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加固代码以防漏洞。用于处理用户输入、认证、数据存储或外部集成时；用于构建任何接受不可信数据、管理用户会话或与第三方服务交互的功能时。
Installer avec Codex ou Claude Copiez ce prompt, collez-le dans Codex, Claude ou un autre assistant, puis laissez-le vérifier la page du skill et l'installer pour vous.
Basé sur la classification professionnelle SOC
指导稳定的 API 和接口设计。设计 API、模块边界或任何公共接口时使用。创建 REST 或 GraphQL endpoint、定义模块之间的类型契约，或建立前后端边界时使用。
在真实浏览器中测试。构建或调试任何在浏览器中运行的内容时使用。当你需要通过 Chrome DevTools MCP 检查 DOM、捕获 console 错误、分析网络请求、分析性能，或用真实运行时数据验证视觉输出时使用。
自动化 CI/CD pipeline 设置。用于设置或修改构建和部署 pipeline 时；用于需要自动化质量门禁、在 CI 中配置 test runners，或建立部署策略时。
执行多维度代码审查。用于合并任何变更之前；用于审查自己、其他 agent 或人类编写的代码；用于在代码进入主分支前从多个维度评估代码质量。
为清晰度简化代码。用于在不改变行为的前提下重构代码以提升清晰度；用于代码能运行但比应有状态更难阅读、维护或扩展时；用于审查已累积不必要复杂度的代码时。
优化 agent 上下文设置。当开始新会话、agent 输出质量下降、在任务之间切换，或需要为项目配置规则文件和上下文时使用。
| name | security-and-hardening |
| description | 加固代码以防漏洞。用于处理用户输入、认证、数据存储或外部集成时；用于构建任何接受不可信数据、管理用户会话或与第三方服务交互的功能时。 |
面向 Web 应用的安全优先开发实践。把每个外部输入都视为敌意输入，把每个 secret 都视为不可泄露，把每次授权检查都视为必需。安全不是一个阶段，而是触及用户数据、认证或外部系统的每一行代码都必须满足的约束。
npm audit（或等价工具）eval() 或 innerHTML// BAD: SQL injection via string concatenation
const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '${userId}'`;
// GOOD: Parameterized query
const user = await db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1', [userId]);
// GOOD: ORM with parameterized input
const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } });
// Password hashing
import { hash, compare } from 'bcrypt';
const SALT_ROUNDS = 12;
const hashedPassword = await hash(plaintext, SALT_ROUNDS);
const isValid = await compare(plaintext, hashedPassword);
// Session management
app.use(session({
secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET, // From environment, not code
resave: false,
saveUninitialized: false,
cookie: {
httpOnly: true, // Not accessible via JavaScript
secure: true, // HTTPS only
sameSite: 'lax', // CSRF protection
maxAge: 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000, // 24 hours
},
}));
// BAD: Rendering user input as HTML
element.innerHTML = userInput;
// GOOD: Use framework auto-escaping (React does this by default)
return <div>{userInput}</div>;
// If you MUST render HTML, sanitize first
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(userInput);
// Always check authorization, not just authentication
app.patch('/api/tasks/:id', authenticate, async (req, res) => {
const task = await taskService.findById(req.params.id);
// Check that the authenticated user owns this resource
if (task.ownerId !== req.user.id) {
return res.status(403).json({
error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Not authorized to modify this task' }
});
}
// Proceed with update
const updated = await taskService.update(req.params.id, req.body);
return res.json(updated);
});
// Security headers (use helmet for Express)
import helmet from 'helmet';
app.use(helmet());
// Content Security Policy
app.use(helmet.contentSecurityPolicy({
directives: {
defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
scriptSrc: ["'self'"],
styleSrc: ["'self'", "'unsafe-inline'"], // Tighten if possible
imgSrc: ["'self'", 'data:', 'https:'],
connectSrc: ["'self'"],
},
}));
// CORS — restrict to known origins
app.use(cors({
origin: process.env.ALLOWED_ORIGINS?.split(',') || 'http://localhost:3000',
credentials: true,
}));
// Never return sensitive fields in API responses
function sanitizeUser(user: UserRecord): PublicUser {
const { passwordHash, resetToken, ...publicFields } = user;
return publicFields;
}
// Use environment variables for secrets
const API_KEY = process.env.STRIPE_API_KEY;
if (!API_KEY) throw new Error('STRIPE_API_KEY not configured');
import { z } from 'zod';
const CreateTaskSchema = z.object({
title: z.string().min(1).max(200).trim(),
description: z.string().max(2000).optional(),
priority: z.enum(['low', 'medium', 'high']).default('medium'),
dueDate: z.string().datetime().optional(),
});
// Validate at the route handler
app.post('/api/tasks', async (req, res) => {
const result = CreateTaskSchema.safeParse(req.body);
if (!result.success) {
return res.status(422).json({
error: {
code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR',
message: 'Invalid input',
details: result.error.flatten(),
},
});
}
// result.data is now typed and validated
const task = await taskService.create(result.data);
return res.status(201).json(task);
});
// Restrict file types and sizes
const ALLOWED_TYPES = ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'image/webp'];
const MAX_SIZE = 5 * 1024 * 1024; // 5MB
function validateUpload(file: UploadedFile) {
if (!ALLOWED_TYPES.includes(file.mimetype)) {
throw new ValidationError('File type not allowed');
}
if (file.size > MAX_SIZE) {
throw new ValidationError('File too large (max 5MB)');
}
// Don't trust the file extension — check magic bytes if critical
}
不是所有 audit 发现都需要立即处理。使用这个决策树：
npm audit reports a vulnerability
├── Severity: critical or high
│ ├── Is the vulnerable code reachable in your app?
│ │ ├── YES --> Fix immediately (update, patch, or replace the dependency)
│ │ └── NO (dev-only dep, unused code path) --> Fix soon, but not a blocker
│ └── Is a fix available?
│ ├── YES --> Update to the patched version
│ └── NO --> Check for workarounds, consider replacing the dependency, or add to allowlist with a review date
├── Severity: moderate
│ ├── Reachable in production? --> Fix in the next release cycle
│ └── Dev-only? --> Fix when convenient, track in backlog
└── Severity: low
└── Track and fix during regular dependency updates
关键问题：
当你延期修复时，记录原因并设置 review date。
import rateLimit from 'express-rate-limit';
// General API rate limit
app.use('/api/', rateLimit({
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, // 15 minutes
max: 100, // 100 requests per window
standardHeaders: true,
legacyHeaders: false,
}));
// Stricter limit for auth endpoints
app.use('/api/auth/', rateLimit({
windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000,
max: 10, // 10 attempts per 15 minutes
}));
.env files:
├── .env.example → Committed (template with placeholder values)
├── .env → NOT committed (contains real secrets)
└── .env.local → NOT committed (local overrides)
.gitignore must include:
.env
.env.local
.env.*.local
*.pem
*.key
提交前始终检查：
# Check for accidentally staged secrets
git diff --cached | grep -i "password\|secret\|api_key\|token"
### Authentication
- [ ] Passwords hashed with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2 (salt rounds ≥ 12)
- [ ] Session tokens are httpOnly, secure, sameSite
- [ ] Login has rate limiting
- [ ] Password reset tokens expire
### Authorization
- [ ] Every endpoint checks user permissions
- [ ] Users can only access their own resources
- [ ] Admin actions require admin role verification
### Input
- [ ] All user input validated at the boundary
- [ ] SQL queries are parameterized
- [ ] HTML output is encoded/escaped
### Data
- [ ] No secrets in code or version control
- [ ] Sensitive fields excluded from API responses
- [ ] PII encrypted at rest (if applicable)
### Infrastructure
- [ ] Security headers configured (CSP, HSTS, etc.)
- [ ] CORS restricted to known origins
- [ ] Dependencies audited for vulnerabilities
- [ ] Error messages don't expose internals
详细安全检查清单和 pre-commit 验证步骤见 references/security-checklist.md。
| 合理化借口 | 现实 |
|---|---|
| “这是内部工具，安全不重要” | 内部工具也会被攻破。攻击者会瞄准最薄弱环节。 |
| “以后再加安全” | 事后补安全比一开始就内建安全难 10 倍。现在就加。 |
| “没人会尝试利用这个” | 自动扫描器会发现它。Security by obscurity 不是安全。 |
| “框架会处理安全” | 框架提供工具，不提供保证。你仍然需要正确使用它们。 |
| “这只是原型” | 原型会变成生产系统。从第一天就养成安全习惯。 |
*）origins实现安全相关代码后：
npm audit 没有 critical 或 high 漏洞