Analyzes bootkit and advanced rootkit malware that infects the Master Boot Record (MBR), Volume Boot Record (VBR), or UEFI firmware to gain persistence below the operating system. Covers boot sector analysis, UEFI module inspection, and anti-rootkit detection techniques. Activates for requests involving bootkit analysis, MBR malware investigation, UEFI persistence analysis, or pre-OS malware detection.
Installer avec Codex ou Claude Copiez ce prompt, collez-le dans Codex, Claude ou un autre assistant, puis laissez-le vérifier la page du skill et l'installer pour vous.
Une commande directe contourne le prompt de vérification. Examinez la source avant de l'exécuter.
Analyzes bootkit and advanced rootkit malware that infects the Master Boot Record (MBR), Volume Boot Record (VBR), or UEFI firmware to gain persistence below the operating system. Covers boot sector analysis, UEFI module inspection, and anti-rootkit detection techniques. Activates for requests involving bootkit analysis, MBR malware investigation, UEFI persistence analysis, or pre-OS malware detection.
# Verify Windows Boot Manager signature
sigcheck -a C:\Windows\Boot\EFI\bootmgfw.efi
# Verify winload.efi
sigcheck -a C:\Windows\System32\winload.efi
# Verify ntoskrnl.exe
sigcheck -a C:\Windows\System32\ntoskrnl.exe
# Check Measured Boot logs (if TPM is available)# Windows: BCDEdit /enum firmware
bcdedit /enum firmware
# Verify Secure Boot state
Confirm-SecureBootUEFI # PowerShell cmdlet# Check boot configuration for tampering
bcdedit /v
# Look for boot configuration changes# testsigning: should be No# nointegritychecks: should be No# debug: should be No
bcdedit | findstr /i "testsigning nointegritychecks debug"
Step 6: Document Bootkit/Rootkit Analysis
Compile comprehensive analysis findings:
Analysis should document:
- Boot sector (MBR/VBR) integrity status with hex comparison
- UEFI firmware module inventory and integrity verification
- Secure Boot status and any bypass mechanisms detected
- Kernel-level hooks (SSDT, IDT, IRP, inline) identified
- Hidden processes, drivers, and files discovered
- Persistence mechanism (SPI flash, ESP, MBR, kernel driver)
- Boot chain integrity verification results
- Attribution to known bootkit families if possible
- Remediation steps (reflash firmware, rebuild MBR, replace hardware)
Key Concepts
Term
Definition
Bootkit
Malware that infects the boot process (MBR, VBR, UEFI) to execute before the operating system loads, gaining persistent low-level control
MBR (Master Boot Record)
First 512 bytes of a disk containing bootstrap code and partition table; MBR bootkits replace this code with malicious loaders
UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface)
Modern firmware interface replacing BIOS; UEFI bootkits implant malicious modules in firmware volumes or modify the ESP
Secure Boot
UEFI security feature verifying digital signatures of boot components; bootkits like BlackLotus exploit vulnerabilities to bypass it
SPI Flash
Flash memory chip storing UEFI firmware; advanced bootkits like LoJax and MoonBounce modify SPI flash for firmware-level persistence
DKOM (Direct Kernel Object Manipulation)
Rootkit technique modifying kernel structures to hide processes, files, and network connections without hooking functions
Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE)
Windows security feature requiring kernel drivers to be digitally signed; bootkits disable DSE during boot to load unsigned rootkit drivers
Tools & Systems
UEFITool: Open-source UEFI firmware image editor and parser for inspecting firmware volumes, drivers, and modules
chipsec: Intel hardware security assessment framework for verifying SPI flash protection, Secure Boot, and UEFI configuration
Volatility: Memory forensics framework with SSDT, IDT, callback, and driver analysis plugins for kernel rootkit detection
GMER: Windows rootkit detection tool scanning for SSDT hooks, IDT hooks, hidden processes, and modified kernel modules
Bootkits Analyzer: Specialized tool for analyzing MBR/VBR code including disassembly and comparison against known-good baselines
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Investigating Persistent Compromise Surviving OS Reinstallation
Context: An organization reimaged a compromised workstation, but the same C2 beaconing resumed within hours. Standard disk forensics finds no malware. UEFI bootkit is suspected.
Approach:
Boot from a Linux live USB to avoid executing any compromised OS components
Dump the SPI flash firmware using chipsec or flashrom for offline analysis
Dump the MBR and VBR sectors with dd for boot sector analysis
Copy the EFI System Partition for bootloader integrity verification
Open the SPI dump in UEFITool and compare module GUIDs against vendor-provided firmware
Look for additional or modified DXE drivers that should not be present
Analyze any suspicious modules with Ghidra (x86_64 UEFI module format)
Verify Secure Boot configuration and check for exploit-based bypasses
Pitfalls:
Analyzing the system while the compromised OS is running (rootkit may hide from live analysis)
