authorization-rbac

name	authorization-rbac
description	RBAC and ABAC in the application layer: defining roles and claims, mapping the authenticated identity to roles, enforcing roles in middleware and UI. The critical seam: row-level data scoping hands off to data-platform RLS via auth.uid(). Authentication proves identity; authorization controls access.

Skill: authorization-rbac

Invoked by: any agent designing access-control rules for a web app or API; ravenclaude-core/security-reviewer for any role-enforcement change.

When to invoke: defining who can access what (roles, permissions); mapping Google-authenticated users to application roles; implementing admin-only sections; designing the handoff between this plugin's identity layer and data-platform's RLS layer.

Output: role model documented + roles stored/retrieved + enforcement in middleware + UI conditional rendering + data-row seam to data-platform RLS documented.

---

Boundary: authentication ≠ authorization ≠ data row access

Three distinct layers — keep them separate:

Layer	What it answers	Owned by
Authentication	"Who is this person?" — verifies Google identity, establishes auth.uid()	This plugin (auth-identity)
Application authorization	"What is this person allowed to do?" — roles, permissions, feature flags	This skill
Data authorization	"Which rows can this person read?" — row-level scoping by tenant/org	data-platform plugin (rls-policy-authoring skill)

A logged-in user is not automatically entitled to every row in the database. A user with the admin role in the app is not automatically entitled to another tenant's data. These are separate controls enforced at separate layers.

The best-practice authenticate-the-person-authorize-the-data-separately.md is an absolute rule in this plugin.

---

RBAC vs ABAC

Model	Structure	When to use
RBAC (Role-Based Access Control)	User → Role → Permissions. Roles are pre-defined (admin, editor, viewer).	Most web apps. Simple, auditable, easy to reason about.
ABAC (Attribute-Based Access Control)	Access based on attributes of the user, resource, and environment. More flexible, more complex.	When roles are insufficient — e.g., "can edit documents they own" or "can access based on department + resource tag".
ReBAC (Relationship-Based)	Access based on graph relationships (user owns resource, is member of group).	Very fine-grained access (Google Zanzibar pattern). Complex; usually overkill for SMB apps.

Default to RBAC. Add ABAC rules only when a concrete access requirement cannot be expressed as a role.

---

Storing roles

Option A — Supabase custom claims / user metadata (recommended)

Store roles in Supabase Auth's user_metadata or app_metadata. app_metadata is server-editable only (not alterable by the user):

-- Set role server-side (admin action only — never let the user set their own app_metadata)
-- Supabase Admin API or a server-side function:
UPDATE auth.users
SET raw_app_meta_data = raw_app_meta_data || '{"role": "admin"}'::jsonb
WHERE id = '<user_id>';

Read in a Server Component or API route:

const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser();
const role = user?.app_metadata?.role ?? "viewer"; // default to lowest privilege

[unverified — confirm app_metadata write behavior in current Supabase Auth API]

Option B — Roles table in the application database

For complex role models (multiple roles per user, org-scoped roles):

-- Roles table — created once per environment
CREATE TABLE user_roles (
  id          uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
  user_id     uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES auth.users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
  role        text NOT NULL CHECK (role IN ('admin', 'editor', 'viewer')),
  created_at  timestamptz DEFAULT now(),
  UNIQUE(user_id, role)
);

-- RLS: users can read their own roles; only admins can write
ALTER TABLE user_roles ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
CREATE POLICY "users can read own roles" ON user_roles
  FOR SELECT USING (auth.uid() = user_id);
CREATE POLICY "admins can manage roles" ON user_roles
  USING (EXISTS (
    SELECT 1 FROM user_roles r2
    WHERE r2.user_id = auth.uid() AND r2.role = 'admin'
  ));

Option C — Roles in the JWT (custom claims)

Embed roles in the Supabase JWT via a custom claims function [unverified — Supabase custom JWT claims feature; verify in current docs]:

-- Supabase SQL editor: custom claim function
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.custom_access_token_hook(event jsonb)
RETURNS jsonb AS $$
DECLARE
  claims jsonb;
  user_role text;
BEGIN
  SELECT role INTO user_role FROM public.user_roles WHERE user_id = (event->>'userId')::uuid LIMIT 1;
  claims := event->'claims';
  claims := jsonb_set(claims, '{app_role}', to_jsonb(coalesce(user_role, 'viewer')));
  RETURN jsonb_set(event, '{claims}', claims);
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;

This embeds the role in the JWT so API routes can read it without a database round-trip. Route to ravenclaude-core/security-reviewer — custom claim functions are security-critical.

---

Enforcing roles in Next.js middleware

// middleware.ts — role-based route protection
// Assumes role is in user.app_metadata.role (Option A)
import { createServerClient } from "@supabase/ssr";
import { NextResponse } from "next/server";

const ADMIN_PATHS = ["/admin", "/admin/:path*"];
const EDITOR_PATHS = ["/edit/:path*"];

export async function middleware(request) {
  // ... (session setup from protect-spa-and-api skill)
  const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser();
  const role = user?.app_metadata?.role ?? "viewer";

  const path = request.nextUrl.pathname;

  if (ADMIN_PATHS.some((p) => path.startsWith(p.replace("/:path*", ""))) && role !== "admin") {
    return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/unauthorized", request.));
  }

   (.( path.(p.(, ))) && ![, ].(role)) {
     .( (, request.));
  }

   .();
}

---

Enforcing roles in API routes

Never rely on UI-only gating — API routes must check roles independently:

// app/api/admin/route.ts
export async function DELETE(request: Request) {
  const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser();
  if (!user) return new Response("Unauthorized", { status: 401 });

  const role = user.app_metadata?.role;
  if (role !== "admin") return new Response("Forbidden", { status: 403 });

  // proceed with admin action
}

---

Conditional rendering in the UI

// components/AdminPanel.tsx
"use client";
import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
import { createClient } from "@/lib/supabase/client";

export function AdminPanel() {
  const [isAdmin, setIsAdmin] = useState(false);
  const supabase = createClient();

  useEffect(() => {
    supabase.auth.getUser().then(({ data: { user } }) => {
      setIsAdmin(user?.app_metadata?.role === "admin");
    });
  }, [supabase]);

  if (!isAdmin) return null; // UI gating only — API must enforce independently
  return <div>Admin controls</div>;
}

UI gating alone is not a security control. API routes must enforce roles regardless of what the UI renders.

---

The identity → RLS seam (data authorization handoff)

Once the user's identity and application role are established, data-row scoping is the data-platform plugin's responsibility:

1. auth.uid() from the Supabase JWT is available in Postgres RLS policies automatically — the Supabase client passes the JWT in every query.
2. The data-platform/rls-policy-authoring skill defines policies like:

   -- Users can only read rows belonging to their tenant
   CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation" ON orders
     FOR SELECT USING (tenant_id = (
       SELECT tenant_id FROM tenant_memberships WHERE user_id = auth.uid()
     ));
   

3. The auth-identity plugin's job ends at establishing auth.uid(). The RLS policy determines which rows that user can read.

Never duplicate RLS logic in application code as the load-bearing control. App-code row filters are acceptable as redundant defense-in-depth layers, but the authoritative control is the database RLS policy. See data-platform/best-practices/enforce-tenant-isolation-closest-to-data.md.

---

Anti-patterns this skill flags

• Checking roles only in UI components and not in API routes — API routes must enforce independently
• Storing roles in user_metadata (user-editable) instead of app_metadata (server-only) [unverified — confirm Supabase metadata editability]
• Admin-role check that accepts any truthy role value instead of explicitly checking role === 'admin'
• Using UI-rendered role gating as the sole data-access control — RLS must be the load-bearing layer
• No default role — always assign the least-privilege role (viewer) if none is set
• Roles stored in localStorage or client-side state — read from server-side session only
• Hard-coding user.id in a URL parameter to determine which data to show — derive tenant from the authenticated session, not the URL

---

See also

• Skill: ../protect-spa-and-api/SKILL.md — route guards that this skill extends with role checks
• Skill: ../gate-the-dashboard/SKILL.md — dashboard-specific role gate + RLS handoff
• Best-practice: ../../best-practices/authenticate-the-person-authorize-the-data-separately.md
• data-platform: ../../../data-platform/skills/rls-policy-authoring/SKILL.md — the data-row authorization layer that follows this skill
• Security escalation: ../../../ravenclaude-core/agents/security-reviewer.md