| name | advanced-prsstn-threats |
| description | Proactively hunts for Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) activity within enterprise environments using hypothesis-driven searches across endpoint telemetry, network logs, and memory artifacts. Use when conducting scheduled threat hunting cycles, investigating anomalous behavior flagged by UEBA, or validating that known APT TTPs are not present in the environment. Activates for requests involving MITRE ATT&CK, Velociraptor, osquery, Zeek, or threat hunting playbooks.
|
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | threat-intelligence |
| tags | ["MITRE-ATT&CK","threat-hunting","APT","Velociraptor","osquery","Zeek","TTP","NIST-CSF","EDR"] |
| version | 1.0.0 |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| d3fend_techniques | ["File Metadata Consistency Validation","Application Protocol Command Analysis","Identifier Analysis","Content Format Conversion","Message Analysis"] |
| nist_csf | ["ID.RA-01","ID.RA-05","DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02"] |
Hunting Advanced Persistent Threats
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- Conducting proactive threat hunting sprints (typically 2–4 week cycles) based on newly published APT intelligence
- A UEBA alert or anomaly detection system flags behavioral deviations warranting deeper investigation
- A peer organization or ISAC sharing partner reports active APT compromise and you need to validate your own exposure
Do not use this skill as a substitute for incident response when a confirmed breach is in progress — escalate to IR procedures (NIST SP 800-61).
Prerequisites
- EDR platform with telemetry retention (CrowdStrike Falcon, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, or SentinelOne) covering 30+ days
- Access to MITRE ATT&CK Navigator for hypothesis development
- Network flow data (NetFlow, Zeek, or Suricata logs) in a queryable SIEM
- Threat hunting platform or query interface (Velociraptor, osquery fleet, or Splunk ES)
Workflow
Step 1: Develop Hunt Hypothesis
Select a threat actor relevant to your sector using MITRE ATT&CK Groups (https://attack.mitre.org/groups/). Review the group's known TTPs mapped to ATT&CK techniques. Example hypothesis: "APT29 (Cozy Bear) uses spearphishing with ISO attachments (T1566.001) and living-off-the-land binaries (T1218) — test for unusual mshta.exe and rundll32.exe parent-child relationships."
Document hypothesis using the Threat Hunting Loop framework: hypothesis → data collection → pattern analysis → response.
Step 2: Identify Required Data Sources
Map each ATT&CK technique to required log sources using the ATT&CK Data Sources taxonomy:
- Process creation (T1059): Windows Security Event 4688 or Sysmon Event ID 1
- Network connections (T1071): Zeek conn.log, NetFlow, EDR network telemetry
- Registry modifications (T1547): Sysmon Event ID 13, Windows Security 4657
- Memory injection (T1055): EDR memory scan telemetry, Volatility output
Verify log coverage using ATT&CK Coverage Calculator or a custom data source matrix.
Step 3: Execute Hunts with Velociraptor or osquery
Velociraptor VQL hunt for unusual PowerShell execution:
SELECT Pid, Ppid, Name, CommandLine, CreateTime
FROM pslist()
WHERE Name =~ "powershell.exe"
AND CommandLine =~ "-enc|-nop|-w hidden"
osquery for persistence via scheduled tasks:
SELECT name, action, enabled, path
FROM scheduled_tasks
action
enabled ;
