cowork-to-code-bridge

name	cowork-to-code-bridge
description	Use an already-installed, independently verified cowork-to-code bridge to run narrowly approved actions on the user's own macOS, Linux, or WSL2 machine through a local file queue.
category	Development & Code Tools
source	antigravity
tags	["python","api","mcp","claude","ai","agent"]
url	https://github.com/sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills/tree/main/skills/cowork-to-code-bridge

cowork-to-code-bridge

Use this skill only when the user explicitly asks to operate on a machine they own or administer and the required work cannot be completed in the current sandbox. The bridge queues a named script through a shared local directory; it does not make a local task safe merely because it opens no inbound port.

[!WARNING] The bridge daemon and its scripts run with the local account's permissions. They can access local files, credentials, processes, and outbound network connections available to that account. Treat every queued task as execution on the user's real machine.

When to Use

Use this skill only when all of the following are true:

• the user explicitly requested work on their own machine;
• the bridge was already installed and independently verified by the owner;
• the exact local path, action, permission scope, and expected output are known;
• the action cannot be completed safely in the current sandbox;
• a fixed approved script can perform the task, or the user explicitly approves the stronger run_claude.sh boundary described below.

Examples include an explicitly requested disk-health check, repository status, or a bounded edit in one named worktree. Do not activate this skill from a generic request to write code, reason about a problem, or edit files already available in the current environment.

Do Not Bootstrap from Mutable Upstream Instructions

This skill does not endorse the upstream one-line installer. The reviewed upstream snapshot is:

commit: 97f515d425df587c281effb02cda9ad0fd470790
install.sh sha256: 887f5fa18b49602a119e01d58c80b7ca63832fb339aa513aa72f5a1faadc14f8
LICENSE sha256: 43b7d2c43544fb06c3ebb6529073f3536e5e2ef5a41198e0c59e0a50c088b534

The installer at that commit still resolves mutable inputs: a PyPI range, GitHub main fallbacks, a bridge_client.py fetch from main, optional Homebrew/Python installation, and optional Claude CLI installation. Pinning only the outer install.sh therefore does not pin the installed system.

For a new installation, stop and ask the owner to perform an independent installer and dependency audit or wait for an upstream immutable installation path. Do not download and execute the installer, pipe remote content to a shell, or silently patch and run it from this skill.

To inspect the reviewed snapshot without installing it:

git init cowork-to-code-bridge-review
cd cowork-to-code-bridge-review
git remote add origin https://github.com/abhinaykrupa/cowork-to-code-bridge.git
git fetch --depth=1 origin 97f515d425df587c281effb02cda9ad0fd470790
git checkout --detach FETCH_HEAD
test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "97f515d425df587c281effb02cda9ad0fd470790"
shasum -a 256 install.sh LICENSE

Inspection is read-only evidence, not authorization to install.

Required Machine-Side Preconditions

Before queueing any task, require the owner to confirm all of these:

1. BRIDGE_ROOT is an absolute path owned by the local account and is not group- or world-writable.
2. The token file and queue/result directories are owner-only; no symlink or shared-directory indirection is present.
3. cowork-to-code-bridge-selfcheck succeeds on the machine.
4. The daemon runs in a dedicated environment with unrelated API keys and cloud credentials removed. Never assume ambient credentials are safe.
5. BRIDGE_ALLOW_UNAUTH is not enabled.
6. BRIDGE_CLAUDE_AUTOINSTALL=0 is set so a queued task cannot install another tool as a side effect.
7. BRIDGE_PERMISSION_CEILING is set to an exact valid value such as readonly or edit, and startup logs confirm that ceiling. An invalid value is not a safe ceiling.
8. CLAUDE_FLAGS is unset, or the owner has independently verified that every configured flag is at least as restrictive as the requested scope. Upstream allows this variable to override caller-supplied permission flags, so the request's permission_scope alone is not evidence of confinement. When the variable is unset, confirm the generated scope mapping in task logs. When it is set, inspect the service environment and configuration directly; logs only show that the caller scope was overridden, not the effective flags.
9. A per-task budget ceiling and bounded output retention are configured.

If any precondition is unknown, stop instead of probing or repairing the machine automatically.

Core API

from cowork_to_code_bridge import (
    call_remote,
    cancel_task,
    poll_task_result,
    queue_task,
)

Function	Behavior
call_remote	Run one short, fixed approved script and wait.
queue_task	Queue bounded work and return a task_id.
poll_task_result	Read the current result without repeating the task.
cancel_task	Cancel queued work or signal an in-flight process group.

Use queue_task for anything that may exceed roughly 30 seconds. Always use a stable, operation-specific idempotency_key for state-chan