hunting-broken-object-level-authorization

name	hunting-broken-object-level-authorization
description	Hunt broken object-level authorization (BOLA, also called IDOR): endpoints that accept a client-supplied object reference - a numeric id, UUID, key, slug, filename, or an id nested in a request body or token - and read or mutate that object without checking the authenticated caller is entitled to it. Covers direct references, enumerable and guessable ids, references buried in nested or batch payloads, second-order ids stored then trusted later, and ownership checks that run on one path but not its siblings. Use when reviewing any API or handler that fetches or changes a record by an id the client controls. The reference is the source, the data access is the sink, and the missing owner binding is the bug.
license	MIT

Hunting broken object-level authorization: follow the id to the access

The most common serious API bug is also the simplest: a handler takes an object reference from the client, fetches or mutates that object, and never checks that the caller is allowed to touch this object. Authentication passes, the route filter passes, the query runs, and user A reads user B's record by changing one id. The bug is not in the routes that are protected; it is in every access that trusts a client-supplied reference without binding it to the caller. You find it by following the reference from the request to the data access and asking, at the access, what proves this is the caller's object.

When to use

• You are reviewing an API or handler that fetches or changes a record by an id, key, slug, filename, or reference the client supplies.
• References travel in the path, query, body, a nested field, a batch item, or a token.
• Access control depends on the object belonging to the caller, not just on the caller being logged in.

Scope check

Test object access only in systems you own or are authorized to test, with test accounts across at least two users and, where relevant, two tenants. If you can't name the authorization, stop.

The loop

1. Enumerate every client-supplied object reference. Inventory each endpoint that accepts an object identifier and where it arrives: path segment, query parameter, body field, an id nested inside a JSON object or array, a batch of ids, a value carried in a token or cookie, or a filename. Each reference that selects an object is a source. Do not stop at the obvious path id; references hide in nested and batch payloads.

2. Follow each reference to the data access. Trace the reference from where it enters to where it selects the object: the query filter, the key lookup, the file open, the mutation. That access is the sink. The question the whole audit turns on is asked here, so find the exact access each reference reaches.

3. Ask what binds the object to the caller. At the access, is there a predicate that ties the object to the authenticated caller, scoping by owner, tenant, or an explicit membership check? A lookup keyed only by the client's id (find(id)) with no owner == caller constraint is unbound. Authentication proves who the caller is; it does not prove the object is theirs.

4. Check the siblings and the write side. An ownership check on GET /object/{id} means nothing if PUT, DELETE, the export path, the batch endpoint, or a newer sibling handler reaches the same object without it. Enumerate every access to the object type and confirm each one binds the caller; the unbound peer is the bug, and write and bulk paths are where it hides.

5. Test the reference substitution. Confirm by requesting another user's or tenant's object: swap the id for one you do not own, walk enumerable or guessable ids, embed a foreign id in a nested or batch field, or replay a second-order id captured earlier. A response that returns or mutates the other party's object is the proof. A predictable id (sequential, timestamped) raises severity but is not required; an unbound access with random ids is still the bug once you have a valid foreign reference.

6. Confirm and record. Confirm with the cross-user or cross-tenant access that succeeds, capturing request and response. Kill the lead if every access to the object binds it to the caller at the data layer, including writes, batches, and exports. Record with the exact endpoint, the reference field, and the foreign object reached.

Where object authorization leaks

• The reference is trusted, not the caller's right to it. The check that must exist is at the access, binding the object to the caller. Its absence is the whole bug.
• Ownership on read, nothing on write. Read paths get the check; PUT, DELETE, bulk, and export paths reach the same object unbound. Audit every verb.
• Nested and batch references escape the pass. A single path id is easy to see; an id three levels into a body, or one item in an array of a hundred, is where the unbound access lives.
• Second-order references defeat the front check. An id validated on the way in, stored, then used later on a different path is only as safe as that later access.
• Random ids are not access control. Unguessable references slow enumeration; they do not bind the object to the caller. One leaked or shared reference and the access fires.

Worked example (a confirm and a kill)

Confirm. GET /api/invoices/{id} scopes the query to the caller. The sibling POST /api/invoices/export takes {"ids": [...]} and streams each invoice with a lookup keyed only by id, no owner predicate. Logged in as user A, exporting user B's invoice ids returns B's invoices. Confirmed BOLA on the batch export path, high, remediation = filter every id in the batch by the caller's ownership at the query, and add a test that the export path rejects foreign ids.

Kill. Every access to the record type, across GET, PUT, DELETE, the batch endpoint, and the export, runs through one repository method whose query is scoped to the caller's tenant and owner id; nested and second-order references pass through the same method. Cross-user and cross-tenant substitution returns nothing on every path. Killed, kill_reason = "single owner-scoped access path used by every reference, including writes, batch, and second-order; no unbound peer."

Rationalizations to reject

• "The id is a random UUID, no one can guess it." → Unguessable is not unbound. The access still needs an owner check; one shared or leaked reference fires it.
• "The route requires authentication." → Authentication is who, not which. The bug is reaching another user's object as a valid user.
• "The read path checks ownership." → And the write, batch, and export paths? Audit every access to the object, not the one that is protected.
• "The id is validated on input." → Validated for shape, or for ownership? A well-formed foreign id passes shape validation and reaches the object.
• "It is an internal endpoint." → Internal to whom? If an authenticated user reaches it, the object binding still has to hold.

Executing this in practice

You need every endpoint that accepts an object reference and where the reference enters, a trace from each reference to the exact data access it reaches, and test accounts across users and tenants to substitute references. A dataflow view that carries a client-supplied reference to the query or mutation it selects, and shows which accesses apply an ownership predicate and which do not, turns this from endpoint-by-endpoint clicking into a coverage pass over every object access; the follow-the-reference method is the same by hand.

Related

• auditing-declarative-authorization - the coverage-and-correctness view of authz as config; this skill is the per-request object-reference dataflow underneath it.
• hunting-mass-assignment-and-property-authz - the sibling bug where the client controls which fields of an object it may write, not which object it may reach.
• auditing-guard-gaps - the unguarded-peer pattern, here the access that skips the owner check its siblings apply.
• hunting-business-logic-flaws - authorization of outcomes reached through a permitted path, above the object-access layer.
• FINDING-SCHEMA.md - source = the client-supplied reference, sink = the data access it reaches, evidence = the cross-user or cross-tenant response.