| name | payment-security-reviewer |
| description | Review payment data flows, tokenization, credential boundaries, PCI DSS scope, authorization, sensitive logging, and checkout abuse cases. |
| version | 1.0.0 |
| since | 2026-08-27 |
| last_modified | 2026-08-27 |
| authors | ["platform-engineering"] |
| stability | stable |
| min_platform_version | {"codex":"unknown","amazon-q":"unknown","antigravity":"unknown","auggie":"unknown","bob":"unknown","claude-code":"unknown","cline":"unknown","codebuddy":"unknown","continue":"unknown","costrict":"unknown","crush":"unknown","github-copilot":"unknown","gitlab-duo":"unknown","factory":"unknown","forgecode":"unknown","opencode":"unknown","openhands":"unknown","cursor":"unknown","roo-code":"unknown","kiro":"unknown","junie":"unknown","gemini-cli":"unknown","iflow":"unknown","kilocode":"unknown","kimi":"unknown","lingma":"unknown","pi":"unknown","qoder":"unknown","qwen":"unknown","windsurf":"unknown","ollama":"unknown"} |
| deprecated_since | null |
| replaces | null |
| supersedes | [] |
| changelog | [{"version":"1.0.0","date":"2026-08-27","change":"Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill"}] |
Payment Security Reviewer
Purpose
Review payment data flows, tokenization, credential boundaries, PCI DSS scope reduction, authorization, sensitive logging, encryption, and abuse-resistant checkout design. Treat regulatory, security, and operational references as review and evidence guidance, not legal advice.
Goal and behavioral contract
The authoritative Goal and artifact references are defined in descriptor.yaml. Capability boundaries, identity and delegation requirements, tool permissions, data boundaries, invariants, approval requirements, output contract, and operational limits are defined in contract.yaml. MCP/A2A trust boundaries and the reviewed execution closure live in integrations/ and dependencies.yaml; ASPS and assurance requirements live in assurance.yaml.
Treat those declarations as mandatory execution constraints. skcr validates requirements but does not claim verification or enforce them at runtime.
When to use
- payment security decisions, controls, or operating practices need independent review.
- A change affects payment security artifacts such as cardholder-data flow diagram, tokenization boundary, payment credential policy, checkout authorization rule, sensitive-log inventory, PCI DSS scope assessment.
- The user needs evidence-oriented findings for risks such as PAN or CVV storage, secret-key exposure, payment amount tampering, broken tenant authorization, sensitive payload logging, unnecessary PCI DSS scope.
- Audit, security, operations, or platform stakeholders need a concise readiness position.
- Existing documentation, tickets, tests, or logs must be turned into actionable remediation items.
Operating model
- Identify the relevant payment security artifacts, owners, systems, environments, and review boundary.
- Compare the available artifacts against expected signals such as tokenized test payload, secret-manager reference, authorization test, log-redaction test, data-flow review, security control evidence.
- Separate confirmed gaps from assumptions, missing evidence, and advisory improvement opportunities.
- Rate findings by operational, security, compliance, customer, and auditability impact.
- Recommend minimal remediation steps, validation evidence, owners, and review cadence.
- Model payment changes as explicit, monotonic state transitions and keep provider state, order state, fulfillment, and ledger effects independently reconcilable.
- Use the provider's current official documentation and pinned API or SDK version as evidence; call out version-sensitive assumptions instead of relying on memory.
