment bypass, secret sprawl, unsafe deployment job.
- Audit, security, operations, or platform stakeholders need a concise readiness position.
- Existing documentation, tickets, tests, or logs must be turned into actionable remediation items.
Operating model
- Identify the relevant pipeline security architecture artifacts, owners, systems, environments, and review boundary.
- Compare the available artifacts against expected signals such as token permission block, runner isolation evidence, signature verification, environment protection, approval record, deployment audit log.
- Separate confirmed gaps from assumptions, missing evidence, and advisory improvement opportunities.
- Rate findings by operational, security, compliance, customer, and auditability impact.
- Recommend minimal remediation steps, validation evidence, owners, and review cadence.
Spec-Driven Change Context
- Treat repository specs, ADRs, runbooks, change proposals, design notes, and task files as durable context that outlives a chat session.
- For non-trivial changes, prefer a checked-in change artifact or equivalent proposal/design/tasks record before implementation begins.
- Capture requirement deltas explicitly: added, modified, removed, deprecated, or unchanged behavior.
- Keep implementation tasks traceable to acceptance criteria, affected specs, validation commands, and owners.
- During verification, compare the implementation against the proposal, design decisions, task checklist, and spec deltas.
- After completion, sync or archive completed change artifacts so the repository's source of truth reflects the final behavior.
- If the repository has no spec workflow yet, report the missing artifact and provide a minimal proposal/spec/tasks outline instead of relying on chat-only intent.
Skill-Specific Review Scope
- Primary artifacts: workflow file, runner pool, OIDC trust policy, artifact signing step, protected environment, approval gate.
