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testssl-inspector-expert

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Mis à jour15 mai 2026 à 00:21

Interpret testssl-inspector normalized findings, recommend remediations, and tie evidence back to SCF anchor controls plus SOC 2 / NIST 800-53 r5 / PCI DSS 4.0.1 / ISO 27002:2022 equivalents derived from SCF crosswalks.

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GRCEngClub

GRCEngClub/claude-grc-engineering

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Métiers associésSOC

Basé sur la classification professionnelle SOC

Analystes en sécurité de l'informationProfessions informatiques et mathématiques·SOC 15-1212

SKILL.md

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name	testssl-inspector-expert
description	Interpret testssl-inspector normalized findings, recommend remediations, and tie evidence back to SCF anchor controls plus SOC 2 / NIST 800-53 r5 / PCI DSS 4.0.1 / ISO 27002:2022 equivalents derived from SCF crosswalks.
license	MIT

testssl Inspector Expert

Use this skill when reviewing findings produced by /testssl-inspector:scan. The connector wraps testssl.sh and emits v1 Findings against tls_endpoint resources; this skill translates those into remediation advice an engineer can act on and audit evidence a reviewer can sign off.

Reading the output

Findings live at ~/.cache/claude-grc/findings/testssl-inspector/<run_id>.json. Each document covers one TLS endpoint:

resource.type = "tls_endpoint", resource.id = "<host>:<port>", resource.uri = "https://<host>:<port>/"
evaluations[] — one entry per (control_framework, control_id, testssl finding) tuple
findings[] — narrative roll-up for CVEs and critical results (cap 50 per doc)
metadata.target, metadata.host, metadata.port — the original input

What testssl IDs mean

Most fails fall into one of five families. The remediation pattern is the same within each family.

Family 1 — Weak protocol offered

IDs: SSLv2, SSLv3, TLS1, TLS1_1. SCF anchors: CRY-01 (Use of Cryptographic Controls), CRY-03 (Transmission of Sensitive Data), NET-09 (Session Authenticity). SCF crosswalk fans these out at scan time — typical resolved targets include NIST SC-08, SC-08(01), SC-08(02), SC-13, SC-23, SI-07(06); SOC 2 CC6.1, CC6.7; PCI 4.2, 4.2.1, 4.2.1.2, 8.3.2; ISO 27002 5.14, 8.24, 8.26.

Remediation:

Terminate TLS at a load balancer or web server that supports a TLS 1.2+ minimum. AWS ALB: set the security policy to ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS-1-2-2017-01 or newer. NGINX: ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;. Apache: SSLProtocol -all +TLSv1.2 +TLSv1.3.
PCI DSS 4.0.1 specifically prohibits SSL and "early TLS" (1.0/1.1) — these are audit-fail conditions, not advisories.

Family 2 — Weak ciphers in the offered list

IDs: cipher_negotiated, cipherlist_* (NULL, aNULL, EXPORT, LOW, 3DES_IDEA, OBSOLETED), RC4, std_* variants. SCF anchors: CRY-01.2 (Algorithm Selection), CRY-05 (Cryptographic Protection). Resolved targets typically include NIST SC-13, SC-28, SC-28(01); SOC 2 CC6.1, CC6.7; PCI 3.5, 3.5.1.2, 3.5.1.3, 8.3.2; ISO 27002 8.24.

Remediation:

Pin an explicit cipher list. Modern baseline: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384.
Prefer forward-secrecy ciphers (ECDHE/DHE families). Anything without (EC)DHE should be disabled in 2026.

Family 3 — Certificate posture

IDs: cert_expirationStatus, cert_notAfter, cert_signatureAlgorithm, cert_keySize, cert_chain_of_trust, OCSP_*, CT, DNS_CAArecord. SCF anchor: CRY-08 (Public Key Infrastructure). Resolved targets include NIST SC-12 (Key Establishment & Management) and SC-17 (PKI Certificates); SOC 2 CC6.1.

Remediation depends on the specific failure:

Expired / near-expiry: rotate via ACM (AWS), Let's Encrypt, or your CA portal. Set up rotation alerts at T-30, T-14, T-7 days.
Weak signature (SHA-1, MD5): reissue with SHA-256+ signature.
Weak key size (RSA <2048): reissue with RSA 2048+ or ECDSA P-256+.
Broken chain: server is missing an intermediate. Re-deploy the cert bundle with the full chain (your CA's portal shows the bundle order).
No CAA record: add a CAA DNS record naming your authorized issuer(s) — defense against unauthorized certificate issuance.

Family 4 — Known TLS CVEs

IDs: heartbleed, CCS, ticketbleed, ROBOT, secure_renego, secure_client_renego, CRIME_TLS, BREACH, POODLE_SSL, fallback_SCSV, SWEET32, FREAK, DROWN, LOGJAM, BEAST, LUCKY13, RC4, winshock. SCF anchors: VPM-01 (Vulnerability & Patch Management), VPM-06 (Vulnerability Scanning). Resolved targets include NIST SI-02, SI-03, RA-05; SOC 2 CC7.1 and CC3.x POFs; PCI 6.3, 6.3.1, 6.3.3, 11.3, 11.3.1; ISO 27002 8.8.

These are not configuration tuning — they're vulnerability remediation. Treat any non-OK finding here as an audit-tracked vuln with a remediation deadline. Most are addressed by:

Patching OpenSSL / the TLS implementation on the server.
Disabling vulnerable protocols/ciphers (e.g., POODLE → drop SSLv3; SWEET32 → drop 3DES/Blowfish; BEAST → use TLS 1.2+).
For BREACH (HTTP-layer): disable HTTP compression for responses containing sensitive data, or add a per-request masking token.

Family 5 — HTTP transport headers

IDs: HSTS, HSTS_preload, HSTS_time, HPKP, cookie_secure, cookie_httponly, banner_*, security_headers. SCF anchors: CRY-03 (Transmission of Sensitive Data), WEB-03 (Web App Hardening), NET-09 (Session Authenticity). Resolved targets include NIST SC-08, SC-08(01), SC-07(17), SC-23; PCI 4.2, 6.4, 6.4.1.

Remediation:

HSTS missing or short max-age: Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload and submit to the HSTS preload list (hstspreload.org) for the strongest posture.
Cookies without Secure or HttpOnly: fix the application — set both flags on every session cookie.
HPKP: deprecated; if testssl flags HPKP usage, plan to remove it (browsers no longer enforce).

Evidence packaging

For an audit, the auditor wants three things per finding:

The raw testssl JSON or its normalized v1 doc (already in ~/.cache/claude-grc/findings/testssl-inspector/<run_id>.json).
The scan timestamp (collected_at field).
A remediation narrative tying each failed evaluation to a specific control and a future check.

Workflow:

/testssl-inspector:scan --target=auth.example.com --target=api.example.com
# Inspect the resulting findings file. Attach it to the audit evidence packet
# alongside the remediation tickets opened for each fail.

/grc-engineer:gap-assessment SOC2,PCI-DSS --sources=testssl-inspector
# Aggregates testssl evaluations with your other connector outputs into a
# control-by-control posture view.

What you will not do

Don't run testssl against endpoints you don't own or are not authorized to test. testssl makes hundreds of connections per target and looks like a scanner to defenders.
Don't recommend ignoring a fail because "the application is internal." TLS 1.0/1.1 and weak ciphers are no less broken on intranets.
Don't recommend disabling individual checks just because they're noisy. If a check produces too many false positives, raise an issue against this connector with the testssl id and reasoning so we can refine the mapping table.
Don't claim a finding maps to a framework beyond the five listed in scan.md. If a user asks about SP 800-52 Rev. 2 specifically, point them at the relevant framework plugin instead.