| name | red-team-review |
| description | Use this skill when the user asks for an adversarial review of a proposal, architecture, system design, agent workflow, or rollout plan. Trigger phrases include "red team this", "adversarial review", "where does this break", "pre-mortem this design", "red team review", "revisión adversarial", "qué puede salir mal", "break my plan". Produces a structured list of failure modes ranked by severity and likelihood, each with a proposed mitigation, not just a list of worries. |
red-team-review
Anchor: A red team's job is to find the failure, not to be agreeable.
When to use
Use this skill when the user needs an adversarial read of something they are about to commit to. Works for:
- A product proposal or PRD before scoping.
- An architecture or design before build.
- An agent or LLM workflow before rollout.
- A migration or cutover plan before execution.
- A go-to-market plan before launch.
- A security or compliance posture before an external review.
Do not use when:
- The user wants a code review of a specific diff. That is a different task.
- The user wants a post-mortem of something that already failed. Use
post-mortem.
- The user wants a user-research critique. Use
ux-audit.
Voice rules (apply to all outputs)
- No buzzwords: leverage, empower, synergy, resonate, tapestry, delve, elevate, captivate, explore, dynamic, testament.
- No em dashes.
- No filler openings.
- Decision-oriented over descriptive.
- High-context, no overexplaining.
- Standard sentence case for formal outputs.
- ES outputs match the register of the handbook: direct, self-aware, no reverence for process, comfortable naming failure.
- EN outputs use direct US business register. Do not soften bluntness into corporate-speak.
- Language switches based on audience, not author.
Bilingual handling
- ES. Rioplatense register. Vos over tú. Keep standard terms in English: red team, blast radius, attack surface, threat model, rollback, runbook, blameless, canary, kill switch, guardrail, prompt injection, race condition, SLA.
- EN. Direct US business register.
- A red team output is meant to be uncomfortable to read. Do not soften findings for polish.
Method
Step 1. Scope the target
A vague scope produces vague findings.
- Target. Document, system, flow, or plan under review.
- Version. Specific version or commit, not a moving target.
- In scope. Components, behaviors, and interactions being reviewed.
- Out of scope. Adjacent systems the review will not touch.
- Stakes. What the target owns if it ships: revenue, user trust, data, compliance, uptime.
Without stakes, severity cannot be calibrated.
Step 2. Surface the assumptions the target depends on
Every plan rests on assumptions. Most plans do not make them explicit. Name:
- User assumptions. How users are expected to behave.
- Operational assumptions. What the team will do, at what cadence, with what care.
- Environmental assumptions. Traffic, latency, volume, concurrency.
- Trust assumptions. Which actors the system trusts, and about what.
- Upstream assumptions. What the dependencies will do or not do.
A finding is either an assumption breaking or a failure the design already allows. Write the assumptions first so the findings are not surprises.
Step 3. Walk the failure classes systematically
A red team is more useful when it is exhaustive than when it is creative. Walk each class explicitly, even when the answer is "no finding":
- Correctness and logic. Off-by-one, missing edge cases, state machines with unreachable or sticky states.
- Concurrency. Race conditions, double-submit, retry amplification.
- Adversarial input. Malformed, malicious, or high-cost inputs. Includes injection, traversal, overflow.
- Trust boundaries. Data or authority crossing zones. Privilege escalation.
- Agent and LLM-specific. Prompt injection, tool misuse, context smuggling, jailbreaks, hallucinated outputs, infinite loops, over-delegation.
- Cost model. Ways an adversary or noisy neighbor can inflate bills or saturate capacity.
- Blast radius. What else fails when this fails. Regional, tenant, customer, data class.
- Observability. Whether the failure is visible. Which signal. Which dashboard. Which owner.
- Rollback and recovery. Whether and how fast.
- Operational. Runbook gaps, on-call confusion, key-person risk.
- Compliance and legal. Regulatory exposure if the failure happens.
- Social and human. How users will behave during and after. Support exposure.
This is not a threat model in the formal security sense. It is a failure-mode walk.
See references/failure-modes.md for the full set.
Step 4. Rate each finding on two axes
Every finding carries:
- Severity. Critical, high, medium, low. Calibrated against the stakes named in step 1.
- Likelihood. Near-certain, likely, possible, unlikely.
A "low severity, unlikely" finding is usually noise. A "high severity, unlikely" finding is the interesting case. A "high severity, likely" finding is the reason this review exists.
Step 5. Write findings adversarially
Each finding is written from the attacker or failure mode's point of view, not from the defender's.
- How it breaks. The specific sequence or condition.
- Why it breaks. The underlying assumption that fails.
- What happens then. The consequence, including blast radius.
- Current defenses. What the design already does to prevent or detect this.
- Why current defenses are or are not enough.
"It might be a problem if" is not a finding. "When a user triggers X during Y, the system does Z, and we do not notice because W" is.
Step 6. Separate fixable bugs from structural risks
Findings split into two classes:
- Bugs. Fixable inside the current design. Propose the fix.
- Structural risks. The design is the reason. Propose the design change, the acceptance, or the mitigation. Name the owner of the decision.
Conflating the two is how a red team review becomes a bug list. Structural risks are the point.
Step 7. Propose mitigations
Every finding ends with one of:
- Fix. Specific change. Effort range.
- Mitigate. Reduce severity or likelihood without closing the risk fully. Named residual.
- Accept. Document the risk, who accepted it, under what condition.
- Monitor. A signal that would indicate the risk has shown up. Owner.
A finding without one of these is advocacy, not review.
Step 8. Deliver in priority order
The report is read top-down. First page carries the three findings that most change the decision. Everything else follows.
The delivery is to a named decision maker, not a committee. The decision maker's next action is explicit in the report.
Templates
templates/en/review-report.md: the red team report as delivered.templates/en/failure-mode-checklist.md: the systematic walk-through used during the review.templates/es/review-report.md: reporte de red team como se entrega.templates/es/failure-mode-checklist.md: checklist sistemático usado durante la revisión.
Related skills
post-mortem: use it instead when the failure already happened and you need a retro.ux-audit: use it when the target is a live user flow needing a research critique.migration-spec: pairs with this to stress-test a cutover and rollback plan before execution.security-questionnaire: pairs with this to pressure-test a security posture before an external review.
Anti-patterns
This skill must never produce:
- A review that lists worries without severity and likelihood.
- A review with only bugs and no structural risks.
- A finding phrased as a question to the target owner.
- A finding that relies on "the team should be careful".
- A review that omits the assumption the finding depends on.
- A review that does not name residual risk after mitigation.
- A review that ends without a named next decision.
- A review that softens findings for political reasons.
Checklist before delivery
